



                                     L.

LABEL. A narrow slip of paper or parchment, affixed to a deed or writing 
hanging at or out of the same. This name is also given to an appending seal. 

LABOR. Continued operation; work. 
     2. The labor and skill of one man is frequently used in a partnership, 
and valued as equal to the capital of another. 
     3. When business has been done for another, and suit is brought to 
recover a just reward, there is generally contained in the declaration, a 
count for work and labor. 
     4. Where penitentiaries exist, persons who have committed crimes are 
condemned to be imprisoned therein at labor. 

LACHES. This word, derived from the French lecher, is nearly synonymous with 
negligence. 
     2. In general, when a party has been guilty of laches in enforcing his 
right by great delay and lapse of time, this circumstance will at common law 
prejudice, and sometimes operate in bar of a remedy which it is 
discretionary and not compulsory in the court to afford. In courts of 
equity, also delay will generally prejudice. 1 Chit. Pr. 786, and the cases 
there cited; 8 Com. Dig. 684; 6 Johns. Ch. R. 360. 
     3. But laches may be excused from, ignorance of the party's rights; 2 
Mer. R. 362; 2 Ball & Beat. 104; from the obscurity of the transaction; 2 
Sch. & Lef. 487; by the pendancy of a suit; 1 Sch. & Lef. 413; and where the 
party labors under a legal disability, as insanity, coverture, infancy, and 
the like. And no laches can be imputed to the public. 4 Mass. Rep. 522; 3 
Serg. & Rawle, 291; 4 Hen. & Munf. 57; 1 Penna. R. 476. Vide 1 Supp. to 
Ves. Jr. 436; 2 Id. 170; Dane's Ab. Index, h.t.; 4 Bouv. Inst. n. 3911. 

LADY'S FRIEND. The name of a functioner in the British house of commons. 
When the husband sues for a divorce, or asks the passage of an act to 
divorce him from his wife, he is required to make a provision for her before 
the passage of the act; it is the duty of the lady's friend to see that such 
a provision is made. Macq. on H. & W. 213. 

LAGA. The law; Magna Carta; hence Saxon-lage, Mercen-lage, Dane-lage, &c. 

LAGAN. Goods tied to a buoy and cast into the sea are so called. The same as 
Ligan. (q.v.) 

LAIRESITE. The name of a fine imposed upon those who committed adultery or 
fornication. Tech. Dict. h.t. 

LAITY. Those persons who do not make a part of the clergy. In the United 
States the division of the people into clergy and laity is not authorized by 
law, but is, merely conventional. 

LAMB. A ram, sheep or ewe, under the age of one year. 4 Car. & P. 216; S. C. 
19 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 351. 

LAND. This term comprehends any found, soil or earth whatsoever, as meadows, 
pastures, woods, waters, marshes, furze and heath. It has an indefinite 
extent upwards as well as downwards; therefore land, legally includes all 
houses and other buildings standing or built on it; and whatever is in a 
direct line between the surface and the centre of the earth, such as mines 
of metals and fossils. 1 Inst. 4 a; Wood's Inst. 120; 2 B1. Com. 18; 1 
Cruise on Real Prop. 58. In a more confined sense, the word land is said to 
denote "frank tenement at the least." Shep. To. 92. In this sense, then, 
leaseholds cannot be said to be included under the word lands. 8 Madd. Rep. 
635. The technical sense of the word land is farther explained by Sheppard, 
in his Touch. p. 88, thus: "if one be seised of some lands in fee, and 
possessed of other lands for years, all in one parish, and he grant all his 
lands in that parish (without naming them) in fee simple or for life; by 
this grant shall pass no, more but the lands he hath in fee simple." It is 
also said that land in its legal acceptation means arable land. 11 Co. 55 a. 
See also Cro. Car. 293; 2 P. Wms. 458, n.; 5 Ves. 476; 20 Vin. Ab. 203. 
     2. Land, as above observed, includes in general all the buildings 
erected upon it; 9 Day, R. 374; but to this general rule there are some 
exceptions. It is true, that if a stranger voluntarily erect buildings on 
another's land, they will belong to the owner of the land, and will become a 
part of it; 16 Mass. R. 449; yet cases are, not wanting where it has been 
decided that such an erection, under peculiar circumstances, would be 
considered as personal property. 4 Mass. R. 514; 8 Pick. R. 283, 402; 5 
Pick, R. 487; 6 N. H. Rep. 555; 2 Fairf. R. 371; 1 Dana, R. 591; 1 Burr. 
144. 

LAND MARK. A monument set up in order to ascertain the boundaries between 
two contiguous estates. For removing a land mark an action lies. 1 Tho. Co. 
Litt. 787. Vide Monuments. 

LAND TENANT. He who actually possesses the land. He is technically called 
the terre-tenant. (q.v.) 

LANDLORD. He who rents or leases real estate to another.
     2. He is bound to perform certain duties and is entitled to certain 
rights, which will here be briefly considered. 1st. His obligations are, 1. 
To perform all the express covenants into which he has entered in making the 
lease. 2. To secure to the tenant the quiet enjoyment of the premises 
leased; but a tenant for years has no remedy against his landlord, if he be 
ousted by one who has no title, in that case the law leaves him to his 
remedy against the wrong doer. Y. B. 22 H. VI. 52 b, and 32 H. VI. 32 b; 
Cro. Eliz. 214; 2 Leon. 104; and see Bac. Ab. Covenant, B. But the implied 
covenant for quiet enjoyment may be qualified, and enlarged or narrowed 
according to the particular agreement of the parties; and a general covenant 
for quiet enjoyment does not extend to wrongful evictions or disturbances by 
a stranger. Y. B. 26 H. VIII. 3 b. 3. The landlord is bound by his express 
covenant to repair the premises, but unless he bind himself by express 
covenant the tenant cannot compel him to repair. 1 Saund. 320; 1 Vent. 26, 
44; 1 Sedgw. on Dam. 429; 2 Keb. 505; 1 T. R. 812; 1 Sim. R. 146. 
     3. His rights are, 1. To receive the rent agreed upon, and to enforce 
all the express covenants into which the tenant may have entered. 2. To 
require the lessee to treat the premises demised in such manner that no 
injury be done to the inheritance, and prevent waste. 3. To have the 
possession of the premises after the expiration of the lease. Vide, 
generally, Com. L. & T., B. 3, c. 1; Woodf. L. & T. ch. 10; 2 Bl. Com. by 
Chitty, 275, note; Bouv. Inst. Index, h.t.; 1 Supp. to Ves. Jr. 212, 246, 
249; 2 Id. 232, 403; Com. Dig. Estate by Grant, G 1; 5 Com. Dig. tit. Nisi 
Prius Dig. page 553; 8 Com. Dig. 694; Whart. Dig. Landlord & Tenant. As to 
frauds between landlord and tenant, see Hov. Pr. c. 6, p. 199 to 225. 

LANGUAGE. The faculty which men possess of communicating their perceptions 
and ideas to one another by means of articulate sounds. This is the 
definition of spoken language; but ideas and perceptions may be communicated 
without sound by writing, and this is called written language. By 
conventional usage certain sounds have a definite meaning in one country or 
in certain countries, and this is called the language of such country or 
countries, as the Greek, the Latin, the French or the English language. The 
law, too, has a peculiar language. Vide Eunom. Dial. 2; Technical. 
     2. On the subjugation of England by William the Conqueror, the French 
Norman language was substituted in all law proceedings for the ancient 
Saxon. This, according to Blackstone, vol. iii. p. 317, was the language of 
the records, writs and pleadings, until the time of Edward III. Mr. Stephen 
thinks Blackstone has fallen into an error, and says the record was, from 
the earliest period to which that document can be traced, in the Latin 
language. Plead. Appx. note 14. By the statute 36 Ed. III. st. 1, c. 15, it 
was enacted that for the future all pleas should be pleaded, shown, 
defended, answered, debated and judged in the English tongue; but be entered 
and enrolled in Latin. The Norman or law French, however, being more 
familiar as applied to the law, than any other language, the lawyers 
continued to employ it in making their notes of the trial of cases, which 
they afterwards published, in that barbarous dialect, under the name of 
Reports. After the enactment of this statute, on the introduction of paper 
pleadings, they followed in the language, as well as in other respects, the 
style of the records, which were drawn up in Latin. This technical language 
continued in use till the time of Cromwell, when by a statute the records 
were directed to be in English; but this act was repealed at the 
restoration, by Charles II., the lawyers finding it difficult to express 
themselves as well and as concisely in the vernacular as in the Latin 
tongue; and the language of the law continued as before till about the year 
1730, when the statute of 4 Geo. II. c. 26, was passed. It provided that 
both the pleadings and the records should thenceforward be framed in 
English. The ancient terms and expressions which had been so long known in 
French and Latin were now literally translated into English. The translation 
of such terms and phrases were found to be exceedingly ridiculous. Such 
terms as nisi prius, habeas corpus, fieri facias, mandamus, and the like, 
are not capable of an English dress with any degree of seriousness. They are 
equally absurd in the manner they are employed in Latin, but use and the 
fact that they are in a foreign language has made the absurdity less 
apparent. 
     3. By statute of 6 Geo. II., c. 14, passed two years after the last 
mentioned statute, the use of technical words was allowed to continue in the 
usual language, which defeated almost every beneficial purpose of the former 
statute. In changing from one language to another, many words and technical 
expressions were retained in the new, which belonged to the more ancient 
language, and not seldom they partook of both; this, to the unlearned 
student, has given an air of confusion, and disfigured the language of the 
law. It has rendered essential also the study of the Latin and French 
languages. This perhaps is not to be regretted, as they are the keys which 
open to the ardent student vast stores of knowledge. In the United States, 
the records, pleadings, and all law proceedings are in the English language, 
except certain technical terms which retain their ancient French and Latin 
dress. 
     4. Agreements, contracts, wills and other instruments, may be made in 
any language, and will be enforced. Bac. Ab. Wills, D 1. And a slander 
spoken in a foreign language, if understood by those present, or a libel 
published in such language, will be punished as if spoken or written in the 
English language. Bac. Ab. Slander, D 3; 1 Roll. Ab. 74; 6 T. R. 163. For 
the construction of language, see articles Construction; Interpretation; and 
Jacob's Intr. to the Com. Law Max. 46. 
     5. Among diplomatists, the French language is the one commonly used. At 
an early period the Latin was the diplomatic language in use in Europe. 
Towards the end of the fifteenth century that of Spain gained the 
ascendancy, in consequence of the great influence which that country then 
exercised in Europe. The French, since the age of Louis XIV. has become the 
almost universal diplomatic idiom of the civilized world, though some states 
use their national language in treaties and diplomatic correspondence. It is 
usual in these cases to annex to the papers transmitted, a translation in 
the language of the opposite party; wherever it is understood this comity 
will be reciprocated. This is the usage of the Germanic confederation, of 
Spain, and of the Italian courts. When nations using a common language, as 
the United States and Great Britain, treat with each other, such language is 
used in their diplomatic intercourse. 
     Vide, generally, 3 Bl. Com. 323; 1 Chit., Cr. Law, *415; 2 Rey, 
Institutions Judiciaires de l'Angleterre, 211, 212. 

LANGUIDUS, practice. The name of a return made by the sheriff, when a 
defendant whom he has taken by virtue of process is so dangerously sick that 
to remove him would endanger his life or health. In that case the officer 
may and ought unquestionably to abstain from removing him, and may permit 
him to remain even in his own house, in the custody of a follower, though 
not named in the warrant, he keeping the key of the house in his possession 
the officer ought to remove him as soon is sufficiently recovered. If there 
be a doubt as to the state of health of the defendant, the officer should 
require the attendance and advice of some respectable medical man, and 
require him, at the peril of the consequences of misrepresentation, to 
certify in writing whether it be fit to remove the party, or take him to 
prison within the county. 3 Chit. Pr. 358. For a form of the return of 
languidus, see 3 Chit. P. 249; T. Chit. Forms, 53. 

LAPSE, eccl. law. The transfer, by forfeiture, of a right or power to 
present or collate to a vacant benefice, from, a person vested with such 
right, to another, in consequence of some act of negligence of the former. 
Ayl. Parerg. 331. 

LAPSED LEGACY. One which is extinguished. The extinguishment may take place 
for various reasons. See Legacy, Lapsed. 
     2. A distinction has been made between a lapsed devise of real estate 
and a lapsed legacy of personal estate. The real estate which is lapsed does 
not fall into the residue, unless so provided by the will, but descends to 
the heir at law; on the contrary, personal property passes by the residuary 
clause where it is not otherwise disposed of. 2 Bouv. Inst. 2154-6. 

LARCENY, crim. law. The wrongful and fraudulent taking and carrying away, by 
one person, of the mere personal goods, of another, from any place, with a 
felonious intent to convert them to his, the taker's use, and make them his 
property, without the consent of the owner. 4 Wash. C. C. R. 700. 
     2. To constitute larceny, several ingredients are necessary. 1. The 
intent of the party must be felonious; he must intend to appropriate the 
property of another to his own use; if, therefore, the accused have taken 
the goods under a claim of right, however unfounded, he has not committed a 
larceny. 
     3.-2. There must be a taking from the possession, actual or implied, 
of the owner; hence if a man should find goods, and appropriate them to his 
own use, he is not a thief on this account. Mart. and Yerg. 226; 14 John. 
294; Breese, 227. 
     4.-3. There must be a taking against the will of the owner, and this 
may be in some cases, where he appears to consent; for example, if a man 
suspects another of an intent to steal his property, and in order to try him 
leaves it in his way, and he takes it, he is guilty of larceny. The taking 
must be in the county where the criminal is to be tried. 9 C. & P. 29; S. C. 
38 E. C. L. R. 23; Ry. & Mod. 349. But when the taking has been in the 
county or state, and the thief is caught with the stolen property in another 
county than that where the theft was committed, he may be tried in the 
county where arrested with the goods, as by construction of law, there is a 
fresh taking in every county in which the thief carries the stolen property. 
     5.-4. There must be an actual carrying away, but the slightest 
removal, if the goods are completely in the power of the thief, is 
sufficient to snatch a diamond from a lady's ear, which is instantly dropped 
among the curls of her hair, is a sufficient asportation or carrying away. 
     6.-5. The property taken must be personal property; a man cannot 
commit larceny of real estate, or of what is so considered in law. A 
familiar example will illustrate this; an apple, while hanging on the tree 
where it grew, is real estate, having never been separated from the 
freehold; it is not larceny, therefore, at common law, to pluck an apple 
from the tree, and appropriate it to one's own use, but a mere trespass; if 
that same apple, however, had been separated from the tree by the owner or 
otherwise, even by accident, as if shaken by the wind, and while lying on 
the ground it should be taken with a felonious intent, the taker would 
commit a larceny, because then it was personal property. In some states 
there are statutory provisions to punish the felonious taking of emblements 
or fruits of plants, while the same are hanging by the roots, and there the 
felony is complete, although the thing stolen is not, at common law, 
strictly personal property. Animals ferae naturae, while in the enjoyment of 
their natural liberty, are not the subjects of larceny; as, doves; 9 Pick. 
15; Bee. 3 Binn. 546. See Bee; 5 N. H. Rep. 203. At common law, choses in 
action are not subjects of larceny. 1 Port. 33. 
     7. Larceny is divided in some states, into grand and petit larceny this 
depends upon the value of the property stolen. Vide 1 Hawk, 141 to 250, ch. 
19; 4 Bl. Com. 229 to 250; Com. Dig. Justices, O 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; 2 East's P. 
C. 524 to 791; Burn's Justice, Larceny; Williams' Justice, Felony; 3 
Chitty's Cr. Law, 917 to 992; and articles Carrying Away; Invito Domino; 
Robbery; Taking; Breach, 6. 

LARGE. Broad; extensive; unconfined. The opposite of strict, narrow, or 
confined. At large, at liberty. 

LAS PARTIDAS. The name of a code of Spanish law; sometimes called las siete 
partidas, or the seven parts, from the number of its principal divisions. It 
is a compilation from the civil law, the customary law of Spain, and the 
canon law. Such of its provisions is are applicable are in force in 
Louisiana, Florida, and Texas. 

LASCIVIOUS CARRIAGE, law of Connecticut. An offence, ill defined, created by 
statute, which enacts that every person who shall be guilty of lascivious 
carriage and behaviour, and shall be thereof duly convicted, shall be 
punished by fine, not exceeding ten dollars, or by imprisonment in a common 
gaol, not exceeding two months, or by fine and imprisonment, or both, at the 
discretion of the court. This law was passed at a very early period. Though 
indefinite in its terms, it has received a construction so limiting it, that 
it may be said to punish those wanton acts between persons of different 
sexes, who are not married to each other, that flow from the exercise of 
lustful passions, and which are not otherwise punished as crimes against 
chastity and public decency. 2 Swift's Dig. 343; 2 Swift's Syst. 331. 
     2. Lascivious carriage may consist not only in mutual acts of wanton 
and indecent familiarity between persons of different sexes, but in wanton 
and indecent actions against the will, and without the consent of one of 
them, as if a man should forcibly attempt to pull up the clothes of a woman. 
5 Day, 81. 

LAST RESORT. A court of last resort, is one which decides, definitely, 
without appeal or writ of error, or any other examination whatever, a suit 
or action, or some other matter, which has been submitted to its judgment, 
and over which it has jurisdiction. 
     2. The supreme court is a court of last resort in all matters which 
legally come before it; and whenever a court possesses the power to decide 
without appeal or other examination whatever, a subject matter submitted to 
it, it is a court of last resort; but this is not to be understood as 
preventing an examination into its jurisdiction, or excess of authority, for 
then the judgment of a superior does not try and decide so much whether the 
point decided has been so done according to law, as to try the authority of 
the inferior court. 

LAST SICKNESS. That of which a person died.
     2. The expenses of this sickness are generally entitled to a 
preference, in payment of debts of an insolvent estate. Civ. Code of Lo. 
art. 3166; Purd. Ab. 393. 
     3. To prevent impositions, the statute of frauds requires that 
nuncupative wills shall be made during the testator's last sickness. Rob. on 
Frauds, 556; 20 John. R. 502. 

LATENT, construction. That which is concealed; or which does not appear; for 
example, if a testator bequeaths to his cousin Peter his white horse; and at 
the time of making his will and at his death he had two cousins named Peter, 
and he owned two white horses, the ambiguity in this case would be latent, 
both as respects the legatee, and the thing bequeathed. Vide Bac. Max. Reg. 
23, and article Ambiguity. A latent ambiguity can only be made to appear by 
parol evidence, and may be explained by the same kind of proof. 5 Co. 69. 

LATITAT, Eng. law. He lies hid. The name of a writ calling a defendant to 
answer to a personal action in the king's bench; it derives its name from a 
supposition that the defendant lurks and lies hid, and cannot be found in 
the county of Middlesex, (in which the said court is holden,) to be taken 
there, but is gone into some other county, and therefore requiring the 
sheriff to apprehend him in such other county. Fitz. N. B. 78. 

LAUNCHES. Small vessels employed to carry the cargo of a large one to and 
from the shore; lighters. (q.v.) 
     2. The goods on board of a launch are at the risk of the insurers till 
landed. 5 N. S. 887. The duties and rights of the master of a launch are the 
same as those of the master of a lighter. 

LAW. In its most general and comprehensive sense, law signifies a rule of 
action; and this term is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of action; 
whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational. 1 Bl. Com. 38. In its 
more confined sense, law denotes the rule, not of actions in general, but of 
human action or conduct. In the civil code of Louisiana, art. 1, it is 
defined to be "a solemn expression of the legislative will." Vide Toull. Dr. 
Civ. Fr. tit. prel. s. 1, n. 4; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 1-3. 
     2. Law is generally divided into four principle classes, namely; 
Natural law, the law of nations, public law, and private or civil law. When 
considered in relation to its origin, it is statute law or common law. When 
examined as to its different systems it is divided into civil law, common 
law, canon law. When applied to objects, it is civil, criminal, or penal. It 
is also divided into natural law and positive law. Into written law, lex 
scripta; and unwritten law, lex non scripta. Into law merchant, martial law, 
municipal law, and foreign law. When considered as to their duration, laws 
are immutable and arbitrary or positive; when as their effect, they are 
prospective and retrospective. These will be separately considered. 

LAW, ARBITRARY. An arbitrary law is one made by the legislator simply 
because he wills it, and is not founded in the nature of things; such law, 
for example, as the tariff law, which may be high or low. This term is used 
in opposition to immutable. 

LAW, CANON. The canon law is a body of Roman ecclesiastical law, relative to 
such matters as that church either has or pretends to have the proper 
jurisdiction over: 
     2. This is compiled from the opinions of the ancient Latin fathers, the 
decrees of general councils, and the decretal epistles and bulls of the holy 
see. All which lay in the same confusion and disorder as the Roman civil 
law, till about the year 1151, when one Gratian, an Italian monk, animated 
by the discovery of Justinian's Pandects, reduced the ecclesiastical 
constitutions also into some method, in three books, which he entitled 
Concordia discordantium canonum, but which are generally known by the name 
of Decretum Gratiani. These reached as low as the time of Pope Alexander 
III. The subsequent papal decrees to the pontificate of Gregory IX., were 
published in much the same method, under the auspices of that pope, about 
the year 1230, in five books, entitled Decretalia Gregorii noni. A sixth book

was added by Boniface VIII., about the year 1298, which is called Sextus 
decretalium. The Clementine constitution or decrees of Clement V., were in 
like manner authenticated in 1317, by his successor, John XXII., who also 
published twenty constitutions of his own, called the Extravagantes Joannis, 
all of which in some manner answer to the novels of the civil law. To these 
have since been added some decrees of the later popes, in five books called 
Extravagantes communes. And all these together, Gratian's Decrees, Gregory's 
Decretals, the Sixth Decretals, the Clementine Constitutions, and the 
Extravagants of John and his successors, form the Corpus juris canonici, or 
body of the Roman canon law. 1 Bl. Com. 82; Encyclopedie, Droit Canonique, 
Droit Public Ecclesiastique; Dict. de Jurispr. Droit Canonique; Ersk. Pr. L. 
Scotl. B. 1, t. 1, s. 10. See, in general, Ayl. Par. Jur. Can. Ang.; Shelf. 
on M. & D. 19; Preface to Burn's Eccl. Law, by Thyrwhitt, 22; Hale's Hist. 
C. L. 26-29; Bell's Case of a Putative Marriage, 203; Dict. du Droit 
Canonique; Stair's Inst. b. 1, t. 1, 7.   

LAW, CIVIL. The term civil law is generally applied by way of eminence to 
the civil or municipal law of the Roman empire, without distinction as to 
the time when the principles of such law were established or modified. In 
another sense, the civil law is that collection of laws comprised in the 
institutes, the code, and the digest of the emperor Justinian, and the novel 
constitutions of himself and some of his successors. Ersk. Pr. L. Scotl. B. 
1, t. l, s. 9; 6 L. R. 494. 
     2. The Institutes contain the elements or first principles of the Roman 
law, in four books. The Digests or Pandects are in fifty books, and contain 
the opinions and writings of eminent lawyers digested in a systematical 
method, whose works comprised more than two thousand volumes, The new code, 
or collection of imperial constitutions, in twelve books; which was a 
substitute for the code of Theodosius. The novels or new constitutions, 
posterior in time to the other books, and amounting to a supplement to the 
code, containing new decrees of successive emperors as new questions 
happened to arise. These form the body of the Roman law, or corpus juris 
civilis, as published about the time of Justinian. 
     3. Although successful in the west, these laws were not, even in the 
lifetime of the emperor universally received; and after the Lombard invasion 
they became so totally neglected, that both the Code and Pandects were lost 
till the twelfth century, A. D. 1130; when it is said the Pandects were 
accidentally discovered at Amalphi, and the Code at Ravenna. But, as if 
fortune would make an atonement for her former severity, they have since 
been the study of the wisest men, and revered as law, by the politest 
nations. 
     4. By the term civil law is also understood the particular law of each 
people, opposed to natural law, or the law of nations, which are common to 
all. Just. Inst. l. 1, t. 1, Sec. 1, 2; Ersk. Pr. L. Scot. B. 1, t. 1, s. 4. 
In this sense it, is used by Judge Swift. See below. 
     5. Civil law is also sometimes understood as that which has emanated 
from the secular power opposed to the ecclesiastical or military. 
     6. Sometimes by the term civil law is meant those laws which relate to 
civil matters only; and in this sense it is opposed to criminal law, or to 
those laws which concern criminal matters. Vide Civil. 
     7. Judge Swift, in his System of the Laws of Connecticut, prefers the 
term civil law, to that of municipal law. He considers the term municipal to 
be too limited in its signification. He defines civil law to be a rule of 
human action, adopted by mankind in a state of society, or prescribed by the 
supreme power of the government, requiring a course of conduct not repugnant 
to morality or religion, productive of the greatest political happiness, and 
prohibiting actions contrary thereto, and which is enforced by the sanctions 
of pains and penalties. 1 Sw. Syst. 37. See Ayl. Pand. B. 1, t. 2, p. 6. 
     See, in general, as to civil law, Cooper's Justinian the Pandects; 1 
Bl. Com. 80, 81; Encyclopedie, art. Droit Civil, Droit Romain; Domat, Les 
Loix Civiles; Ferriere's Dict.; Brown's Civ. Law; Halifax's Analys. Civ. 
Law; Wood's Civ. Law; Ayliffe's Pandects; Hein. Elem. Juris.; Erskine's 
Institutes; Pothier; Eunomus, Dial. 1; Corpus Juris Civilis; Taylor's Elem. 
Civ. Law. 

LAW, COMMON. The common law is that which derives its force and authority 
from the universal consent and immemorial practice of the people. It has 
never received the sanction of the legislature, by an express act, which is 
the criterion by which it is distinguished from the statute law. It has 
never been reduced to writing; by this expression, however, it is not meant 
that all those laws are at present merely oral, or communicated from former 
ages to the present solely by word of mouth, but that the evidence of our 
common law is contained in our books of Reports, and depends on the general 
practice and judicial adjudications of our courts. 
     2. The common law is derived from two sources, the common law of 
England, and the practice and decision of our own courts. In some states the 
English common law has been adopted by statute. There is no general rule to 
ascertain what part of the English common law is valid and binding. To run 
the line of distinction, is a subject of embarrassment to courts, and the 
want of it a great perplexity to the student. Kirb. Rep. Pref. It may, 
however, be observed generally, that it is binding where it has not been 
superseded by the constitution of the United States, or of the several 
states, or by their legislative enactments, or varied by custom, and where 
it is founded in reason and consonant to the genius and manners of the 
people. 
     3. The phrase "common law" occurs in the seventh article of the 
amendments of the constitution of the United States. "In suits at common 
law, where the value in controversy shall not exceed twenty dollar says that 
article, "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. The "common law" 
here mentioned is the common law of England, and not of any particular 
state. 1 Gall. 20; 1 Bald. 558; 3 Wheat. 223; 3 Pet. R. 446; 1 Bald. R. 
554. The term is used in contradistinction to equity, admiralty, and 
maritime law. 3 Pet. 446; 1 Bald. 554. 
     4. The common law of England is not in all respects to be taken as that 
of the United States, or of the several states; its general principles are 
adopted only so far as they are applicable to our situation. 2 Pet, 144; 8 
Pet. 659; 9 Cranch, 333; 9 S. & R. 330; 1 Blackf 66, 82, 206; Kirby, 117; 5 
Har. & John. 356; 2 Aik. 187; Charlt. 172; 1 Ham. 243. See 5 Cow. 628; 5 
Pet. 241; 1 Dall. 67; 1 Mass. 61; 9 Pick. 532; 3 Greenl. 162; 6 Greenl. 55; 
3 Gill & John. 62; Sampson's Discourse before the Historical Society of New 
York; 1 Gallis. R. 489; 3 Conn. R. 114; 2 Dall. 2, 297, 384; 7 Cranch, R. 
32; 1 Wheat. R. 415; 3 Wheat. 223; 1 Blackf. R. 205; 8 Pet. R. 658; 5 Cowen, 
R. 628; 2 Stew. R. 362. 

LAW, CRIMINAL. By criminal law is understood that system of laws which 
provides for the mode of trial of persons charged with criminal offences, 
defines crimes, and provides for their punishments. 

LAW, FOREIGN. By foreign laws are understood the laws of a foreign country. 
The states of the American Union are for some purposes foreign to each 
other, and the laws of each are foreign in the others. See Foreign laws. 

LAW, INTERNATIONAL. The law of nature applied to the affairs of nations, 
commonly called the law of nations, jus gentium; is also called by some 
modern authors international law. Toullier, Droit Francais,  tit. rel. Sec. 
12. Mann. Comm. 1; Bentham. on Morals, &c., 260, 262; Wheat. on Int. Law; 
Foelix, Du Droit Intern. Prive, n. 1. 

LAW, MARTIAL. Martial law is a code established for the government of the 
army and navy of the United States. 
     2. Its principal rules are to be found in the articles of war. (q.v.) 
The object of this code, or body of regulations is to, maintain that order 
and discipline, the fundamental principles of which are a due obedience of 
the several ranks to their proper officers, a subordination of each rank to 
their superiors, and the subjection of the whole to certain rules of 
discipline, essential to their acting with the union and energy of an 
organized body. The violations of this law are to be tried by a court 
martial. (q.v.) 
     3. A military commander has not the power, by declaring a district to 
be under martial law, to subject all the citizens to that code, and to 
suspend the operation of the writ of habeas corpus. 3 Mart. (Lo.) 531. Vide 
Hale's Hist. C. L. 38; 1 Bl. Com. 413; Tytler on Military Law; Ho. on C. M.; 
M'Arth. on C. M.; Rules and Articles of War, art. 64, et seq; 2 Story, L. U. 
S. 1000. 

LAW, MERCHANT. A system of customs acknowledged and taken notice of by all 
commercial nations; and those customs constitute a part of the general law 
of the land; and being a part of that law their existence cannot be proved 
by witnesses, but the judges are bound to take notice of them ex officio. 
See Beawes' Lex Mercatoria Rediviva; Caines' Lex Mercatoria Americana; Com. 
Dig. Merchant, D; Chit. Comm. Law; Pardess. Droit Commercial; Collection des 
Lois Maritimes anterieure au dix hutiŠme siŠcle, par Dupin; Capmany, 
Costumbres Maritimas; II Consolato del Mare; Us et Coutumes de la Mer; 
Piantandia, Della Giurisprudenze Maritina Commerciale, Antica e Moderna; 
Valin, Commentaire sur l'Ordonnance de la Marine, du Mois d'Aout, 1681; 
Boulay-Paty, Dr. Comm.; Boucher, Institutions au Droit Maritime. 

LAW, MUNICIPAL. Municipal law is defined by Mr. Justice Blackstone to be "a 
rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding 
what is right and prohibiting what is wrong." This definition has been 
criticised, and has been perhaps, justly considered imperfect. The latter 
part has been thought superabundant to the first; see Mr. Christian's note; 
and the first too general and indefinite, and too limited in its 
signification to convey a just idea of the subject. See Law, civil. Mr. 
Chitty defines municipal law to be "a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by 
the supreme power in a state, commanding what shall be done or what shall 
not be done." 1 Bl. Com. 44, note 6, Chitty's edit. 
     2. Municipal law, among the Romans, was a law made to govern a 
particular city or province; this term is derived from the Latin municipium, 
which among them signified a city which was governed by its own laws, and 
which had its own magistrates. 

LAW OF NATIONS. The science which teaches the rights subsisting between 
nations or states, and the obligations correspondent to those rights. 
Vattel's Law of Nat. Prelim. Sec. 3. Some complaints, perhaps not unfounded, 
have been made as to the want of exactness in the definition of this term. 
Mann. Comm. 1. The phrase "international law" has been proposed, in its 
stead. 1 Benth. on Morals and Legislation, 260, 262. It is a system of rules 
deducible by natural reason from the immutable principles of natural 
justice, and established by universal consent among the civilized 
inhabitants of the world; Inst. lib. 1, t. 2, Sec. 1; Dig. lib. 1, t. 1, l. 
9; in order to decide all disputes, and to insure the observance of good 
faith and justice in that intercourse which must frequently occur between 
them and the individuals belonging to each or it depends upon mutual 
compacts, treaties, leagues and agreements between the separate, free, and 
independent communities. 
     2. International law is generally divided into two branches; 1. The 
natural law of nations, consisting of the rules of justice applicable to the 
conduct of states. 2. The positive law of nations, which consist of, 1. The 
voluntary law of nations, derived from the presumed consent of nations, 
arising out of their general usage. 2. The conventional law of nations, 
derived from the express consent of nations, as evidenced in treaties and 
other international compacts. 3. The customary law of nations, derived from 
the express consent of nations, as evidenced in treaties and other 
international compacts between themselves. Vattel, Law of Nat. Prel. 
     3. The various sources and evidence of the law of nations, are the 
following: 1. The rules of conduct, deducible by reason from the nature of 
society existing among independent states, which ought to be observed among 
nations. 2. The adjudication of international tribunals, such as prize 
courts and boards of arbitration. 3. Text writers of authority. 4. 
Ordinances or laws of particular states, prescribing rules for the conduct 
of their commissioned cruisers and prize tribunal's. 5. The history of the 
wars, negotiations, treaties of peace, and other matters relating to the 
public intercourse of nations. 6. Treaties of peace, alliance and commerce, 
declaring, modifying, or defining the pre-existing international law. Wheat. 
Intern. Law, pt. 1, c. 1, Sec. 14. 
     4. The law of nations has been divided by writers into necessary and 
voluntary; or into absolute and arbitrary; by others into primary and 
secondary, which latter has been divided into customary and conventional. 
Another division, which is the one more usually employed, is that of the 
natural and positive law of nation's. The natural law of nations consists of 
those rules, which, being universal, apply to all men and to all nations, 
and which may be deduced by the assistance of revelation or reason, as being 
of utility to nations, and inseparable from their existence. The positive 
law of nations consists of rules and obligations, which owe their origin, 
not to the divine or natural law, but to human compacts or agreements, 
either express or implied; that is, they are dependent on custom or 
convention. 
     5. Among the Romans, there were two sorts of laws of nations, namely, 
the primitive, called primarium, and the other known by the name of 
secundarium. The primarium, that is to say, primitive or more ancient, is 
properly the only law of nations which human reason suggests to men; as the 
worship of God, the respect and submission which children have for their 
parents, the attachment which citizens have for their country, the good 
faith which ought to be the soul of every agreement, and the like. The law 
of nations called secundarium, are certain usages which have been 
established among men, from time to time, as they have been felt to be 
necessary. Ayl. Pand. B. 1, t. 2, p. 6. 
     As to the law of, nations generally, see Vattel's Law of Nations; 
Wheat. on Intern. Law; Marten's Law of Nations; Chitty's Law of Nations; 
Puffend. Law of Nature and of Nations, book 3; Burlamaqui's Natural Law, 
part 2, c. 6; Principles of Penal Law, ch. 13; Mann. Comm. on the Law of 
Nations; Leibnitz, Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus; Binkershoek, 
Quaestionis Juris Publici, a translation of the first book of which, made by 
Mr. Duponceau, is published in the third volume of Hall's Law Journal; 
Kuber, Droit des Gens Modeme de l'Europe; Dumont, Corps Diplomatique; Mably, 
Droit Public de l'Europe; Kent's Comm. Lecture 1. 

LAW OF NATURE. The law of nature is that which God, the sovereign of the 
universe, has prescribed to all men, not by any formal promulgation, but by 
the internal dictate of reason alone. It is discovered by a just 
consideration of the agreeableness or disagreeableness of human actions to 
the nature of man; and it comprehends all the duties which we owe either to 
the Supreme Being, to ourselves, or to our neighbors; as reverence to God, 
self-defence, temperance, honor to our parents, benevolence to all, a strict 
adherence to our engagements, gratitude, and the like. Erskine's Pr. of L. of

Scot. B. 1, t. 1, s. 1. See Ayl. Pand. tit. 2, p. 5; Cicer. de Leg. lib. 1. 
     2. The primitive laws of nature may be reduced to six, namely: 1. 
Comparative sagacity, or reason. 2. Self-love. 3. The attraction of the 
sexes to each other. 4. The tenderness of parents towards their children. 5. 
The religious sentiment. 6. Sociability. 
     3.-1. When man is properly organized, he is able to discover moral 
good from moral evil; and the study of man proves that man is not only an 
intelligent, but a free being, and he is therefore responsible for his 
actions. The judgment we form of our good actions, produces happiness; on 
the contrary the judgment we form of our bad actions produces unhappiness. 
     4.-2. Every animated being is impelled by nature to his own 
preservation, to defend his life and body from injuries, to shun what may be 
hurtful, and to provide all things requisite to his existence. Hence the 
duty to watch over his own preservation. Suicide and duelling are therefore 
contrary to this law; and a man cannot mutilate himself, nor renounce his 
liberty. 
     5.-3. The attraction of the sexes has been provided for the 
preservation of the human race, and this law condemns celibacy. The end of 
marriage proves that polygamy, (q.v.) and polyendry, (q.v.) are contrary 
to the law of nature. Hence it follows that the husband and wife have a 
mutual and exclusive right over each other. 
     6.-4. Man from his birth is wholly unable to provide for the least of 
his necessities; but the love of his parents supplies for this weakness. 
This is one of the most powerful laws of nature. The principal duties it 
imposes on the parents, are to bestow on the child all the care its weakness 
requires, to provide for its necessary food and clothing, to instruct it, to 
provide for its wants, and to use coercive means for its good, when 
requisite. 
     7.-5. The religious sentiment which leads us naturally towards the 
Supreme Being, is one of the attributes which belong to humanity alone; and 
its importance gives it the rank of the moral law of nature. From this 
sentiment arise all the sects and different forms of worship among men. 
     8.-6. The need which man feels to live in society, is one of the 
primitive laws of nature, whence flow our duties and rights; and the 
existence of society depends upon the condition that the rights of all shall 
be respected. On this law are based the assistance, succors and good offices 
which men owe to each other, they being unable to provide each every thing 
for himself. 

LAW, PENAL. One which inflicts a penalty for a violation of its enactment. 

LAW, POSITIVE. Positive law, as used in opposition to natural law, may be 
considered in a threefold point of view. 1. The universal voluntary law, or 
those rules which are presumed to be law, by the uniform practice of nations 
in general, and by the manifest utility of the rules themselves. 2. The 
customary law, or that which, from motives of convenience, has, by tacit, 
but implied agreement, prevailed, not generally indeed among all nations, 
nor with so permanent a utility as to become a portion of the universal 
voluntary law, but enough to have acquired a prescriptive obligation among 
certain states so situated as to be mutually benefited by it. 1 Taunt. 241. 
3. The conventional law, or that which is agreed between particular states 
by express treaty, a law binding on the parties among whom such treaties are 
in force. 1 Chit. Comm. Law, 28. 

LAW, PRIVATE. An act of the legislature which relates to some private 
matters, which do not concern the public at large. 

LAW, PROSPECTIVE. One which provides for, and regulates the future acts of 
men, and does not interfere in any way with what has past. 

LAW, PUBLIC. A public law is one in which all persons have an interest. 

LAW, RETROSPECTIVE. A retrospective law is one that is to take effect, in 
point of time, before it was passed. 
     2. Whenever a law of this kind impairs the obligation of contracts, it 
is void. 3 Dall. 391. But laws which only vary the remedies, divest no 
right, but merely cure a defect in proceedings otherwise fair, are valid. 10 
Serg. & Rawle, 102, 3; 15 Serg. & Rawle, 72. See Ex post facto. 

LAW, STATUTE. The written will of the legislature, solemnly expressed 
according to the forms prescribed by the constitution; an act of the 
legislature. See Statute. 

LAW, UNWRITTEN, or lex non scripta. All the laws which do not come under the 
definition of written law; it is composed, principally, of the law of 
nature, the law of nations, the common law, and customs. 

LAW, WRITTEN, or lex scripta. This consists of the constitution of the 
United States the constitutions of the several states the acts of the 
different legislatures, as the acts of congress, and of the legislatures of 
the several states, and of treaties. See Statute. 

LAWFUL. That which is not forbidden by law. Id omne licitum est, quod non 
est legibus prohibitum, quamobrem, quod, lege permittente, fit, poenam non 
meretur. To be valid a contract must be lawful. 

LAWLESS. Without law; without lawful control.

LAWS EX POST FACTO. Those which are made to punish actions committed before 
the existence of such laws, and which had not been declared crimes by 
preceding laws. Declar. of Rights, Mass. part 1, s. 24 Declar. of Rights, 
Maryl. art. 15. By the constitution of the United States and those of the 
several states, the legislatures are forbidden to pass ex post facto laws. 
Const. U. S. art. 1, s. 10, subd. 1. 
     2. There is a distinction between ex post facto laws and retrospective 
laws; every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective, but every 
retrospective law is not an ex post facto law; the former only are 
prohibited. 
     3. Laws under the following circumstances are to be considered ex post 
facto laws, within the words and intents of the prohibition 1st. Every law 
that makes an act done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent 
when done, criminal, and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates 
a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed. 3d. Every law that 
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law 
annexed to the crime when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal 
rules of evidence and receives less, or different testimony, than the law 
required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict 
the offender. 3 Dall. 390. 
     4. The policy, the reason and humanity of the prohibition against 
passing ex post facto laws, do not extend to civil cases, to cases that 
merely affect the private property of citizens. Some of the most necessary 
acts of legislation are, on the contrary, founded upon the principles that 
private rights must yield to public exigencies. 3 Dall. 400; 8 Wheat. 89; 
see 1 Cranch, 109; 1 Gall. Rep. 105; 9 Cranch, 374; 2 Pet. S. C. R. 627; Id. 
380; Id. 523. 

LAWS OF THE TWELVE TABLES. Laws of ancient Rome composed in part from those 
of Solon, and other Greek legislators, and in part from the unwritten laws 
or customs of the Romans. These laws first appeared in the year of Rome 303, 
inscribed on ten plates of brass. The following year two others were added, 
and the entire code bore the name of the Laws of the Twelve Tables. The 
principles they contained became the source of all the Roman law, and serve 
to this day as the foundation of the jurisprudence of the greatest part of 
Europe. 
     See a fragment of the Law of the twelve Tables in Coop. Justinian, 656; 
Gibbon's Rome, c. 44. 

LAWS OF THE HANSE TOWNS. A code of maritime laws known as the laws of the 
Hanse towns, or the ordinances of the Hanseatic towns, was first published 
in German, at Lubec, in 1597. In an assembly of deputies from the several 
towns held at Lubec, these laws were afterwards, May 23, 1614, revised and 
enlarged. The text of this digest, and a Latin translation, are published 
with a commentary by Kuricke; and a French translation has been given by 
Cleirac. 

LAWS OF OLERON, maritime law. A code of sea laws of deserved celebrity. It 
was originally promulgated by Eleanor, duchess of Guienne, the mother of 
Richard the First of England. Returning from the Holy Land, and familiar 
with the maritime regulations of the Archipelago, she enacted these laws at 
Oleron in Guienne, and they derive their title from the place of their 
publication. The language in which they were originally written is the 
Gascon, and their first object appears to have been the commercial 
operations of that part of France only. Richard I., of England, who 
inherited the dukedom of Guienne from his mother, improved this code, and 
introduced it into England. Some additions were made to it by King John; it 
was promulgated anew in the 50th year of Henry III., and received its 
ultimate confirmation in the 12th year of Edward III. Brown's Civ. and Adm. 
Law, vol. ii. p. 40. 
     2. These laws are inserted in the beginning of the book entitled "Us et 
Coutumes de la Mer," with a very excellent commentary on each section by 
Clairac, the learned editor. A translation is to be found in the Appendix to 
1 Pet. Adm. Dec.; Marsh. Ins. B. 1, c. 1, p. 16. See Laws of Wisbuy: Laws of 
the Hanse Towns; Code 

LAWS OF WISBUY, maritime law. A code of sea laws established by "the 
merchants and masters of the magnificent city of Wisbuy." This city was the 
ancient capital of Gothland, an island in the Baltic sea, anciently much 
celebrated for its commerce and wealth, now an obscure and inconsiderable 
place. Malyne, in his collection of sea laws, p. 44, says that the laws of 
Oleron were translated into Dutch by the people of Wisbuy for the use of the 
Dutch coast. By Dutch probably means German, and it cannot be denied that 
many of the provisions contained in the Laws of Wisbuy, are precisely the 
same as those which are found in the Laws of Oleron. The northern writers 
pretend however that they are more ancient than the Laws of Oleron, or than 
even the Consolato del Mare. Clairac treats this notion with contempt, and 
declares that at the time of the promulgation of the laws of Oleron, in 
1266, which was many years after they were compiled, the magnificent city of 
Wisbuy had not yet acquired the denomination of a town. Be this as it may, 
these laws were for some ages, and indeed still remain, in great authority 
in the northern part of Europe. "Lex Rhodia navalis," says Grotius, "pro 
jure gentium, in illo mare Mediteraneo vigebat; sicut apud Gallium leges 
Oleronis, et apud omnes transrhenanos, leges Wisbuenses." Grotius de Jure 
bel. lib. 2, c. 3. 
     A translation of these laws is to be found in 1 Pet. Adm. Dec. 
Appendix. See Code; Laws of Oleron. 

LAWS, RHODIAN, maritime. law. A code of laws adopted by the people of 
Rhodes, who had, by their commerce and naval victories, obtained the 
sovereignty of the sea, about nine hundred. years before the Christian era. 
There is reason to suppose this code has not been transmitted to posterity, 
at least not in a perfect state. A collection of marine constitutions, under 
the denomination of Rhodian Laws, may be seen in Vinnius, but they bear 
evident marks of a spurious origin. See Marsh. Ins. B. 1, c. 4, p. 15; this 
Dict. Code; Laws of Oleron; Laws of Wisbuy; Laws of the Hanse Towns. 

LAWYER. A counselor; one learned in the law. Vide attorney.

LAY, English law. That which relates to persons or things not 
ecclesiastical. In the United States the people are not, by law, divided, as 
in England, into ecclesiastical and lay. The law makes no distinction 
between them. 

TO LAY, pleading. To state or to allege. The place from whence a jury are to 
be summoned, is called the venue, and the allegation in the declaration, of 
the place where the jury is to be summoned, is in technical language, said 
to lay the venue. 3 Steph. Com. 574; 3 Bouv. Inst. n. 2826. 

TO LAY DAMAGES. The statement at the conclusion of the declaration the 
amount of damages which the plaintiff claims. 

LAY CORPORATION. One which affects or relates to other than ecclesiastical 
persons. 

LAY DAYS, mar. law. The time allowed to the master of a vessel for loading 
and unloading the same. In the absence of any custom to the contrary, 
Sundays are to be computed in the calculation of lay days at the port of 
discharge. 10 Mees. & Wels. 331. See 3 Esp. 121. They differ from demurrage. 
(q.v.) 

LAY PEOPLE. By this expression was formerly understood jurymen. Finch's Law, 
B. 4, p. 381 Eunom. Dial. 2, Sec. 51, p. 151. 

LAYMAN, eccl. law. One who is not an ecclesiastic nor a clergyman. 

LAZARET or LAZARETTO. A place selected by public authority, where vessels 
coming from infected or unhealthy countries are required to perform 
quarantine. Vide Health. 

LAESAE MAJESTATIS CRIMEN. The crime of high treason. Glanv. lib. 1, c. 2; 
Clef des Lois Rom. h.t.; Inst. 4, 18, 3 Dig. 48, 4; Code, 9, 8. 

LE ROI S'AVISERA. The king will consider of it. This phrase is used by the 
English monarch when he gives his dissent to an act passed by the lords and 
commons. The same formula was used by the late king of the French, for the 
same purpose. Toull. n. 52. Vide Veto. 

LE ROI LE VEUT. The king assents. This is the formula used in England, and 
formerly in France, when the king approved of a bill passed by the 
legislature. 1 Toull. n. 52. 

LE ROI VEUT EN DELIBERER. The king will deliberate on it. This is the 
formula which the late French king used, when he intended to veto an act of 
the legislative assembly. 1 Toull. n. 42. 

TO LEAD TO USES. In England, when deeds are executed prior to fines and 
recoveries, they are called deeds to lead to uses; when subsequent, deeds to 
declare the uses. 

LEADING. That which is to be followed; as, a leading case; leading question 
leading counsel. 

LEADING CASE. A case decided by a court in the last resort, which settles a 
particular point or question; the principles upon which it is decided are to 
be followed in future cases, which are similar to it. Collections of such 
cases have been made, with commentaries upon them by White, by Wallace and 
Hare, and others. 

LEADING COUNSEL, English, law. When there are two or more counsel employed 
on the same side in a cause, he who has the principal management of the 
cause, is called the leading counsel, as distinguished from the other, who 
is called the junior counsel. 

LEADING QUESTION, evidence, Practice. A question which puts into the 
witness' mouth the words to be echoed back, or plainly suggests the answer 
which the party wishes to get from him. 7 Serg. & Rawle, 171; 4 Wend. Rep. 
247. In that case the examiner is said to lead him to the answer. It is not 
always easy to determine what is or is not a leading question. 
     2. These questions cannot, in general, be put to a witness in his 
examination in chief. 6 Binn. R. 483, 3 Binn. R. 130; 1 Phill. Ev. 221; 1 
Stark. Ev. 123. But in an examination in chief, questions may be put to lead 
the mind of the witness to the subject of inquiry; and they are allowed when 
it appears the witness wishes to conceal the truth, or to favor the opposite 
party, or where, from the nature of the case, the mind of the witness cannot 
be directed to the subject of inquiry, without a particular specification of 
such subject. 1 Camp. R. 43; 1 Stark. C. 100. 
     3. In cross-examinations, the examiner has generally the right to put 
leading questions. 1 Stark. Ev. 132; 3 Chit. Pr. 892; Rosc. Civ. Ev. 94; 3 
Bouv. Inst. n. 3203-4. 

LEAGUE, measure. A league is a measure of length, which consists of three 
geographical miles. The jurisdiction of the United States extends into the 
sea a marine league. See Acts of Congress of June 5, 1794; 1 Story's L. U. 
S. 352; and April 20, 1818, 3 Story's L. U. S. 1694; 1 Wait's State Papers, 
195. Vide Cannon Shot. 

LEAGUE, crim. law, contracts. In criminal law, a league is a conspiracy to 
do an unlawful act. The term is but little used. 
     2. In contracts it is applied to agreements between states. Leagues 
between states are of several kinds. 1st. Leagues offensive and defensive, 
by which two or more nations agree not only to defend each other, but to 
carry on war against their common enemies. 2d. Defensive, but not offensive, 
obliging each to defend the other against any foreign invasion. 3d. Leagues 
of simple amity, by which one contracts not to invade, injure, or offend the 
other; this usually includes the liberty of mutual commerce and trade, and 
the safe guard of merchants and traders in each others dominion. Bac. Ab. 
Prerogative, D 4. Vide Confederacy; Conspiracy; Peace; Truce; War. 

LEAKAGE. The waste which has taken place in liquids, by their escaping out 
of the casks or vessels in which they were kept. By the act of March 2, 
1799, s. 59, 1 Story's L. U. S, 625, it is provided that there be an 
allowance of two per cent for leakage, on the quantity which shall appear by 
the gauge to be contained in any cask of liquors, subject to duty by the 
gallon and ten per cent on all beer, ale, and porter, in bottles and five 
per cent on all other liquors in bottles; to be deducted, from the invoice 
quantity, in lieu of breakage or it shall be lawful to compute the duties on 
the actual quantity, to be ascertained by tale, at the option of the 
importer, to be made at the time of entry. 

LEAL. Loyal; that which belongs to the law.

LEAP YEAR. Vide Bissextile.

LEASE, contracts. A lease is a contract for the possession and profits of 
lands and tenements on one side, and a recompense of rent or other income on 
the other; Bac. Ab. Lease, in pr.; or else it is a conveyance of lands and 
tenements to a person for life, or years, or at will, in consideration of a 
return of rent, or other recompense. Cruise's Dig. tit. Leases. The 
instrument in writing is also known by the name of lease; and this word 
sometimes signifies the term, or time for which it was to run; for example, 
the owner of land, containing a quarry, leases the quarry for ten years, and 
then conveys the land, "reserving the quarry until the end of the lease;" in 
this case the reservation remained in force tin the ten years expired, 
although the lease was cancelled by mutual consent within the ten. years. 8 
Pick. R. 3 3 9. 
     2. To make such contract, there must be a lessor able to grant the 
land; a lessee, capable of accepting the grant, and a subject-matter capable 
of being granted. See Lessor; Lessee. 
     3. This contract resembles several others, namely: a sale,, to 
constitute which there must be a thing sold, a price for which it is sold, 
and the consent of the parties as to both. So, in a lease there must be a 
thing leased, the price or rent, and the consent of the parties as to both. 
Again, a lease resembles the contract of hiring of a thing, locatio condudio 
rei, where there must be a thing to be hired, a price or compensation, 
called the hire, and the agreement and consent of the parties respecting 
both. Poth. Bail a rente, n. 2. 
     4. Before proceeding to the examination of the several parts of a 
lease, it will be proper here to say a few words, pointing out the 
difference between an agreement or covenant to make a lease, and the lease 
itself. When an agreement for a lease contains words of present demise, and 
there are circumstances from which it may be collected that it was meant 
that the tenant should have an immediate legal interest in the term, such an 
agreement will amount to an actual lease; but although words of present 
demise are used, if it appears on the whole, that no legal interest was 
intended to pass, and that the agreement was only preparatory to a future 
lease, to be made, the construction will be governed by the intention of the 
parties, and the contract will be held to amount to no more than an 
agreement for a lease. 2 T. R. 739. See Co. Litt. 45 b: Bac. Abr. Leases, K; 
15 Vin. Abr. 94, pl. 2; 1 Leon. 129; 1 Burr. 2209; Cro. Eliz. 156; Id. 173; 
12 East, 168; 2 Campb. 286; 10 John. R. 336; 15 East, 244; 3 Johns. R. 44, 
383; 4 Johns. R. 74, 424; 5 T. R. 163; 12 East, 274; Id. 170; 6 East, 530; 
13 East, 18; 16 Esp. R. 06; 3 Taunt. 65; 5 B. & A. 322. 
     5. Having made these few preliminary observations, it is proposed to 
consider, 1. By what words a lease may be made. 2. Its several parts. 3. The 
formalities the law requires. 
     6.-1 The words "demise, grant, and to farm let," are technical words 
well understood, and are the most proper that can be used in making a lease; 
but whatever words are sufficient to explain the intent of the parties, that 
the one shall divest himself of the possession and the other come into it, 
for such a determinate time, whether they run in the form of a license, 
covenant, or agreement, are of themselves sufficient, and will, in 
construction of law, amount to a lease for years as effectually as if the 
most proper and pertinent words had been made use of for that purpose. 4 
Burr. 2209; 1 Mod. 14; 11 Mod. 42; 2 Mod. 89; 3 Burr. 1446; Bac. Abr. 
Leases; 6 Watts, 362; 3 M'Cord, 211; 3 Fairf. 478; 5 Rand. 571; 1 Root, 318. 
     7.-2. A lease in writing by deed indented consists of the following 
parts, namely, 1. The premises. 2. The habendum. 3. The tenendum. 4. The 
reddendum. 5. The covenants. 6. The conditions. 7. The warranty. See Deed. 
     8.-3. As to the form, leases may be in writing or not in writing. See 
Parol Leases. Leases in writing are either by deed or without deed; a deed 
is a writing sealed and delivered by the parties, so that a lease under seal 
is a lease by deed. The respective parties, the lessor and lessee, whose 
deed the lease is, should seal, and now in every case, sign it also. The 
lease must be delivered either by the parties themselves or their attorneys, 
which delivery is expressed in the attestation "sealed and delivered in the 
presence of us." Almost any manifestation, however, of a party's intention 
to deliver, if accompanied by an act importing such intention, will 
constitute a delivery. 1 Ves. jr. 206. 
     9. A lease may be avoided, 1. Because it is not sufficiently formal; 
and, 2. Because of some matter which has arisen since its delivery. 
    10.-1. It may be avoided for want of either, 1st. Proper parties and a 
proper subject-matter. 2d. Writing or, printing on parchment or paper, in 
those cases where the statute of frauds requires they should be in writing. 
3d. Sufficient and legal words properly disposed. 4th. Reading, if desired, 
before the execution. 5th. Sealing, and in most cases, signing also; or, 
6th. Delivery. Without these essentials it is void from the beginning. 
    11.-2. It may be avoided by matter arising after its delivery; as, 
1st. By erasure, interlineation, or other alteration in any material part; 
an immaterial alteration made by a stranger does not vitiate it, but such 
alteration made by the party himself, renders it void. 2d. By breaking or 
effacing the seal, unless it be done by accident. 3d. By delivering it up to 
be cancelled. 4th. By the disagreement of such whose concurrence is 
necessary; as, the husband, where a married woman is concerned. 5th. By the 
judgment or decree of a court of judicature. 

LEASE AND RELEASE. A species of conveyance, invented by Serjeant Moore, soon 
after the enactment of the statute of uses. It is thus contrived; a lease, 
or rather bargain and sale, upon some pecuniary consideration, for one year, 
is made by the tenant of the freehold to the lessee or bargainee. This, 
without any enrollment, makes the bargainor stand seised to the use of the 
bargainee, and vests in the bargainee the use of the term for one year, and 
then the statute immediately annexes the possession. Being thus in 
possession, he is capable of receiving a release of the freehold and 
reversion, which must be made to the tenant in possession; and, accordingly, 
the next day a release is granted to him. 
     2. The lease and release, when used as a conveyance of the fee, have 
the joint operation of a single conveyance. 2 Bl. Com. 339; 4 Kent, Com. 
482; Co. Litt. 207; Cruise, Dig. tit. 32, c. 11. 

LEASEHOLD. The right to an estate held by lease.

LEAVE OF COURT. The grant by the court of something, which, without such 
grant it would have been unlawful to do. 
     2. Asking leave of court to do any act, is an implied admission of 
jurisdiction of the court, and, in those cases in which the objection to the 
jurisdiction must be taken, if at all, by plea to the jurisdiction, and it 
can be taken in no other way, the court by such asking leave becomes fully 
vested with the jurisdiction. Bac. Ab. Abatement, A; Bac. Ab. Pleas, &c., E 
2; Lawes, Pl. 91; 6 Pick. 391. But such admission cannot aid the 
jurisdiction except in such cases. 
     3. The statute of 4 Ann. c. 16, s. 4, provides that it shall be lawful 
for any defendant, or tenant, in any action or suit, or for any plaintiff in 
replevin, in any court of record, with leave of the court, to plead as many 
several matters thereto, as he shall think necessary for his defence. The 
principles of this statute have been adopted by most of the states of the 
Union. 
     4. When the defendant, in pursuance of this statute, pleads more than 
one plea in bar, to one and the same demand, or thing, all of the pleas, 
except the first, should purport to be pleaded with leave of the court. But 
the omission is not error nor cause of demurrer. Lawes, Pl. 132; 2 Chit. Pl. 
421; Story, Pl. 72, 76; Gould on Pl. c. 8, Sec. 21; Andr. 109; 3 N. H. Rep. 
523. 

LEDGER, commerce, accounts, evidence. A book in which are inscribed the 
names of all persons dealing with the person who keeps it, and in which 
there is a separate account, composed generally of one or more pages for 
each. There are two parallel columns, on one of which the party named is the 
debtor, and on the other the creditor, and presents a ready means of 
ascertaining the state of the account. As this book is a transcript from the 
day book or journal, it, is not evidence per se.  

LEDGER BOOK, eccl. law. The name of a book kept in the prerogative courts in 
England. It is considered as a roll of the court, but, it seems, it cannot 
be read in evidence. Bac. Ab. h.t. 

LEGACY. A bequest or gift of goods or chattels by testament. 2 Bl. Com. 512; 
Bac. Abr. Legacies, A. See Merlin, Repertoire, mot Legs, s. 1; Swinb. 17; 
Domat, liv. 4, t. 2, Sec. 1, n. 1. This word, though properly applicable to 
bequests of personal estate only, has nevertheless been extended to property 
not technically within its import, in order to effectuate the intention of 
the testator, so as to include real property and annuities. 5 T. R. 716; 1 
Burr. 268; 7 Ves. 522; Id. 391; 2 Cain. R. 345. Devise is the term more 
properly applied to gifts of real estate. Godolph. 271. 
     2. As the testator is presumed at the time of making his will to be 
inops concilii, his intention is to, be sought for, and any words which 
manifest the intention to give or create a legacy, are sufficient. Godolph. 
281, pt. 3, c. 22, s. 21; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 Y 4; Bac. Abr. Legacies, B 
1. 
     3. Legacies are of different kinds; they may be considered as general, 
specific, and residuary. 1. A legacy is general, when it is so given as not 
to amount to a bequest of a specific part of a testator's personal estate; 
as of a sum of money generally, or out of the testator's personal estate, or 
the like. 1 Rop. Leg. 256; Lown. Leg. 10. A general legacy is relative to 
the testator's death; it is a bequest of such a sum or such a thing at that 
time, or a direction to the executors, if such a thing be not in the 
testator's possession at that time, to procure it for the legatee. Cas. 
Temp. Talb. 227; Amb. 57; 4 Ves. jr. 675; 7 Ves. jr. 399. 
     4.-2. A specific legacy is a bequest of a particular thing, or money 
specified and distinguished from all other things of the same kind; as of a 
particular horse, a particular piece of plate, a particular term of years, 
and the like, which would vest immediately, with the assent of the executor. 
1 Rop. Leg. 149; Lownd. Leg. 10, 11; 1 Atk. 415. A specific legacy has 
relation to the time of making the will; it is a bequest of some particular 
thing in the testator's possession at that time, if such a thing should be 
in the testator's possession at the time of his death. If it should not be 
in the testator's possession, the legatee has no claim. There are legacies 
of quantity in the nature of specific legacies, as of so much money with 
reference to a particular fund for their payment. Touchs. 433; Amb. 310; 4 
Ves. 565; 3 Ves. & Bea. 5. 
     5. This kind of legacy is so far general, and differs so much in effect 
from a specific one, that if the funds be called in or fail, the legatees 
will not be deprived of their legacies, but be permitted to receive them out 
of the general assets; yet the legacies are go far specific, that they will 
not be liable to abate with general legacies upon a deficiency of assets. 2 
Ves. jr. 640; 5 Ves. jr. 206; 1 Mer. R. 178. 
     6.-3. A residuary legacy is a bequest of all the testator's personal 
estate, not otherwise effectually disposed of by his will. Lown. Leg, 10; 
Bac. Abr. Legacies, I. 
     7. As to the interest given, legacies may be considered, as absolute, 
for life, or in remainder. 1. A legacy is absolute, when it is given without 
condition, and is to vest immediately. See 2 Vern. 181; Ambl. 750; 19 Ves. 
86; Lownd. 151; 2 Vern. 430; 1 Vern. 254; 5 Ves. 461; Com. Dig. Appendix, 
Chancery IX. 
     8.-2. A legacy for life is sometimes given, with an executory 
limitation after the death of the tenant for life to another person; in this 
case, the tenant for life is entitled to the possession of the legacy, but 
when it is of specific article's, the first legatee must sign and deliver to 
the second, an inventory of the chattels expressing that they are in his 
custody for life only, and that afterwards they are to be delivered and 
remain to the use and benefit of the second legatee. 3 P. Wms. 336; 1 Atk. 
471; 2 Atk. 82; 1 Bro. C. C. 279; 2 Vern. 249.  See 1 Rop. Leg. 404, 5, 580. 
It seems that a bequest for life, if specific of things quo ipso usu 
consumuntur, is a gift of the property, and that there cannot be a 
limitation over, after a life interest in such articles. 3 Meriv. 194. 
     9.-8. In personal property there cannot be a remainder in the strict 
sense of the word, and therefore every future bequest of personal property, 
whether it be preceded or not by any particular bequest, or limited on a 
certain or uncertain event, is an executory bequest, and falls under the 
rules by which that mode of limitation is regulated. Fearne, Cont. R. 401, 
n. An executory bequest cannot be prevented or destroyed by any alteration 
whatsoever, in the estate, out of which, or after, which it is limited. Id. 
421; 8 Co. 96, a; 10 Co. 476. And this privilege of executory bequests, 
which exempts them from being barred or destroyed, is the foundation of an 
invariable rule, that the event on which an interest of this sort is 
permitted to take effect, is such as must happen within a life or lives in 
being, and twenty-one years, and the fraction of another year, allowing for 
the period of gestation afterwards. Fearne, Cont. R. 431. 
    10. As to the right acquired by the legatee, legacies may be considered 
as vested and contingent. 1. A vested legacy is one;, by which a certain 
interest, either present or future in possession, passes to the legatee. 2. 
A contingent legacy is one which is so given to a person, that it is 
uncertain whether any interest will ever vest in him. 
    11. A legacy may be lost by abatement, ademption, and lapse. I. 
Abatement, see Abatement of Legacies. 2. Ademption, see, Ademption. 3. When 
the legatee dies before the testator, or before the condition upon which the 
legacy is given be performed, or before the time at which it is directed to 
vest in interest have arrived, the legacy is lapsed or extinguished. See 
Bac. Abr. Legacies, E; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 Y. 13; 1 P. Wms. 83; Lownd. 
Leg. ch. 12, p. 408 to 415; 1 Rop. Leg. ch. 8, p. 319 to 341. 
    12. In Pennsylvania, by legislative enactment, no legacy in favor of a 
child or other lineal descendant of any testator, shall be deemed or held to 
lapse or become void, by reason of the decease of such devisee or legatee, 
in the lifetime of the testator, if such devisee or legatee shall leave 
issue surviving the testator, but such devise or legacy shall be good and 
available, in favor of such surviving issue, with like effect, as if such 
devisee or legatee had survived the testator. The testator may however, 
intentionally exclude such surviving issue, or any of them. Act of March 19, 
1810, 5 Smith's L. of Pa. 112. 
    13. As to the payment of legacies, it is proper to consider out of what 
fund they are to be paid; at what time; and to whom. 1. It is a general 
rule, that the personal estate is the primary fund for the payment of 
legacies. When the real estate is merely charged with those demands, the 
personal assets are to be applied in the first place towards their 
liquidation. 1 Serg. & Rawle, 453; 1 Rop. Leg. 463. 
    14.-2. When legacies are given generally to persons under no 
disability to receive them, the payments ought to be made at the end of a 
year next after the testator's decease. 5 Binn. 475. The executor is not 
obliged to pay them sooner although the testator may have directed them to 
be discharged within six months after his death, because the law allows the 
executor one year from the demise of the testator, to ascertain and settle 
his testator's affairs; and it presumes that at the expiration of that 
period, and not before, all debts due by the estate have been satisfied, and 
the executor to be then able, properly to apply the residue among the 
legatees according to their several rights and interests. 
    15. When a legacy is given generally, and is subject to a limitation 
over upon a subsequent event, the divesting contingency will not prevent the 
legatee from receiving his legacy at the end of the year after the 
testator's death, and he is under no obligation to give security for 
repayment of the money, in case the event shall happen. The principle seems 
to be, that as the testator has entrusted him without requiring security, no 
person has authority to require it. 1 Ves. Jr. 97; 18 Ves. 131; Lownd. on 
Legacies, 403. 
    16. As to the persons to whom payment to be made, see, where the legacy 
is given to an infant 1 Rop. Leg. 589 ;1 P. Wms. 285; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 300; 3 
Bro. C. C. 97, edit. by Belt; 2 Atk. 80; 2 Johns. C. R. 614; where the 
legacy is given to a married woman; 1 Rop. Leg. 595; Lownd. Leg 399; where 
the legacy is given to a lunatic, 1 Rop. Leg. 599; where it is given to a 
bankrupt; Id. 600; 2 Burr. 717.; where it is given to a person abroad, who 
has not been heard of for a long time. Id. 601 Finch, R. 419; 3 Bro. C. C. 
510; 5 Ves. 458; Lownd. Leg. 398. 
     See, generally, as to legacies; Roper on Legacies; Lowndes on Legacies; 
Bac. Abr. Legacy; Com. Dig. Administration, C 3, 5; Id. Chancery, 3 A; 3 G; 
8 Y 1; Id. Prohibition, G 17; Vin. Abr. Devise; Id. Executor; Swinb. 17 to 
44; 2 Salk. 414 to 416. 
    17. By the Civil Code of Louisiana, legacies are divided into universal 
legacies, legacies under an universal title, and particular legacies. 1. An 
universal legacy is a testamentary disposition, by which the testator gives 
to one or several persons the whole of the property which he leaves; at his 
decease. Civ. Code of Lo. art. 1599. 
    18.-2. The legacy under an universal title, is that by which a 
testator bequeaths a certain proportion of the effects of which the law 
permits him to dispose, as a half, a third, or all his immovables, or all 
his movables, or a fixed proportion of all his immovables, or of all his 
movables. Id. 1604. 
    19.-3. Every legacy not included in the definition given of universal 
legacies, and legacies under a universal title, is a legacy under a 
particular title. Id. 1618. Copied from Code Civ. art. 1003 and 1010. See 
Toullier, Droit Civil Francais, tome 5, p. 482, et seq. 

LEGACY, ACCUMULATIVE. An accumulative legacy is a second bequest given by 
the same testator to the same legatee, whether it be of the same kind of 
thing, as money, or whether it be of different things, as, one hundred 
dollars, in one legacy, and a thousand dollars in another, or whether the 
sums are equal or whether the legacies are of a different nature. 2 Rop. 
Leg. 19. 

LEGACY, ADDITIONAL. An additional legacy is one which is given by a codicil, 
besides one before given by the will; or it is an increase by a codicil of a 
legacy before given by the will. An additional legacy is generally subject 
to the same qualities and conditions as the original legacy. 6. Mod. 31; 2 
Ves. jr. 449; 3 Mer. 154; Ward on Leg. 142. 

LEGACY, ALTERNATIVE. One where the testator gives one of two things to the 
legatee without designating which of them; as, one of my two horses. Vide 
Election. 

LEGACY, CONDITIONAL. A bequest which is to take effect upon the happening 
or, not happening of a certain event. Lownd. Leg. 166; Rop. Leg. Index, tit. 
Condition. 

LEGACY, DEMONSTRATIVE. A demonstrative legacy is a bequest of a certain sum 
of money; intended for the legatee at all events, with a fund particularly 
referred to for its payment; so that if the estate be not the testator's 
property at his death, the legacy will not fail: but be payable out of 
general assets. 1 Rop. Leg. 153; Lownd. Leg 85; Swinb. 485; Ward on Leg. 
370. 

LEGACY, INDEFINITE. A bequest of things which are not enumerated or 
ascertained as to numbers or quantities; as, a bequest by a testator of all 
his goods, all his stocks in the funds. Lownd. on Leg. 84; Swinb. 485; Amb. 
641; 1 P. Wms. 697. 

LEGACY, LAPSED. A legacy is said to be lapsed or extinguished, when the 
legatee dies before the testator, or before the condition upon which the 
legacy is given has been performed, or before the time at which it is 
directed to vest in interest has arrived. Bac. Ab. Legacy, E; Com. Dig. 
Chancery, 3 Y 13; 1 P. Wms. 83. Lownd. Leg. 408 to 415; 1 Rop. Leg. 319 to 
341. See, as to the law of Pennsylvania in favor of lineal descendants, 5 
Smith's Laws of Pa. 112. Vide, generally, 8 Com. Dig. 502-3; 5 Toull. n. 
671. 

LEGACY, M0DAL. A modal legacy is a bequest accompanied with directions as to 
the mode in which it should be applied for the legatee's benefit; for 
example, a legacy to Titius to put him an apprentice. 2 Vern. 431; Lownd. 
Leg. 151. 

LEGACY, PECUNIARY, A pecuniary legacy is one of money; pecuniary legacies 
are most usually general legacies, but there may be a specific pecuniary 
legacy; for example, of the money in a certain bag. 1 Rop. Leg. 150, n. 

LEGACY, RESIDUARY. That which is of the remainder of an estate after the 
payment of all the debts and other legacies. Madd. Ch. P. 284. 

LEGAL. That which is according to law. It is used in opposition to 
equitable, as the legal estate is, in the trustee, the equitable estate in 
the cestui que trust. Vide Powell on Mortg. Index, h.t. 
     2. The party who has the legal title, has alone the right to seek a 
remedy for a wrong to his estate, in a court of law, though he may have no 
beneficial interest in it. The equitable owner, is he who has not the legal 
estate, but is entitled to the beneficial interest. 
     3. The person who holds the legal estate for the benefit of another, is 
called a trustee; he who has the beneficiary interest and does not hold the 
legal title, is called the beneficiary, or more technically, the cestui que 
trust. 
     4. When the trustee has a claim, he must enforce his right in a court 
of equity, for he cannot sue any one at law, in his own name; 1 East, 497; 8 
T. R. 332; 1 Saund. 158, n. 1; 2 Bing. 20; still less can he in such court 
sue his own trustee. 1 East, 497. 

LEGAL ESTATE. One, the right to which may be enforced in a court of law. It 
is distinguished from an equitable estate, the rights to which can be 
established only in a court of equity. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1688. 

LEGALIZATION. The act of making lawful.
     2. By legalization, is also understood the act by which a judge or 
competent officer authenticates a record, or other matter, in order that the 
same may be lawfully read in evidence. Vide Authentication. 

LEGATES. Legates are extraordinary ambassadors sent by the pope to catholic 
countries to represent him, and to exercise his jurisdiction. They are 
distinguished from the ambassadors of the pope who are sent to other powers. 
     2. The canonists divide them into three kinds, namely: 1. Legates A 
latere. 2. Legati missi. 3. Legati nati. 
     3.-1. Legates latere hold the first rank among those who are honored 
by a legation; they are always chosen from the college of cardinals, and are 
called a latere, in imitation of the magistrates of ancient Rome, who were 
taken from the court, or side of the emperor. 
     4.-2. The legati missi are simple envoys. 
     5.-3. The legati nati, are those who are entitled to be legates by 
birth. 

LEGATEE. A legatee is a person to whom a legacy is given by a last will and 
testament. 
     2. It is proposed to consider, 1. Who may be a legatee. 2. Under what 
description legatees may take. 
     3.-1. Who may be a legatee. In general, every person may be a 
legatee. 2 Bl. Com. 512. But a person civilly dead cannot take a legacy. 
     II. Under what description legatees may take. 
     4.-1. Of legacies to legitimate children. 1. When it appears from 
express declaration, or a clear inference arising upon the face of the will, 
that a testator in giving a legacy to a class of individuals generally, 
intended to apply the terms used by him to such persons only as answered the 
description at the date of the instrument, those individuals alone will be 
entitled, although if no such intention had been expressed, or appeared in 
the will, every person failing within that class at the testator's death, 
would have been included in the terms of the bequest. 1 Meriv. 320; and see 
3 Ves. 611; Id. 609; 15 Ves. 363; Ambl. 397; 2 Cox, 291; 4 Bro. C. C. 55; 3 
Bro. C. C. 148; 2 Cox, 384. 
     5.-2. Where a legacy is given to a class of individuals, as to 
children, in general terms, and no period is appointed for the distribution 
of it, the legacy is due at the death of the testator; the payment of it 
being merely postponed to the end of a year after that event, for the 
convenience of the executor or administrator in administering the assets. 
The rights of the legatees are finally settled, and determined at the 
testator's decease. 1 Ball & B. 459; 2 Murph. 178. Upon this principal, is 
founded the well established rule that children in existence at that period, 
or legally considered so to be, are alone entitled to participate in the 
bequest. 1 Bro. C. C. 532, n.; 2 Bro. C. C. 658; 2 Cox, 190.; 1 Dick. 344; 
14 Ves. 576; 1 Ves. jr. 405; 1 Cox, 68; 3 Bro. C. C. 391; Amb. 448; 1 Ves. 
sen. 485; 5 Binn. 607. 
     6.-3. A child in ventre sa mere takes a share in a fund bequeathed to 
children, under the general description of "children," or of "children 
living at the testator's death." 1 Ves. sen. 85; and see 1 P. Wms. 244, 341; 
2 Bro. C. C. 63; 1 Salk. 229; 2 Cox, 425; 5 Serg. & Rawle, 38. See tit. In 
ventre sa mere. 
     7.-4. When legacies are given to a class of individuals, generally, 
payable at a future period, as to the children of B, when the youngest shall 
attain the age of twenty-one, or to be divided among them upon the death of 
C; any child who can entitle itself under the description, at the time when 
the fund is to be divided, may claim a share, viz: as well children living 
at the period of distribution, although not born till after the testator's 
death, as those born before, and living at the happening of that event. 1 
Supp. to Ves. jr. 115, note 3, to Hill v. Chapman; 2 Supp. to Ves. jr. 157, 
note 1, to Lincoln v. Pelham. This general rule may be divided into two 
branches. First,  when the division of the fund is postponed until a child 
or children attain a particular age; as, when a legacy is given to the 
children of A, at the age of twenty-one; in that case, so soon as the eldest 
arrives at that period, the fund is distributable among so many as are in 
existence at that time; and no child born afterwards can be admitted to a 
share, because the period of division fixes the number of legatees. 
Distribution is then made, and nothing remains for future partition. 1 Ball 
& Beat. 459; 3 Bro. C. C. 402; 5 Binn. 607; 2 Ves. jr. 690; 3 Ves. 730; 3 
Bro. C. C. 352, ed. by Belt; 14 Ves. 256; 6 Ves. 345; 10 Ves. 152; 11 Ves. 
238. Second, when the distribution of the fund is deferred during the life 
of a person in esse. In these cases, when the enjoyment of the thing given, 
is by the testator's express declaration not to be immediate by those, among 
whom it is to be finally divided, but is postponed to a particular period, 
as the death of A, then the children or individuals who answer the general 
description at that time, when distribution is to be made, are entitled to 
take, in exclusion of those afterwards coming in esse. 1 Ves. sen. 111; 1 
Bro. C. C. 386; Id. 530; Id. 582; Id. 537; 1 Atk. 509; 2 Atk. 329; 5 Ves. 
136; 3 Bro. C. C. 417; 1 Cox, 327; 8 Ves. 375; 15 Ves. 122; 1 Madd. R. 290; 
1 Ball & Beat. 449. 
     8.-5. The word "children" does not, ordinarily and properly speaking, 
comprehend grandchildren or issue generally; these are included in that term 
only in two cases, namely, 1. From necessity, which occurs where the will 
would remain inoperative unless the sense of the word "children" were 
extended beyond its natural import; and, 2. Where the testator has shown by 
other words, that he did not intend to use the term children in its proper 
and actual meaning, but in a more extended sense. 1 Supp. to Ves. jr. 202, 
note 2, to Bristow v. Ward. In the following cases, the word children was 
extended beyond its natural import from necessity. 6 Rep. 16; 10 Ves. 201; 2 
Desaus. R. 123, in note. The following are instances where by using the 
words children and issue, indiscriminately, the testator showed his 
intention to use the former term in the sense of issue so as to entitle 
grandchildren, &c. to take. 1 Ves. sen. 196; S. C. Ambl. 555; 3 Ves. 258; 3 
Ves. & Bea. 68; 4 Ves. 437; 2 Supp. to Ves. jr. 158. There is another class 
of cases wherein it was determined that grandchildren, &c. were not included 
in the word children. 2 Vern. 107; 4 Ves. 692; 10 Ves. 195; 3 Ves. & Bea. 
59; see 2 Desauss. 308. 
     9.-2. Of legacies to natural children. 1. Natural children unborn at 
the date of the will, cannot take under a bequest to the children generally, 
or to the illegitimate children of A B by Mary C; because a natural child 
cannot take as the issue of a particular person, until it has acquired the 
reputation of being the child of that person, which cannot be before its 
birth. Co, Litt. 3, b. 
    10.-2. Natural children, unborn at the date of the will and described 
as children of the testator or another man, to be born of a particular 
woman, cannot take under such a description. 1 Peere, Wms. 529; 18 Ves. 288. 
    11.-3. A legacy to an illegitimate child in ventre sa mere, described 
as the child of the testator or of another man, will fail, since whether the 
testator or such person were or were not in truth the father, is a fact 
which can only be ascertained by evidence that public policy forbids to be 
admitted. 1 Meriv. 141 to 152. 
    12.-4. A child in ventre sa mere described merely as a child with 
which the mother is enceinte, without mentioning its putative father; or if 
the testator express a belief that the child is his own, and provide for it 
under that impression, regardless of the chance of being mistaken; then the 
child will in the first place be capable of taking and in the second, as 
presumed, be also, entitled in consequence of the testator's intent to 
provide for it, whether he be the father or not. 1 Meriv. 148, 152. 
    13.-5. Natural children in existence, having acquired by reputation 
the name and character of children of a particular person, prior to the date 
of the will, are capable of taking under the name of children. 1 P. Wms. 
529; 1 Ves. & Bea. 467. But the term child, son, issue, and every other word 
of that species, is to be considered as prima facie to mean legitimate 
child, son, or issue. Id. 
    14.-6. Whether such children take or not depends upon the evidence of 
the testator's intention, manifested by the will, to include them in the 
term children; these cases are instances where the evidence of such 
intention was deemed insufficient. 5 Ves. 530; 1 Ves. & Bea. 454; 6 Ves. 43, 
48; 1 Ves. & Bea. 4619; and see 1 Ves. & Bea. 456; 2 East, 530, 542. In the 
following, the evidence of intention was held to be sufficient. 1 Ves. & 
Bea. 469; Blundell v. Dunn, cited in 1 Madd. 433; Beachcroft v. Beachcroft, 
cited in 1 Madd. 430; 2 Meriv. 419. 
    15.-3. Of legacies of personal estate to a man and his heirs. 1. A 
legacy to A and his heirs, is an absolute legacy to A, and the whole 
interest of the money vests in him for his use. 4 Mad. 361. But when no 
property in the bequest is given to A, and the money is bequeathed to his 
heirs, or to him with a limitation to his heirs, if he die before the 
testator, and the contingency happens, then if there be nothing in the will 
showing the sense in which the testator made use of the word heirs, the next 
of kin of A, are entitled to claim under the description, as the only 
persons appointed by law to succeed to personal estate. 5 Ves. 403; 4 Ves. 
649; 1 Jac. & Walk. 388. 
    16.-2. A bequest to the heirs of an individual, without addition or 
explanation, will belong to the next of kin; the rule, however, is subject 
to, alteration by the intention of the testator. If then the contents of the 
will show, that by the word heirs the testator meant other persons than the 
next of kin, those persons will be entitled. Ambl. 273; 1 P. Wms. 432; 
Forrest, 56; 2 Atk. 89; See, also, 1 Ves. jr. 145; 4 Madd. 361; 14 Ves. 488; 
1 Car. Law R. 484. 
    17.-4. Legacies to issue. 1. The term issue, is of very extensive 
import, and when used as a word of purchase, and unconfined by any 
indication of intention, will comprise all persons who can claim as 
descendants from or through the person to whose issue the bequest is made; 
and in order to restrain the legal sense of the term, a clear intention must 
appear upon the will. 3 Ves. 257; Id. 421; 1 Meriv. 434; 13 Ves. 344. 
    18.-2. Where it appears clearly to be a testator's meaning to provide 
for a class of individuals living at the date of his will, and he provides 
against a lapse by the death of any of them in his lifetime, by the 
substitution of their issue; in such case, although the word will include 
all the descendants of the designated legatees, yet if any person who would 
have answered the description of an original legatee when the will was made, 
be then dead, leaving issue, that issue will be excluded, because the issue 
of those individuals only who were capable of taking original shares, at the 
date of the will, were intended to take by substitution; so that as the 
person who was dead when the will was made, could never have taken an 
original share, there is nothing for his issue to take in his place. 1 
Meriv. 320. 
    19.-3. When it can be collected from the will that a testator in using 
the word issue, did not intend it should be understood in its common 
acceptation, the import of it will be confined to the persons whom it was 
intended to comprehend. 7 Ires. 531; 3 Ves. 383; 7 Ves. 522; 1 Ves. jr. 143. 
    20.-5. Of legacies to relations. 1. Under a bequest to relations, none 
are entitled but those, who in the case of intestacy, could have claimed 
under the statute of distribution. Forrest. 251; 4 Bro. C. C. 207; 1 Bro. C. 
C. 31; 3 Bro. C. C. 234; 5 Ves. 529; Ambl. 507; Dick. 380; 1 P. Wms. 327; 2 
Ves. sen. 527; 19 Ves. 403; 1 Taunt. 263; 1 T. R. 435; n. See the following 
cases where the bequests were to "poor relations;" 1 P. Wms. 327; 8 Serg. & 
Rawle, 45; 1 Sch. & Lef. 111; "most necessitous relations;" Ambl. 636. 
    21.-2. To this general rule there are several exceptions, namely, 
first, when the testator has delegated a power to an individual to 
distribute the fund among the testator's relations according to his 
discretion; in such an instance whether the bequest be made to "relations" 
generally, or to "poor," or "poorest," or "most necessitous" relations, the 
person may exercise his discretion in distributing the property among the 
testator's kindred although they be not within the statute of distributions. 
1 Scho. & Lef. 111, and 16 Ves. 43; 1 T. R. 485, n.; Ambl. 708; 16 Ves. 27, 
43. Secondly. Another exception occurs where a testator has fixed ascertain 
test, by which the number of relatives intended by him to participate in his 
property, can be ascertained; as if a legacy be given to such of the 
testator's relations as should not be worth a certain sum, in such case, it 
seems, all the testator's relatives answering the description would take, 
although not within the degrees of the statute of distributions. Ambl. 798. 
Thirdly. Another exception to the general rule is, where a testator has 
shown an intention in his will, to comprehend relations more remote than 
those entitled nuder the statute; in that case his intention will prevail. 1 
Bro. C. C. 32, n., and see 1 Cox, 235. 
    22.-3. The word "relation" or "relations," may be so qualified as to 
exclude some of the next of kin from participating in the bequest; and this 
will also happen when the terms of the bequest are to my "nearest 
relations;" 19 Ves. 400; Coop. 275; 1 Bro. C. C. 293; and see 1 Ves. sen. 
337; Ambl. 70; to testator's relations of his name 1 Ves. sen. 336; or 
stock, or blood; 15 Ves. 107. 
    23.-4. The word relations being governed by the statute of 
distributions, no person can regularly answer the description but those who 
are of kin to the testator by blood, consequently relatives by marriage are 
not included in a bequest to relations generally. 1 Ves. sen. 84; 3 Atk. 
761; 1 Bro. C. C. 71, 294. 
    24.-6. Legacies to next of kin. 1. When a bequest is made to 
testator's next of kin, it is understood the testator means such as are 
related to him by blood. But it is not necessary that the next of kin should 
be of the whole blood, the half blood answering the description of next of 
kin, are equally entitled with the whole, and if nearer in degree, will 
exclude the whole blood. 1 Ventr. 425; Alley. L. D. of Mar. 36; Sty. 74. 
    25-2. Relations by marriage are in general excluded from 
participating in a legacy given to the next of kin. 18 Ves. 53; 14 Ves. 376, 
381, 386; and, see 3 Ves. 244; 18 Ves. 49. But this is only a prima facie 
construction, which may be repelled by the contrary intention of a testator. 
14 Ves. 382. 
    26.-3. A testator is to be understood to mean by the expression "next 
of kin," when he does not refer to the statute, or to a distribution of the 
property as if he had died intestate, those persons only who should be 
nearest of kin to him, to the exclusion of others who might happen to be 
within the degree limited by the statute. 3 Bro. C. C. 69; 19 Ves. 404; 14 
Ves. 385. See 3 Bro. C. C. 64. 
    27.-4. Nearest of kin will alone be entitled under a bequest to the 
next of kin in equal degree. 12 Ves. 433; 1 Madd. 36. 
    28.-7. Legacies to legal personal representatives or to personal 
representatives. 1. Where there is nothing on the face of the will to 
manifest a different intention, the legal construction of the words 
"personal representatives," or "legal personal representatives," is 
executors or administrators of the person described. 6 Ves. 402; 6 Mead. 
159. A legacy limited to the personal or legal personal representatives of 
A, unexplained by anything in the will, will entitle A's executors or 
administrators to it, not as representing A, or as part of his estate, or 
liable to his debts, but in their own right as personae designated by the 
law. 2 Mad. 155. 
    29.-2. In the following cases the executors or administrators were 
held to be entitled under the designation of personal, or legal personal 
representatives. 3 Ves. 486; Anstr. 128. 
    30.-3. The next of kin and not the executors or administrators, were, 
in the following cases, held to be entitled under the same designation. 3 
Bro. C. C. 224, approved by Lord Rosslyn in 3 Ves. 486; 3 Ves. 146; 19 Ves. 
404. 
    31.-4. The same words were held to mean children, grandchildren, &c. 
to the exclusion of those persons who technically answer the description of 
"personal representatives." 3 Ves. 383. 
    32.-5. A husband or wife may take as such, if there is a manifest 
intention in the will that they should and if either be clothed with the 
character of executor or administrator of the other, the prima facie legal 
title attaches to the office, which will prevail, unless an intention to the 
contrary be expressed or clearly apparent in the instrument. See 14 Ves. 
382; 18 Ves. 49; 3 Ves. 231; 2 Ves. sen. 84; 3 Atk. 758; 1 Rop. on H.& W., 
326; 2 Rop. on H.& W., 64. 
    33.-8. The construction of bequests when limited to executors and 
administrators. 1. Where personal estate is given to B, his executors and 
administrators, the law transfers to B the absolute interest in the legacy. 
15 Ves. 537; 2 Mad. 155. 
    34.-2. If no interest were given to B, and the bequest were to his 
executors and administrators, it should seem that the individual answering 
the description would be beneficially entitled as personal designatee, in 
analogy to the devise of real estate to the heir of B, without a previous 
limitation to B, whose heir would take by purchase in his own right, and not 
by force of the word "heir" considered as a term of limitation. 2 Mad. 155. 
See 8 Com. Dig. Devise of Personal Property, xxxvi. 
    35:-9. Legacies to descendants. 1. A legacy to the descendants of A, 
will comprehend all his children, grandchildren, &c.; and if the will direct 
the bequest to be divided equally among them, they are entitled to the fund 
per capita. Ambl. 97; 3 Bro. C. C. 369. 
    36.-10. Legacies to a family. 1. The word family, when applied to 
personal property, is synonymous with "kindred," or "relations;" see 9 Ves. 
323. This being the ordinary acceptation of the word family, it may 
nevertheless be confined to particular relations by the context of the will; 
or the term may be enlarged by it, so that the expression may, in some 
cases, mean children, or next of kin, and in others may even include 
relations by marriage. See 8 Ves. 604; Dy. 333; 5 Ves. 166; Hob. 33; Coop. 
122; 5 M. & S. 126; 17 Ves. 263; 1 Taunt. 266; 14 Ves. 488; 9 Ves. 319; 3 
Meriv. 689. 
    37.-11. Legacies to servants. 1. To entitle himself to a bequest "to 
servants," the relation of master and servant must have arisen out of a 
contract by which the claimant must have formed an engagement which entitled 
the master to the service of the individual during the whole period, or each 
and every part of the time for which he contracted to, serve. 12 Ves. 114; 2 
Vern. 546. 
    38.-2. To claim as a servant, the legatee must in general be in the 
actual service of the testator at the time of his death. Still a servant may 
be considered by a testator as continuing in his employment, and be intended 
to take under the bequest, although he quitted the testator's house previous 
to his death, so as to answer the description in the instrument; and to 
establish which fact declarations of the testator upon the subject cannot be 
rejected; but testimony that the testator meant a servant notwithstanding 
his having left the testator's service, to take a legacy bequeathed only to 
servants in his employment at his death, cannot be received as in direct 
opposition to the will. 16 Ves. 486, 489. 
    39.-12. The different periods of time at which persons answering the 
descriptions of next of kin, family relations, issue, heirs, descendants and 
personal representatives, (to whom legacies are given by those terms 
generally,  and without discrimination,) were required to be in esse, for 
the purpose of participating in the legatory fund. 1. When the will 
expresses or clearly shows that a testator in bequeathing to the relations, 
&c. of a deceased individual, referred to such of them as were in existence 
when the will was made, they only will be entitled; as if the bequest was, 
"I give œ1000 to the descendants of the late A B, now living," those 
descendants only in esse at the date of the will can claim the legacy. Ambl. 
397. 
    40.-2. But, in general, a will begins to speak at the death of the 
testator, and consequently in ordinary cases, relations, next of kin, issue, 
descendants, &c., living at that period will alone divide the property 
bequeathed to them by those words. See 1 Ball &. Beat. 459; 1 Bro. C. C. 
532; 3 Bro. C. C. 224; 5 Ves. 399; 1 Jac. & Walk, 388, n.; 3 Meriv. 689; 5 
Binn. 607; 2 Murph. 178. 
    41.-3. If a testator express, or his intention otherwise appear from 
his will, that a bequest to his relations, &c., living at the death of a 
person, or upon the happening of any other event, should take the fund, his 
next of kin only in existence at the period described, will be entitled, in 
exclusion of the representatives of such of them as happened to be then 
dead. 3 Ves. 486; 9 Ves. 325; 1 Atk. 469; 15 Ves. 27; 4 Vin. Abr. 485, pl. 
16; 8 Ves. 38; 5 Binn. 606; see 6 Munf. 47. 
    42.-13. When the fund given to legatees, by the description of 
"family," "relations" "next in kin," &c., is to be divided among them either 
per capita, or per stirpes, or both per stirpes et capita. 1. Where the 
testator gives a legacy to his relations generally, if his next of kin be 
related to him in equal degree, as brothers, there being no children of a 
deceased brother, the brothers will divide the fund among them in equal 
shares, or per capita; each being entitled in his own right to an equal 
share. So it would be if all the brothers had died before the testator, one 
leaving two children, another three, &c., all the nephews and nieces would 
take in equal shares, per capita, in their own rights, and not as 
representing their parents; because they are sole next of kin, and related 
to the testator in equal degree. Pre. Ch. 54; and see 1 P. Wms. 595; 1 Atk. 
454; 3 P. Wms. 50. But if the testator's next of kin happen not to be 
related to him in equal degrees, as a brother, and the children of a 
deceased brother, so as that under the statute the children would take per 
stirpes as representing their parent, namely, the share he would have taken 
had he been living; yet if the testator has shown au intention that his next 
of kin shall be entitled to his property in equal shares, i. e. per capita, 
the distribution by the statute will be superseded. This may happen where 
the bequest is to relations, next of kin, &c., to be equally divided among 
them; or by expressions of like import. Forrest. 251; and see 1 Bro. C. C. 
33; 8 Serg. & Rawle, 43; 11 Serg. & Rawle 103; 1 Murph. 383. 
    43.-2. Where a bequest is to relations, &c., those persons only who 
are next of kin are entitled, and the statute of distributions is adopted, 
not only to ascertain the persons who take, but also the proportions and 
manner in which the property is to be divided; the will being silent upon 
the subject, if the next of kin of the person described be not related to 
him in equal degree, those most remote can only claim per stirpes, or in 
right of those who would have been entitled under the statute if they had 
been living. Hence it appears that taking per stirpes, always supposes an 
inequality in relationship. For example, where a testator bequeaths a legacy 
to his "relations," or "next of kin," and leaves at his death two children, 
and three grandchildren, the children of a deceased child; the grandchildren 
would take their parents' share, that is, one-third per stirpes under the 
statute, as representing their deceased parent. 1 Cox, 235. 
    44.-3. Where a testator bequeaths personal estate to several persons 
as tenants in common, with a declaration that upon all or any of their 
deaths before a particular time, their respective shares shall be equally 
divided among the issue or descendants of each of them, and they die before 
the arrival of the period, some leaving children, others grandchildren, and 
great grandchildren, and other grandchildren and more remote descendants in 
such case the issue of each deceased person will take their parents share 
per stirpes; and such issue, whether children only, or children and 
grandchildren, &c., will divide each parent's share among them equally per 
capita. 1 Ves. sen. 196. 
    45.-14. The effect of a mistake in the names of legatees. 1. Where the 
name has been mistaken in a will or deed, it will be corrected from the 
instrument, if the intention appear in the description of the legatee or 
donee, or in other parts of the will or deed. For example, if a testator 
give a bequest to Thomas second son of his brother John, when in fact John 
had no son named Thomas, and his second son was called William; it was held 
William was entitled. 19 Ves. 381; Coop. 229; and see Ambl. 175; Co. Litt. 
3, a; Finch's R. 403; 3 Leon, 18. When a bequest is made to a class of 
individuals, nominatim, and the name or christian name of one of them is 
omitted, and the name or christian name of another is repeated; if the 
context of the will show that the repetition of the name was error, and the 
name of the person omitted was intended to have been inserted, the mistake 
will be corrected. As where a testator gave his residuary estate to his six 
grandchildren, by their christian names. The name of Ann, one of them, was 
repeated, and the name of Elizabeth, another of them, was omitted. The 
context of the will clearly showed the mistake which had occurred, and 
Elizabeth was admitted to an equal share in the bequest. 1 Bro. C. C. 30; 
see 2 Cox, 186. And is to cases where parol evidence will be received to 
prove the mistakes in the names or additions of legatees, and to ascertain 
the proper person, see 3 B. & A. 632 to 642; 6 T. R. 676; 2 P. Wms. 137; 1 
Atk. 410: 1 P. Wms. 421; 5 Rep. 68, b; 6 Ves. 42; 7 East, 302; Ambl. 75. 
    46.-15. The effect of mistakes in the descriptions of legatees, and 
the admission of parol evidence in those cases. 1. Where the description of 
the legatee is erroneous, the error not having been occasioned by any fraud 
practiced upon the testator, and there is no doubt as to the person who was 
intended to be described, the mistake will not disappoint the bequest. Hence 
if a legacy be given to a person by a correct name, but a wrong description 
or addition, the mistaken description will not vitiate the bequest, but be 
rejected; for it is a maxim that veritas nominis tollit errorem 
demonstrationis. Ld. Bac. Max. reg. 25; and see 2 Ves. jr. 589; Ambl. 75; 4 
Ves. 808; Plowd. 344; 19 Ves. 400. 
    47.-2. Wherever a legacy is given to a person under a particular 
description and character which he himself has falsely assumed; or, where a 
testator, induced by the false representations of third persons to regard 
the legatee in a relationship which claims his bounty, bequeaths him a 
legacy according with such supposed relationship, and no motive for such 
bounty can be supposed, the law will not, in either case, permit the legatee 
to avail himself of the description, and therefore he cannot demand his 
legacy. See 4 Ves. 802; 4 Bro. C. C. 20. 
    48.-3. The same principle which has established the admissibility of 
parol evidence to correct errors in naming legatees, authorizes its 
allowance to rectify mistakes in the description of them. Ambl. 374; 1 Ves. 
jr. 266; 1 Meriv. 184. 
    49.-4. If neither the will nor extrinsic evidence is sufficient to 
dispel the ambiguity arising from the attempt to apply the description of 
the legatee to the person intended by the testator, the legacy must fail 
from the uncertainty of its object. 7 Ves. 508; 6 T. R. 671. 
    50.-16. The consequences of imperfect descriptions of, or reference to 
legatees, appearing upon the face of wills, and when parol evidence is 
admissible. These cases occur, 1. When a blank is left for the Christian 
name of the legatee. 2. When the whole name is omitted. 3. When the testator 
has merely written the initials of the name; and, 4. When legatees have been 
once accurately described, but in a subsequent reference to one of them, to 
take an additional bounty, the person intended is doubtful, from ambiguity 
in the terms. 
    51.-1. When a blank is left for the Christian name of the legatee, 
evidence is admissible to supply the omission. 4 Ves. 680. 
    52.-2. When the omission consists of the entire name of the legatee, 
parol evidence cannot be admitted to supply the blank. 2 Ch. Ca. 51.; 2 Atk. 
239; 3 Bro. C.C. 311. 
    53.-3. When a legatee is described by the initials of his name only, 
parol evidence may be given to prove his identity. 3 Ves. 148. When a patent 
ambiguity arises from an imperfect reference to one of two legatees 
correctly described in a prior part of the will, parol evidence is admitted 
to show which of them was intended, so that the additional legacy intended 
for the one will depend upon the removal of the obscurity by a sound 
interpretation of the whole will. 3 Atk. 257 and see 2 Ves. 217; 2 Eden, 
107. 
     See further, upon this subject, Lownd on Leg. ch. 4; 1 Roper on Leg. 
ch. 2; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 Y; Bac. Abr. h.. t. Vin. Abr. h.t.; Nels. Abr. 
h.t.; Whart. Dig. Wills, G. P.; Hamm. Dig. 756; Grimk. on Ex. ch. 5; 
Toll. on Executors, ch. 4. 

LEGALIS HOMO. A person who stands rectus in curia, who possesses all his 
civil rights. A lawful man. One who stands rectus in curia, not outlawed nor 
infamous. In this sense are the words probi et legates homines. 

LEGANTINE CONSTITUTIONS. The name of a code of ecclesiastical laws, enacted 
in national synods under Pope Gregory IX., and Pope Clement IV., about the 
years from 1220 to 1230. 

LEGATARY. One to whom anything is bequeathed; a legatee. This word is 
sometimes though seldom used to designate a legate or nuncio. 

LEGATION. An embassy; a mission. 
     2. All persons attached to a foreign legation, lawfully acknowledged by 
the government of this country, whether they are ambassadors, envoys, 
ministers, or attaches, are protected by the act of April 30, 1790, 1 
Story's L. U. S. 83, from violence, arrest or molestation. 1 Dall. 117; 1 W. 
C. C. R. 232; 11 Wheat. 467; 2 W. C. C. Rep. 435; 4 W. C. C. R. 531; 1 
Miles, 366; 1 N & M. 217; 1 Bald. 240; Wheat. Int. Law, 167. Vide 
Ambassador; Envoy; Minister. 

LEGATORY, dead man's part or share. (q.v.) The third part of a freeman's 
personal estate, which by the custom of London, in case he had a wife and 
children, the freeman might always have disposed of by will. Bac. Ab. 
Customs of London, D 4. 

LEGISLATIVE POWER. The authority under the constitution to make laws and to 
alter or repeal them. 

LEGISLATOR. One who makes laws.
     2. In order to make good laws, it is necessary to understand those 
which are in force; the legislator ought therefore, to be thoroughly imbued 
with a knowledge of the laws of his country, their advantages and defects; 
to legislate without this previous knowledge is to attempt to make a 
beautiful piece of machinery with one's eye shut. There is unfortunately too 
strong a propensity to multiply our laws and to change them. Laws must be 
yearly made, for the legislatures meet yearly but whether they are always 
for the better may be well questioned. A mutable legislation is always 
attended with evil. It renders the law uncertain, weakens its effects, hurts 
credit, lessens the value of property, and as they are made frequently, in 
consequence of some extraordinary case, laws sometimes operate very 
unequally. Vide 1 Kent, Com. 227 and Le Magazin Universel, tome ii. p. 227, 
for a good article against excessive legislation; Matter, De l'Influence des 
Lois sur les Moeurs, et de l'Influence des Moeurs sur les Lois. 

LEGISLATURE, government. That body of men in the state which has the power 
of making laws. 
     2. By the Constitution of the United States, art. 1, s. 1, all 
legislative powers granted by it are vested in a congress of the United 
States, which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives. 
     3. It requires the consent of a majority of each branch of the 
legislature in order to enact a law, and then it must be approved by the 
president of the United States, or in case of his refusal, by two-thirds of 
each house. Const. U. S. art. 1, s. 7, 2. 
     4. Most of the constitutions of the several states, contain provisions 
nearly similar to this. In general, the legislature will not exercise 
judicial functions; yet the use of supreme power upon particular occasions, 
is not without example. Vide Judicial. 

LEGITIMACY. The state of being born in wedlock; that is, in a lawful manner. 
     2. Marriage is considered by all civilized nations as the only source 
of legitimacy; the qualities of husband and wife must be possessed by the 
parents in order to make the offspring legitimate; and furthermore the 
marriage must be lawful, for if it is void ab initio, the children who may 
be the offspring of such marriage are not legitimate. 1 Phil. Ev. Index,
h.t.; Civ. Code L. art. 203 to 216. 
     3. In Virginia, it is provided by statute of 1787, "that the issue of 
marriages deemed null in law, shall nevertheless be legitimate." 3 Hen. & 
Munf. 228, n. 
     4. A conclusive, presumption of legitimacy arises from marriage and 
cohabitation; and proof of the mother's irregularities will not destroy this 
presumption: pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant. To rebut this presumption, 
circumstances must be shown which render it impossible that the husband 
should be the father, as impotency and the like. 3 Bouv. Inst. n. 300-2. 
Vide Bastard; Bastardy; Paternity; Pregnancy. 

LEGITIMATE. That which is according to law; as, legitimate children, are 
lawful children, born in wedlock, in contradistinction to bastards; 
legitimate authority, or lawful power, in opposition to usurpation. 

LEGITIMATION. The act of giving the character of legitimate children to 
those who were not so born. 
     2. In Louisiana, the Civil Code, art. 217, enacts that "children born 
out of marriage, except those who are born of an incestuous or adulterous 
connexion, may be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their father and 
mother whenever the latter have legally acknowledged them for their 
children, either before their marriage, or by the contract of marriage 
itself." 
     3. In most of the other states the character of legitimate children is 
given to those who are not so, by special acts of assembly. In Georgia, real 
estate may descend from a mother to her illegitimate children and their 
representatives, and from such child, for want of descendants, to brothers 
and sisters, born of the same mother, and their representatives. Prince's 
Dig. 202. In Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Vermont and Virginia, 
subsequent marriages of parents, and recognition by the father, legitimatize 
an illegitimate child  and in Massachusetts, for all purposes except 
inheriting from their kindred. Mass. Rev. St. 414. 
     4. The subsequent marriage of parents legitimatizes the child in 
Illinois, but he must be afterwards acknowledged. The same rule seems to 
have been adopted in Indiana and Missouri. An acknowledgment of illegitimate 
children, of itself, legitimatizes in Ohio, and in Michigan and Mississippi 
marriage alone between the reputed parents has the same effect. In Maine, a 
bastard inherits to one who is legally adjudged, or in writing owns himself 
to be the father. A bastard may be legitimated in North Carolina, on 
application of the putative father to court, either where he has married the 
mother, or she is dead, or married another or lives out of the state. In a 
number of the states, namely, in Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode 
Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia, a bastard takes by descent from 
his mother, with modifications regulated by the laws of these states. 2 
Hill, Ab. s. 24 to 35, and the authorities there referred to. Vide Bastard; 
Bastardy; Descent. 

LEGITIME, civil law. That portion of a parent's estate of which he cannot 
disinherit his children, without a legal cause. The civil code of Louisiana 
declares that donations inter vivos or mortis causa cannot exceed two-thirds 
of the property of the disposer if he leaves at his decease a legitimate 
child; one half if he leaves two children; and one-third if he leaves three 
or a greater number. Under the name of children are included descendants of 
whatever degree they may be; it must be understood that they are only 
counted for the child they represent. Civil. Code of Lo. art. 1480. 
     3. Donation inter vivos or mortis causa, cannot exceed two-thirds of 
the property if the disposer having no children have a father, mother, or 
both. Id. art. 1481. Where there are no descendants, and in case of the 
previous decease of the father and mother, donations inter vivos and mortis 
causa, may, in general, be made of the whole amount of the property of the 
disposer. Id. art. 1483. The Code Civil makes nearly similar provisions. 
Code Civ. L. 3, t. 2, c. 3, s. 1, art. 913 to 919. 
     4. In Holland, Germany, and Spain, the principles of the Falcidian law, 
more or less limited, have been generally adopted. Coop. Just. 616. 
     5. In the United States, other than Louisiana and in England, there is 
no restriction on the right of bequeathing. But this power of bequeathing 
did not originally extend to all a man's personal estate; on the contrary, 
by the common law, as it stood in the reign of Henry II, a man's goods were 
to be divided into three equal parts, one of which went to his heirs or 
lineal descendants, another to his wife, and the third was at his own 
disposal; or if he died without a wife, he might then dispose of one moiety, 
and the other went to his children; and so e converso if he had no children, 
the wife was entitled to one moiety, and he might bequeath the other; but if 
he died without either wife or issue, the whole was at his own disposal. 
Glanv. 1. 2, c. 6;, Bract. 1. 2, c. 26. The shares of the wife and children 
were called their reasonable part. 2 Bl. Comm. 491-2. See Death's part; 
Falcidian law. 

LENDER, contracts. He from whom a thing is borrowed.
     2. The contract of loan confers rights, and imposes duties on the 
lender. 1. The lender has the right to revoke the loan at his mere pleasure; 
9 Cowen, R. 687; 8 Johns. Rep. 432; 1 T. R. 480; 2 Campb. Rep. 464; and is 
deemed the owner or proprietor of the thing during the period of the loan; 
so that au action for a trespass or conversion will lie in favor of the 
lender against a stranger, who has obtained a wrongful possession, or has 
made a wrongful conversion of the thing loaned; as mere gratuitous 
permission to a third person to use a chattel does not, in contemplation of 
the common law, take it out of the possession of the owner. 11 Johns. Rep. 
285; 7 Cowen, Rep. 753; 9 Cowen, Rep. 687; 2 Saund. Rep. 47 b; 8 Johns. Rep. 
432; 13 Johns. Rep. 141, 661; Bac. Abr. Trespass, c 2; Id. Trover, C 2. And 
in this the Civil agrees with the common law. Dig. 13, 6, 6, 8; Pothier, 
Pret …, Usage, ch. 1, Sec. 1, art. 2, n. 4; art. 3, n. 9; Ayliffe's Pand. B. 
4, t. 16, p. 517; Domat, B. 1, t. 5, Sec. 1, n. 4; and so does the Scotch 
law. Ersk. Pr. Laws of Scotl. B. 3, t. 1 Sec. 8. 
     3.-2. In the civil law, the first obligation on the part of the 
lender, is to suffer the borrower to use and enjoy the thing loaned during 
the time of the loan, according to the original intention. Such is not the 
doctrine of the common law. 9 Cowen, Rep. 687. The lender is obliged by the 
civil law to reimburse the borrower the extraordinary expenses to which he 
has been put for the preservation of the thing lent. And in such a case, the 
borrower would have a lien on the thing, and may detain it, until these 
extraordinary expenses are paid, and the lender cannot, even by an 
abandonment of the thing to the borrower, excuse himself from repayment, nor 
is he excused by the subsequent loss of the thing by accident, nor by a 
restitution of it by the borrower, without insisting upon repayment. 
Pothier, Pret … Usage, ch. 3, n. 82, 83; Dig. 13, 6, 18, 4; Ersk. Pr. Laws 
of Scotl. B. 3, t. 1, Sec. 9. What would be decided at common law does not 
seem very clear. Story on Bailm. Sec. 274. Another case of implied 
obligation on the part of the lender by the civil law is, that he is bound 
to give notice to the borrower of the defects of the thing loaned; and if he 
does not and conceals them, and any injury occurs to the borrower thereby, 
the lender is responsible. Dig. 13, 6, 98, 3; Poth. Pret … Usage, n. 84; 
Domat, Liv. 1, t. 5, s. 3, n. 3. In the civil law there is also an implied 
obligation on the part of the lender where the thing has been lost by the 
borrower, and after he has paid the lender the value of it, the thing has 
been restored to the lender; in such case the lender must return to the 
borrower either the price or thing. Dig. 13, 6, 17, 5; Poth. Id. n. 85. "The 
common law seems to recognize the same principles, though," says Judge 
Story, Bailm. Sec. 276, "it would not perhaps be easy to cite a case on a 
gratuitous loan directly on the point." See Borrower; Commodate; Story, 
Bailm. ch. 4; Domat. Liv. 2, tit. 5; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 1078, et seq. 

LESION, contracts. In the civil law this term is used to signify the injury 
suffered, in consequence of inequality of situation, by one who does not 
receive a full equivalent for what he gives in a commutative contract. 
     2. The remedy given for this injury, is founded on its being the effect 
of implied error or imposition; for in every commutative contract, 
equivalents are supposed to be given and received. Louis. Code, 1854. 
Persons of full age, however, are not allowed in point of law to object to 
their agreements as being injurious, unless the injury be excessive. Poth. 
Oblig. P. 1, c. 1, s. 1, art. 3, Sec. 4. But minors are admitted to 
restitution, not only against any excessive inequality, but against any 
inequality whatever. Poth. Oblig. P. 1, c. 1, s. 1, art. 3, Sec. 5; Louis. 
Code, art. 1858. 
     3. Courts of chancery relieve upon terms of redemption and set aside 
contracts entered into by expectant heirs dealing for their expectancies, on 
the ground of mere inadequacy of price. 1 Vern. 167; 2 Cox, 80; 2 Cas. in 
Ch. 136; 1 Vern. 141; 2 Vern. 121; 2 Freem. 111; 2 Vent. 359; 2 Vern. 14; 2 
Rep. in Ch. 396; 1 P. W. 312; 1 Bro. C. C. 7; 3 P. Wms. 393, n.; 2 Atk. 133; 
2 Ves. 125; 1 Atk. 301; 1 Wils. 286; 1 Wils. 320; 1 Bro. P. 6. ed. Toml. 
198; 1 Bro. C. C. 1; 16 Ves. 512; Sugd. on Vend. 231, n. k.; 1 Ball & B. 
330; Wightw. 25; 3 Ves. & Bea. 117; 2 Swanst. R. 147, n.; Fonb. notes to the 
Treatise of Equity, B, 1, c. 2, s. 9. A contract cannot stand where the 
party has availed himself of a confidential situation, in order to obtain 
some selfish advantage. Note to Crowe v. Ballard. 1 Ves. jun. 125; 1 Hov. 
Supp. 66, 7. Note to Wharton v. May. 5 Ves. 27; 1 Hov. Supp. 378. See 
Catching bargain; Fraud; Sale. 

LESSEE. He to whom a lease is made. The subject will be considered by taking 
a view, 1. Of his rights. 2. Of his duties. 
     2.-1. He has a right to enjoy the premises leased for the term 
mentioned in the lease, and to use them for the purpose agreed upon. He may, 
unless, restrained by the covenants in the lease, either assign it, or 
underlet the premises. 1 Cruise, Dig. 174. By an assignment of the lease is 
meant the transfer of all the tenant's interest in the estate to another 
person; on the contrary, an underletting is but a partial transfer of the 
property leased, the lessee retaining a reversion to himself. 
     3.-2. The duties of the lessee are numerous. First, he is bound to 
fulfill all express covenants he has entered into in relation to the premises

leased; and, secondly, he is required to fulfill all implied covenants, which

the relation of lessee imposes upon him towards the lessor. For example, he 
is bound to put the premises to no other use than that for which it was 
hired; when a farm is let to him for common farming purposes, he cannot open 
a mine and dig ore which may happen to be in the ground; but if the mine has 
been opened, it is presumed both parties intended it should be used, unless 
the lessee were expressly restrained; 1 Cruise, Dig. 132. He is required to 
use the property in a tenant-like and proper manner; to take reasonable care 
of it and to restore it at the end of his term, subject only to the 
deterioration produced by ordinary wear and the reasonable use for which it 
was demised. 12 M. & W. 827. Although he is not bound, in the absence of an 
express covenant, to rebuild in case of destruction by fire or other 
accident, yet he must keep the house in a habitable state if he received it 
in good order. See Repairs. The lessee is required to restore the property 
to the lessor at the end of the term. 
     4. The lessee remains chargeable, after an assignment of his term, as 
before, unless the lessor has accepted the assignee; and even then he 
continues liable in covenant on an express covenant, as for repairs, or to 
pay rent; 2 Keb. 640; but not for the performance of an implied one, or, as 
it is usually termed, a covenant in law. By the acceptance, he is discharged 
from debt for arrears of future rent. Cro. Jac. 309, 334; Ham. on Parties, 
129, 130. 
     Vide Estate for years; Lease;, Notice to quit: Tenant for years; 
Underlease. 

LESSOR. contr. He who grants a lease. Civ. Code of L. art. 2647.

LESTAGE, Eng: law. Duties paid for unlading goods in port. Harg. L. Tr. 75. 

LET. Hindrance, obstacle, obstruction; as, without let, molestation or 
hindrance. 

TO LET. To hire, to lease; to grant the use and possession of something for 
a compensation. 
     2. This term is applied to real estate and the words to hire are more 
commonly used when speaking of personal estate. See Hire, Hirer, and Letter. 
     3. Letting is very similar to selling; the difference consists, in 
this; that instead of selling the thing itself, the letter sells only the 
use of it. 

LETTER, com. law, Crim. law. An epistle; a despatch; a written message, 
usually on paper, which is folded up and sealed, sent by one person to 
another. 
     2. A letter is always presumed to be sealed, unless the presumption be 
rebutted. 1 Caines, R. 682. 1 
     3. This subject will be considered by 1st. Taking a view of the law 
relating to the transmission of letters through the post office; and, 2. The 
effect of letters in making contracts. 3. The ownership of letters sent and 
received. 
     4.-1. Letters are, commonly sent through the post office, and the law 
has carefully provided for their conveyance through the country, and their 
delivery to the persons to whom they are addressed. The act to reduce into 
one the several acts establishing and regulating the post office department, 
section 21, 3 Story's Laws United States, 1991, enacts, that if any person 
employed in any of the departments of the post office establishment, shall 
unlawfully detain, delay, or open, any letter, packet, bag, or mail of 
letters, with which he shall be entrusted, or which shall have come to his 
possession, and which are intended to be conveyed by post or, if any such 
person shall secrete, embezzle, or destroy, any letter or packet entrusted 
to such person as aforesaid, and which shall not contain any security for, 
or assurance relating to money, as hereinafter described, every such 
offender, being thereof duly convicted, shall, for every such offence, be 
fined, not exceeding three hundred dollars, or imprisoned, not exceeding six 
months, or both, according to the circumstances and aggravations of the 
offence. And if any person, employed as aforesaid, shall secrete, embezzle, 
or destroy any letter, packet, bag, or mail of letters, with which he or she 
shall be entrusted, or which shall have come to his or her possession, and 
are intended to be conveyed by post, containing any bank notes, or bank post 
bill, bill of exchange, warrant of the treasury of the United States, note 
of assignment of stock in the funds, letters of attorney for receiving 
annuities or dividends, or for, selling stock in the funds, or for receiving 
the interest thereof, or any letter of credit, or note for, or relating to, 
payment of moneys or any bond, or warrant, draft, bill, or promissory note, 
covenant, contract, or agreement whatsoever, for, or relating to, the 
payment of money, or the delivery of any article of value, or the 
performance of any act, matter, or thing, or any receipt, release, 
acquittance, or discharge of, or from, any debt; covenant, or demand, or any 
part thereof, or any copy of any record of any judgment or decree, in any 
court of law or chancery, or any execution which way may have issued 
thereon; or any copy of any other record, or any other article of value, or 
any writing representing the same or if any such person, employed as 
aforesaid, shall steal, or take, any of the same out of any letter, packet, 
bag, or mail of letters, that shall come to his or her possession, such 
person shall, on conviction for any such offence, be imprisoned not less 
than ten years, nor exceeding twenty-one years; and if any person who shall 
have taken charge of the mails of the United States, shall quit or desert 
the same before such person delivers it into the post office kept at the 
termination of the route, or some known mail carrier, or agent of the 
general post office, authorized to receive the same, every such person, so 
offending, shall forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars, 
for every such offence; and if any person concerned in carrying the mail of 
the United States, shall collect, receive, or carry any letter, or packet, 
or shall cause or procure the same to be done, contrary, to this act, every 
such offender shall forfeit and pay for every such offence a sum, not 
exceeding fifty dollars. 
     5.-2. Most contracts may be formed by correspondence; and cases not 
unfrequently arise where it is difficult to say whether the concurrence of 
the will of the contracting parties took place or not. In order to form a 
contract both parties must concur at the same time, or there is no 
agreement. Suppose, for example, that Paul of Philadelphia, is desirous of 
purchasing a thousand bales of cotton, and offers by letter to Peter of New 
Orleans, to buy them from him at a certain price; but on the next day he 
changes his mind, and then he writes to Peter that he withdraws his offer; 
or on the next day he dies; in either case, there is no contract, because 
Paul did not continue in the same disposition to buy the cotton, at the time 
that his offer was accepted. The precise moment when the consent of both 
parties is perfect, is, in strictness, when the person who made the offer 
becomes acquainted with the fact that it has been accepted. But this may be 
presumed from circumstances. The acceptance must be of the same precise 
terms without any variance whatever. 4 Wheat. 225; see 1 Pick. 278; 10 Pick. 
326; 6 Wend. 103. 
     6.-3. A letter received by the person to whom it is directed, is the 
qualified property of such person: but where it is of a private nature, the 
receiver has no right to publish it without the consent of the writer, 
unless under very extraordinary circumstances; as, for example, when it is 
requisite to the defence of the character of the party who received it. 2 
Ves. & B. 19; 2 Atk. 542; Amb. 737; 1 Ball. & B. 207; 1 Mart. (Lo.) R. 297; 
Denisart, verbo Lettres Missives. Vide Dead Letter; Jeopardy; Mail; 
Newspaper; Postage; Post Master General. 

LETTER, contracts. In the civil law, locator, and in the French law, 
locateur, loueur, or bailleur, is he who, being the owner of a thing, lets 
it out to another for hire or compensation. See Hire; Locator; Conductor; 
Story on Bailm. Sec. 369. 
     2. According to the French and civil law, in virtue of the contract, 
the letter of a thing to hire impliedly engages that the hirer shall have 
the full use and enjoyment of the thing hired, and that he will fulfill his 
own engagements and trusts in respect to it, according to the original 
intention of the parties. This implies an obligation to deliver the thing to 
the hirer; to refrain from every obstruction to the use of it by the hirer 
during the period of the bailment; to do no act which shall deprive the 
hirer of the thing; to warrant the title and possession to the hirer, to 
enable him to use the thing or to perform the service; to keep the thing in 
suitable order and repair for the purpose of the bailment; and finally to 
warrant the thing from from any fault inconsistent with the use of it. These 
are the main obligations deduced from the nature of the contract, and they 
seem generally founded on unexceptionable reasoning. Pothier, Louage, n. 53; 
Id. n. 217; Domat, B. 1, tit. 4, Sec. 3 Code Civ. of L. tit. 9, c. 2, s. 2. 
It is difficult to say how far (reasonable as they are in a general sense) 
these obligations are recognized in the common law. In some respects the 
common law certainly differs. See Repairs; Dougl. 744, 748; 1 Saund. 321, 
32e, and ibid. note 7; 4 T. R. 318; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 980 et seq. 

LETTER, civil law. The answer which the prince gave to questions of law 
which had been submitted to him by magistrates, was called letters or 
epistles. See Rescripts. 

LETTER OF ADVICE. comm. law. A letter containing information of any 
circumstances unknown to the person to whom it is written; generally 
informing him of some act done by the writer of the letter. 
     2. It is usual and perfectly proper for the drawer of a bill of 
exchange to write a letter of advice to the drawee, as well to prevent fraud 
or alteration of the bill, as to let the drawee know what provision has been 
made for the payment of the bill. Chit. on Bills 185. (ed. of 1836.) 

LETTER OF ATTORNEY, practice. A written instrument under seal, by which one 
or more persons, called the constituents, authorize one or more other 
persons called the attorneys, to do some lawful act by the latter, for or 
instead, and in the place of the former. 1 Moody,  Cr. Cas. 52, 70. 
     2. The authority given in the letter of attorney is either general, as 
to transact all the business of the constituent; or special, as to do some 
special business, particularly named; as, to collect a debt. 
     3. It is revocable or irrevocable; the former when no interest is 
conveyed to the attorney, or some other person. It is irrevocable when the 
constituent conveys a right to the attorney in the matter which is the 
subject of it; as, when it is given as part security. 2 Esp. R. 565. Civil 
Code of Lo: art. 2954 to 2970. 

LETTER BOOK, commerce. A book containing the copies of letters written by a 
merchant or trader to his correspondents. 
     2. After notice to the plaintiff to produce a letter which he admitted 
to have received from the defendant, it was held that an entry by a deceased 
clerk, in a letter book professing to be a copy of a letter from the 
defendant to the plaintiff of the same date, was admissible evidence of the 
contents, proof having been given, that according to the course of business, 
letters of business written by the plaintiff were copied by this clerk and 
then sent off by the post. 3 Campb. R. 305. Vide 1 Stark Ev. 356; Bouv. 
Inst. n. 3139. 

LETTER CARRIER. A person employed to carry letters from the post office to 
the persons to whom they are addressed. 
     2. The act of congress of March 3, 1851, Statutes at Large of U. S. by 
Minot, 591, directs, Sec. 10, That it shall be in the power of the 
postmaster general, at all post offices where the postmaster's are appointed 
by the president of the United States, to establish post routes within the 
cities or towns, to provide for conveying letters to the post office by 
establishing suitable and convenient places of deposit, and by employing 
carriers to receive and deposit them in the post office; and at all such 
offices it shall be in his power to cause letters to be delivered by 
suitable carriers, to be appointed by him for that purpose, for which not 
exceeding one or two cents shall be charged, to be paid by the person 
receiving or sending the same, and all sums so received shall be paid into 
the post office department: Provided, The amount of compensation allowed by 
the postmaster general to carriers shall in no case exceed the amount paid 
into the treasury by each town or city under the provisions of this section. 
     3. It is further enacted by c. xxi. s. 2, That the postmaster general 
shall be, and he is hereby, authorized to appoint letter carriers for the 
delivery of letters from any post office in California or Oregon, and to 
allow the letter carriers who may be appointed at any such post office to 
demand and receive such sum for all letters, newspapers, or other mailable 
matter delivered by them, as may be recommended by the postmaster for whose 
office such letter carrier may be appointed, not exceeding five cents for 
every letter, two cents for every newspaper, and two cents for every ounce 
of other mailable matter and the postmaster general shall be, and he is 
hereby, authorized to empower the special agents of the post office 
department in California and Oregon to appoint such letter carriers in their 
districts respectively, and to fix the rates of their compensation within 
the limits aforesaid, subject to, and until the final action of, the 
postmaster general thereon. And such appointments may be made, and rates of 
compensation modified from time to time, as may be deemed expedient and the 
rates of compensation may be fixed, and graduated in respect to the distance 
of the place of delivery from the post office for which such carriers are 
appointed, but the rate of compensation of any such letter carrier shall not 
be changed after his appointment, except by the order of the postmaster 
general; and such letter carriers shall be subject to the provisions of the 
forty-first section of the act entitled "An Act to change the organization 
of the post office, department, and to provide more effectually for the 
settlement of the accounts thereof," approved July second, eighteen hundred 
and thirty-six, except in cases otherwise provided for in this act. 

LETTER OF CREDENCE, international law. A written instrument addressed by the 
sovereign or chief magistrate of a state, to the sovereign or state to whom 
a public minister is sent, certifying his appointment as such, and the 
general objects of his mission, and requesting that full faith and credit 
may be given to what he shall do and say on the part of his court. 
     2. When it is given to an ambassador, envoy, or minister accredited to 
a sovereign, it is addressed to the sovereign or state to whom the minister 
is delegated in the case of a charge d'affaires, it is addressed by the 
secretary or minister of state charged with the department of foreign 
affairs to the minister of foreign affairs of the other government. Wheat. 
International Law, pt. 3, c. 1, Sec. 7; Wicquefort, de l'Ambassadeur, l. 1, 
Sec. 15. 

LETTER OF CREDIT, contracts. An open or sealed letter, from a merchant in 
one place, directed to another, in another place or country, requiring him 
that if a person therein named, or the bearer of the letter, shall have 
occasion to buy commodities, or to want money to any particular or unlimited 
amount, either to procure the same, or to pass his promise, bill, or other 
engagement for it, the writer of the letter undertaking to provide him the 
money for the goods, or to repay him by exchange, or to give him such 
satisfaction as he shall require, either for himself or the bearer of the 
letter. 3 Chit Com. Law, 336; and see 4 Chit. Com. Law, 259, for a form of 
such letter. 
     2. These letters are either general or special; the former is directed 
to the writer's friends or correspondents generally, where the bearer of the 
letter may happen to go; the latter is directed to some particular person. 
When the letter is presented to the person to whom it is addressed, he 
either agrees to comply with the request, in which case he immediately 
becomes bound to fulfill all the engagements therein mentioned; or he 
refuses in which case the bearer should return it to the giver without any 
other proceeding, unless, indeed, the merchant to whom the letter is 
directed is a debtor of the merchant who gave the letter, in which case he 
should procure the letter to be protested. 3 Chit. Com. Law, 337; Mal., 76; 
1 Beawes. 607; Hall's Adm. Pr. 14; 4 Ohio R. 197; 1 Wilc. R. 510. 
     3. The debt which arises on such letter, in its simplest form, when 
complied with, is between the mandator and the mandant; though it may be so 
conceived as to raise a debt also against the person who is supplied by the 
mandatory. 1. When the letter is purchased with money by the person wishing 
for the foreign credit; or, is granted in consequence of a check on his cash 
account, or procured on the credit of securities lodged with the person who 
granted it; or in payment of money due by him to the payee; the letter is, 
in its effects, similar to a bill of exchange drawn on the foreign merchant. 
The payment of the money by the person on whom the letter is granted raises 
a debt, or goes into account between him and the writer of the letter; but 
raises no debt to the person who pays on the letter, against him to whom the 
money is paid. 2. When not so purchased, but truly an accommodation, and 
meant to raise a debt on the person accommodated, the engagement, generally 
is, to see paid any advances made to him, or to guaranty any draft accepted 
or bill discounted and the compliance with the mandate, in such case, raises 
a debt, both against the writer of the letter, and against the person 
accredited. 1 Bell's Com. 371, 6th ed. The bearer of the letter of credit is 
not considered bound to receive the money; he may use the letter as he 
pleases, and he contracts an obligation only by receiving the money. Poth. 
Contr. de Change, 237. 

LETTER OF LICENSE, contracts. An instrument or writing made by creditors to 
their insolvent debtor, by which they bind themselves to allow him a longer 
time than he had a right to, for the payment of his debts and that they will 
not arrest or molest him in his person or property till after the expiration 
of such additional time. 

LETTER OF MARQUE AND REPRISAL, War. A commission granted by the government 
to a private individual, to take the property of a foreign state, or of the 
citizens or subjects of such state, as a reparation for an injury committed 
by such state, its citizens or subjects. A vessel loaded with merchandise, 
on a voyage to a friendly port, but armed for its own defence in case of 
attack by an enemy, is also called a letter of marque. 1 Boulay Paty, tit. 
3, s. 2, p. 300. 
     2. By the constitution, art. 1, s. 8, cl. 11, congress has power to 
grant letters of marque and reprisal. Vide Chit. Law of Nat. 73; 1 Black. 
Com. 251; Vin. Ab. Prerogative, N a; Com. Dig. Prerogative, B 4; Molloy, B. 
1, c. 2, s. 10; 2 Woodes. 440; 6 Rob. Rep. 9; 5 Id. 360; 2 Rob. Rep. 224. 
And vide Reprisal. 

LETTER missive, Engl. law. After a bill has been filed against a peer or 
peeress, or lord of parliament, a petition is presented to the lord 
chancellor for his letter, called a letter missive, which requests the 
defendant to appear and answer to the bill. A neglect to attend to this, 
places the defendant, in relation to such suit, on the same ground as other 
defendants, who are not peers, and a subpoena may then issue. Newl. Pr. 9; 2 
Madd. Ch. Pr. 196; Coop. Eq. Pl. 16. 

LETTER of RECALL. A written document addressed by the executive of one 
government to the executive of another, informing the latter that a minister 
sent by the former to him, has been recalled. 

LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION, com. law. An instrument given by one person to 
another, addressed to a third, in which the bearer is represented as worthy 
of credit. 1 Bell's Com. 371, 6th, ed.; 9 T. R. 51; 7 Cranch, Rep. 69; Fell 
on Guar. c. 8; 6 Johns. R. 181; 13 Johns. R. 224; 1 Day's Cas. Er. 22; and 
the article Recommendation. 

LETTER OF RECREDENTIALS. A document delivered to a minister, by the 
secretary of state of the government to which he was accredited. It is 
addressed to the executive of the minister's country. This is in reply to 
the letter of recall. 

LETTERS CLOSE, Engl. law. Close letters are grants, of the king, and being 
of private concern, they are thus distinguished from letters patent. 

LETTERS AD COLLIGENDUM BONA DE FUNCTI, practice. In default of the 
representatives and creditors to administer to the estate of an intestate, 
the officer entitled to grant letters of administration, may grant to such 
person as he approves, letters to collect the goods of the deceased, which 
neither make him executor nor administrator; his only business being to 
collect the goods and keep them in his safe custody. 2 Bl. Com. 505. 

LETTERS PATENT. The name of an instrument granted by the government to 
convey a right to the patentee; as, a patent for a tract of land; or to 
secure to him a right which he already possesses, as a patent for a new 
invention or discovery; Letters patent are a matter of record. They are so 
called because they are not sealed up, but are granted open. Vide Patent. 

LETTERS OF REQUEST, Eng. eccl. law, An instrument by which a judge of an 
inferior court waives or remits his own jurisdiction in favor of a court of 
appeal immediately superior to it. 
     2. Letters of request, in general, lie only where an appeal would lie, 
and lie only to the next immediate court of appeal, waiving merely the 
primary jurisdiction to the proper appellate court, except letters of 
request from the most inferior ecclesiastical court, which may be direct to 
the court of arches, although one or two courts of appeal may, by this, be 
ousted of their jurisdiction as courts of appeal. 2 Addams, R. 406. The 
effect of letters of request is to give jurisdiction to the appellate court 
in the first instance. Id. See a form of letters of request in 2 Chit. Pr. 
498, note. 

LETTERS ROGATORY. A letter rogatory is an instrument sent in the name and by 
the authority of a judge or court to another, requesting the latter to cause 
to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause depending before the 
former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of the judge or court to 
whom such letters are addressed. In letters rogatory there is always an 
offer on the part of the court whence they issued, to render a similar 
service to the court to which they may be directed whenever required. Pet. 
C. C. Rep. 236. 
     2. Though formerly used in England in the courts of common law, 1 Roll. 
Ab. 530, pl. 13, they have been superseded by commissions of Dedimus 
potestatem, which are considered to be but a feeble substitute. Dunl. Pr. 
223, n.; Hall's Ad. Pr. 37. The courts of admiralty use these letters, which 
are derived from the civil law, and are recognized by the law of nations. 
See Foelix, Dr. Intern. liv. 2, t. 4, p. 800; Denisart, h.t. 

LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, AND OF ADMINISTRATION. It is proposed to consider, 1. 
Their different kinds. 2. Their effect. 
     2.-1. Their different kinds. 1. Letters testamentary. This is an 
instrument in writing, granted by the judge or officer having jurisdiction 
of the probate of wills, under his hand and official seal, making known that 
on the day of the date of the said letters, the last will of the testator, 
(naming him,) was duly proved before him; that the testator left goods, &c., 
by reason, whereof, and the probate of the said will, he certifies "that 
administration of all and singular, the goods, chattels, rights and credits 
of the said deceased, any way concerning his last will and testament, was 
committed to the executor, (naming him,) in the said testament named." 2. 
Letters of administration may be described to be an instrument in writing, 
granted by the judge or officer having jurisdiction and power of granting 
such letters, thereby giving the administrator, (naming him,)," full power 
to administer the goods, chattels, rights and credits, which were of the 
said deceased, in the county or, district in which the said judge or officer 
has jurisdiction; as also to ask, collect, levy, recover and receive the 
credits whatsoever, of the said deceased, which at the time of his death 
were owing, or did in any way belong to him, and to pay the debts in which 
the said deceased stood obliged, so far forth as the said goods and 
chattels, rights and credits will extend, according, to the rate and order 
of law." 3. Letters of administration pendente lite, are letters granted 
during the pendency of a suit in relation to a paper purporting to be the 
last will and testament of the deceased. 4. Letters of administration de 
bonis non, are granted, where the former executor or administrator did not 
administer all the personal estate of the deceased, and where he is dead or 
has been discharged or dismissed. Letters of administration, durante minori 
aetate, are granted where the testator, by his will, appoints an infant 
executor, who is incapable of acting on account of his infancy. Such letters 
remain in force until the infant arrives at an age to take upon himself the 
execution of the will. Com. Dig. Administration, F; Off. Ex. 215, 216. And 
see 6 Rep. 67, b; 5 Rep. 29, a; 11 Vin. Abr. 103; Bac. Ab. h.t. 6. Letters 
of administration durante absentia, are granted when the executor happens to 
be absent at the time when the testator died, and it is necessary that some 
person should act immediately in the management of the affairs of the 
estate. 
     3.-2. Of their effect. 1. Generally. 2. Of their effect in the 
different states, when granted out of the state in which legal proceedings 
are instituted. 
     4.-1. Letters testamentary are conclusive as to personal property, 
while they remain unrevoked; as to realty they are merely prima facie 
evidence of right. 3 Binn. 498; Gilb. Ev. 66;. 6 Binn. 409; Bac. Abr. 
Evidence, F. See 2 Binn. 511. Proof that the testator was insane, or that 
the will was forged, is inadmissible. 16 Mass. 433; 1 Lev. 236. But if the 
nature of his plea allow the defendant to enter into such proof, he may show 
that the seal of the supposed probate has been forged, or that the letters 
have been obtained by surprise; 1 Lev. 136; or been revoked;  15 Serg. & 
Rawle, 42; or that the testator is alive. 15 Serg. & Rawle, 42; 3 T. R. 130. 
     5.-2. The effect of letters testamentary, and of administration 
granted, in some one of the United States, is different in different states. 
A brief view of the law on this subject will here be given, taking the 
states in alphabetical order. 
     6. Alabama. Administrators may sue upon letters of administration 
granted in another state, where the intestate had no known place of 
residence in Alabama at the time of his death, and no representative has 
been appointed in the state; but before rendition of the judgment, he must 
produce to the court his letters of administration, authenticated according 
to the laws of the United States, and the certificate of the clerk of some 
county court in this state, that the letters have been recorded in his 
office. Before he is entitled to the money on the judgment, he must also 
give bond, payable to the judge of the court where the judgment is rendered, 
for the faithful administration of the money received. Aiken's Dig. 183 
Toulm. Dig. 342. 
     7. Arkansas. When the deceased had no residence in Arkansas, and he 
devised lands by will, or where the intestate died possessed of lands, 
letters testamentary or of administration shall be granted in the county 
where the lands lie, or of one of them, if they lie in several counties; and 
if the deceased had no such place of residence and no lands, such letters 
may be granted in the county in which the testator or intestate died, or 
where the greater part of his estate may be. Rev. Stat. c. s. 2. 
     8. Connecticut. Letters testamentary issued in another state, are not 
available in this. 3 Day 303. Nor are letters of administration. 3 Day, 74; 
and see 2 Root, 462. 
     9. Delaware. By the act of 1721, 1 State Laws, 82, it is declared in 
substance, that when any person shall die, leaving bona notabilia, in 
several counties in the state and in Pennsylvania or elsewhere; and, any 
person not residing in the state, obtains letters of administration out of 
the state, the deceased being indebted to any of the inhabitants of the 
state, for a debt contracted within the same to the value of œ20, then, and 
in such case, such administrator, before he can obtain any judgment in any 
court of record within the state against any inhabitant thereof, by virtue 
of such letters of administration, is obliged to file them with some of the 
registers in this state; and must enter into bonds with sufficient sureties, 
who have visible estates here, with condition to pay and satisfy all such 
debts as were owing by the intestate at the time of his death to any person 
residing in this state, so far as the effects of the deceased in this state 
will extend. By the act of June 16, 1769, 1 State Laws, 448, it is enacted 
in substance that any will in writing made by a person residing out of the 
state, whereby any lands within the state are devised, which shall be proved 
in the chancery in England, Scotland, Ireland, or any colony, plantation, or 
island in America, belonging to the king of Great Britain, or in the 
hustings, or mayor's court, in London, or in some manor court, or before 
such persons as have power or authority at the time of proving such wills, 
in the places aforesaid, to take probates of wills, shall be good and 
available in law for granting the lands devised, as well as of the goods and 
chattels bequeathed by such will. The copies of such will, and of the bill, 
answer, depositions and decree, where proved in any court of chancery, or 
copies of such wills and the probate thereof, where proved in any other 
court, or in any office as aforesaid, being transmitted to this state, and 
produced under the public or common-seal of the court or office where the 
probate is taken, or under the great seal of the kingdom, colony, plantation 
or island, within which such will is proved (except copies of such wills and 
probates as shall appear to be revoked), are declared to be matter of 
record, and to be good evidence in an any court of law or equity in this 
state, to prove the gift or devise made in such will; and such probates are 
declared to be sufficient to enable executors to bring their actions within 
any court within this state, as if the same probates or letters testamentary 
were granted here, and produced under the seal of any of the registers 
offices within this state. By the 3d section of the act, it is declared that 
the copies of such wills and probates so produced, and given in evidence, 
shall not be returned by the court to the persons producing them, but shall 
be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county where the same are 
given in evidence, at the expense of the party producing the same. 
    10. Florida. Copies of all wills, and letters testamentary and of 
administration, heretofore recorded in any public office of record in the 
state, when duly certified by the keeper of said records, shall be received 
in evidence in all courts of record in this state and the probate of wills 
granted in any of the United States or of the territories thereof, in any 
foreign country or state, duly authenticated and certified according to the 
laws of the state or territory, or of the foreign country or state, where 
such probate may have been granted, shall likewise be received in evidence 
in all courts of record in this state. 
    11. Georgia. To enable executors and administrators to sue in Georgia, 
the former must take out letters testamentary in the county where the 
property or debt is; and administrators, letters of administration. Prince's 
Dig. 238; Act of 1805, 2 Laws of Geo. 268. 
    12. Illinois. Letters testamentary must be taken out in this state, and 
when the will is to be proved, the original must be produced; administrators 
of other states must take out letters in Illinois, before they can maintain 
an action in the courts of the state. 3 Grif. Reg. 419. 
    13. Indiana. Executors and administrators appointed in another state may 
maintain actions and suits and do all other acts coming within their powers, 
as such, within this state, upon producing authenticated copies of such 
letters and filing them with the clerk of the court in which such suits are 
to be brought. Rev. Code, c. 24, Feb. 17, 1838, sec. 44. 
    14. Kentucky executors and administrators appointed in other states may 
sue in Kentucky "upon filing with the clerk of the court where the suit is 
brought, an authenticated copy of the certificate of probate, or orders 
granting letters of administration of said estate, given in such non-
resident's  state." 1 Dig. Stat. 536; 2 Litt. 194; 3 Litt. 182. 
    15. Louisiana. Executors or administrators of other states must take out 
letters of curatorship in this state. Exemplifications of wills, and 
testaments are evidence. 4 Griff. L. R. 683; 8 N. S. 586. 
    16. Maine. Letters of administration must be taken from some court of 
probate in this state. Copies of wills which have been proved in a court of 
probate in any of the United States, or in a court of probate of any other 
state or kingdom, with a copy of the probate thereof, under the seal of the 
court where such wills have been proved, may be filed and recorded in any 
probate court in this state, which recording shall be of the same force as 
the recording and proving the original will. Rev. Stat. T. 9, c. 107 Sec. 
20; 3 Mass, 514; 9 Mass. 337; 11 Mass. 256; 1 Pick. 80; 3 Pick. 128. 
    17. Maryland. Letters testamentary or of administration granted out of 
Maryland have no effect in this state, except only such letters issued in 
the District of Columbia, and letters granted there authorize executors or 
administrators to claim and sue in this state. Act of April 1813, chap. 165. 
By the act of 1839, chap. 41, when non-resident owners of any public or 
state of Maryland stocks, or stocks of the city of Baltimore, or any other 
corporation in this state die, their executors or administrators constituted 
under the authority of the state, district, territory or country, where the 
deceased resided at his death, have the same power as to such stocks, as if 
they were appointed by authority of the state of Maryland. But, before they 
can transfer the stocks, they must, during three months, give notice to two 
newspapers published in Baltimore, of the death of the testator or 
intestate, and of the "amount and description of the stock designed to be 
transferred." Administration must be granted in this state, in order to 
recover a debt due here to a decedent, or any of his property, with the 
exceptions above noticed. 
    18. Massachusetts. When any person shall die intestate in any other 
state or country, leaving estate to be administered within this state, 
administration thereof shall be granted by the judge of probate of any 
county, in which there is any estate to be administered; and the 
administration, which shall be first lawfully granted shall extend to all 
the estate of the deceased within the state, and shall exclude the 
jurisdiction of the probate court in every other county. Rev. Stat., ch. 64, 
s. 3. See 3 Mass. 514; 5 Mass. 67; 11 Mass. 256 Id. 314; 1 Pick. 81. 
    19. Michigan. Letters testamentary or letters of administration granted 
out of the state are not of any validity in it. In order to collect the 
debts or to obtain the property a deceased person who was not a resident of 
the state, it is requisite to take out letters testamentary or letters of 
administration from a probate court of this stafe, within whose jurisdiction 
the property lies, which letters operate over all the state, and then sue in 
the name of the executor or administrator so appointed. Rev. Stat. 280. When 
the deceased leaves a will executed according to the laws of this state, and 
the same is admitted to proof and record where he dies, a certified 
transcript of the will and probate thereof, may be proved and recorded in 
any county in this state, where the deceased has property real or personal, 
and letters testamentary may issue thereon. Rev. Stat. 272, 273. 
    2O. Mississippi. Executors or administrators in another state or 
territory cannot as such, sue nor be sued in this state. In order to recover 
a debt due to a deceased person or his property, there must be taken out in 
the state, letters of administration or letters with the will annexed, as 
the case may  be. These may be taken out from the probate court of the 
county where the proprty is situated, by a foreign as well as a local 
creditor, or any person interested in the estate of the deceased, if 
properly qualified in other  respects. Walker's R. 211. 
    21. Missouri. Letters testamentary or of administration granted in 
another state have no validity in this; to maintain a suit, the executors or 
administrators must be appointed under the laws of this state. Rev. Code, 
Sec. 2, pt 41. 
    22. New Hampshire. One who has obtained letters of administrition; 
Adams' Rep. 193, or letters testamentary under the authority of another 
state, cannot maintain an action in New Hampshire by virtue of such letters. 
3 Griff. L. R. 41. 
    23. New Jersey. Executors having letter testamentary, and administrators 
letters of administration granted in another state, cannot sue thereon in 
New Jersey, but must obtain such letters in that state as the law 
prescribes. 4 Griff. L R. 1240. By the act of March 6, 1828, Harr. Comp. 
195, when a will has been admitted to probate in any state or territory of 
the United States, or foreign nation, the surrogate of any county or this 
state is authorized, on application of the executor or any person interested,

on filing a duly exemplified copy of the will, to appoint a time not less 
than thirty days, and not more than six-months distant, of which notice is 
to be given as he shall direct, and if at such time, no sufficient reason be 
shown to the contrary, to a omit such will to probate, and grant letters 
testamentary or of administration cum testamento annexo, which shall have 
the same effect as though the original will had been produced and proved 
under form. If the person to whom such letters testamentary or of 
administration be granted, is not a resident of this state, he is required 
to give security for the faithful administration of the estate. By the 
statute passed February 28, 1838, Elmer's Dig. 602, no instrument of writing 
can be admitted to probate under the preceding act unless it be signed and 
published by the testator as his will. See Saxton's Ch. R. 332. 
    24. New York. An executor or administrator appointed in another state 
has no authority to sue in New York. 6 John. Ch. Rep. 353; 7 John. Ch. Rep. 
45; 1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 153. Whenever an intestate, not being an inhabitant of 
this state, shall die out of the state, leaving assets in several counties, 
or assets shall after his death come in several counties, the surrogate of 
any county in which assets shall be, shall have power to grant letters of 
administration on the estate of such intestate; but the surrogate, who shall 
first grant letters of administration on such estate, shall be deemed 
thereby to have acquired sole and exclusive jurisdiction over such estate, 
and shall be vested with the powers incidental thereto. Rev. Stat. part 2, 
c. 6. tit. 2, art. 2, s. 24; 1 R. L. 455 Sec. 3; Laws, of 1823, p. 62, s. 2, 
1824, p. 332. 
    25. North Carolina. It was decided by the court of conference, then the 
highest tribunal in North Carolina, that letters granted in Georgia were 
insufficient. Conf. Rep. 68. But the supreme court have since held that 
letters testamentary granted in South Carolina, were sufficient to enable an 
executor to sue in North Carolina. 1 Car. Law Repos. 471. See 1 Heyw. 364. 
    26. By the revised statutes, ch. 46, s. 6, it is provided, that "where a 
testator or testatrix shall appoint any person, residing out of this state, 
executor or executrix of his or her last will and testament, it shall be the 
duty of the court of pleas and quarter sessions, before which the said will 
shall be offered for probate, to cause the executor or executrix named 
therein, to enter into bond with good and sufficient security for his or her 
faithful administration of the estate of the said testator or testatrix and 
for the distribution thereof in the manner prescribed by law; the penalty of 
said bond shall be double the supposed amount of the personal estate of the 
said testator or testatrix; and until the said executor or executrix shall 
enter into such bond, he or she shall have no power nor authority to 
intermeddle with the estate of the said testator or testatrix; and the court 
of the county in which the testator or testatrix had his or her last usual 
place of residence, shall proceed to, grant letters of administration with 
the will annexed, which shall continue in force until the said executor or 
executrix shall enter into bond as aforesaid. Provided nevertheless, and it 
is hereby declared, that the said executor or executrix shall enter into 
bond as by this act directed within the space of one year after the death of 
the said testator, or testatrix, and not afterwards." 
    27. Ohio. Executors and administrators appointed under the authority of 
another state, may, by virtue of such appointment, sue in this. Ohio Stat. 
vol. 38, p. 146; Act. of March 23, 1840, which, went into effect the first 
day of November following; Swan's Coll. 184. 
    28. Pennsylvania. Letters testamentary or of administration, or 
otherwise purporting to authorize any person to intermeddle with the estate 
of a decedent, granted out of the commonwealth, do not in general confer on 
any such person any of the powers, and authorities possessed by an executor 
or administrator, under letters granted within the state. Act of March 15, 
1832 s. 6. But by the act of April 14, 1835, s. 3, this rule is declared not 
to apply to any public debt or loan of this commonwealth; but such public 
debt or loan shall pass and be transferable, and the dividends thereon 
accrued and to accrue, be receivable in like manner and in all respects and 
under the same and no other regulations, powers and authorities as were used 
and practiced before the passage of the above mentioned act. And the act of 
June 16, 1836, s. 3, declares that the above act of March 15, 1832, s. 6, 
shall not apply to shares of stock in any bank or other incorporated 
company, within this commonwealth, but such shares of stock shall pass and 
be transferable, and the dividends thereon accrued and to accrue, be 
receivable in like manner in all respects, and under the same regulations, 
powers and authorities as were used and practiced with the loans or public 
debts of the United States and were used and practiced with the loans or 
public debt of this commonwealth, before the passage of the, said act of 
March 15, 1832, s. 6, unless the by-laws, rules and regulations of any such 
bank or corporation, shall, otherwise provide and declare. Executors and 
administrators who had been lawfully appointed in some other of the United 
States, might, by virtue of their letters duly authenticated by the proper 
officer, have sued in this state. 4 Dall. 492; S. C. 1 Binn. 63. But letters 
of administration granted by the archbishop of York, in England, give no 
authority to the administrator in Pennsylvania. 1 Dall. 456. 
    29. Rhode Island. It does not appear to be settled whether executors and 
administrators appointed in another state, may, by virtue of such 
appointment, sue in this. 3 Griff. L. R. 107, 8. 
    30. South Carolina. Executors and administrators of other states, 
cannot, as such, sue in South Carolina; they must take out letters in the 
state. 3 Griff. L. R. 848. 
    31. Tennessee. 1. Where any person or persons may obtain, administration 
on the estate of any intestate, in any one of the United States, or 
territory thereof, such person or persons shall be enabled to prosecute 
suits in any court in this state, in the same manner as if administration 
had been granted to such person or persons by any court in the state of 
Tennessee. Provided, that such person or persons shall, produce a copy of 
the letters of administration, authenticated in the manner which has been 
prescribed by the congress of the United States, for authenticating the 
records or judicial acts of any one state, in order to give them validity in 
any other state and that such letters of administration had been granted in 
pursuance of, and agreeable to the laws of the state or territory in which 
such letters of administration were granted. 
    32.-2. When any executor or executors may prove the last will and 
testament of any deceased person, and take on him or themselves the 
execution of said will in any state in the United States, or in any 
territory thereof, such person or persons shall be enabled to prosecute 
suits in any court in this state, in the same manner as if letters 
testamentary had been granted to him or them, by any court within the state 
of Tennessee. Provided, That such executor or executors shall, produce a 
certified copy of the letters testamentary under the hand and seal of the 
clerk of the court where the same were obtained, and a certificate by the 
chief justice, presiding judge, or chairman of such court, that the clerk's 
certificate is in due form, and that such letters testamentary had been 
granted in pursuance of, and agreeable to, the laws of the state or 
territory in which such letters testamentary were granted. Act of 1839, 
Carr. & Nich. Comp. 78. 
    33. Vermont. If the deceased person shall, at the time of his death, 
reside in any other state or country, leaving estate to be administered in 
this state, administration thereof shall be granted by the probate court of 
the district in which there shall be estate to administer; and the 
administration first legally granted, shall extend to all the estate of the 
deceased in this state, and shall exclude the jurisdiction of the probate 
court of every other district. Rev. Stat. tit. 12, c. 47, s. 2. 
    34. Virginia. Authenticated copies of wills, proved according to the 
laws of any of the United States, or of any foreign country, relative to any 
estate in Virginia, may be offered for probate in the general court, or if 
the estate lie altogether in any other county or corporation, in the 
circuit, county or corporation court of such county or corporation. 3 Griff. 
L. R. 345. It is understood to be the settled law of Virginia, though there 
is no statutory provision on the subject, that no probate of a will or grant 
of administration in another state of the Union, or in a foreign country, 
and no qualification of an executor or administrator, elsewhere than in 
Virginia, give any such executor or administrator any right to demand the 
effects or debts of the decedent, which may happen to be within the 
jurisdiction of the state. There must be a regular probate or grant of 
administration and qualification of the executor or administrator in 
Virginia, according to her laws. And the doctrine prevails in the federal 
courts held in Virginia, as well as in the state courts. 3 Grif. Reg. 348. 

LEVANT ET COUCHANT. This French phrase, which ought perhaps more properly to 
be couchant et levant, signifies literally rising and lying down. In law, it 
denotes that space of time which cattle have been on the land in which they 
have had time to lie down and rise again, which, in general, is held to be 
one night at least. 3 Bl. Com. 9; Dane's Ab. Index, h. t; 2 Lilly's Ab. 167; 
Wood's Inst. 190; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1641. 

LEVARI FACIAS, Eng. law. A writ of execution against the goods and chattels 
of a clerk. Also the writ of execution on a judgment at the suit of the 
crown. When issued against an ecclesiastic, this writ is in effect the writ 
of fieri facias directed to the bishop of the diocese, commanding him to 
cause execution to be made of the goods and chattels of the defendant in his 
diocese. The writ also recites, that the sheriff had returned that the 
defendant had no lay fee, or goods or chattels whereof he could make a levy, 
and that the defendant was a beneficed clerk; &c. See 1, Chit. R. 428; Id. 
589, for cases when it issues at the suit of the crown. This writ is also 
used to recover the plaintiff's debt; the sheriff is commanded to levy, 
such debt on the lands and goods of the defendant, in virtue of which he may 
seize his goods, and receive the rents and profits of his lands, till 
satisfaction be made to the plaintiff. 8 Bl. Com. 417; Vin. Ab. 14; Dane's 
Ab. Index, h.t. 
     2. In Pennsylvania, this writ is used to sell lands mortgaged after a 
judgment has been obtained by the mortgagee, or his assignee, against the 
mortgagor, under peculiar. proceeding authorized by statute. 3 Bouv. Inst. 
n. 3396. 

LEVITICAL DEGREES. Those degrees of 'kindred set forth' in the eighteenth 
chapter of Leviticus, within which persons are prohibited to marry. Vide 
Branch; Descent; Line. 

LEVY, practice. A seizure (q.v.) the raising of the money for which an 
execution has been issued. 
     2. In order to make a valid levy on personal property, the sheriff must 
have it within his power and control, or at least within his view, and if, 
having it so, he makes a levy upon it, it will be good if followed up 
afterwards within a reasonable time, by his taking possession in such 
manner as to apprize everybody of the fact of its having been taken into 
execution. 3 Rawle R. 405-6; 1 Whart. 377; 2 S. & R. 142; 1 Wash C. C. R. 
29; 6 Watts, 468; 1 Whart. 116. The usual mode of making levy upon real 
estate, is to describe the land which has been seised under the execution, 
by metes and bounds, as in a deed of conveyance. 3 Bouv. Inst. n. 3391. 
     3. It is a general rule, that when a sufficient levy has been made, the 
officer cannot make a second. 12 John. R. 208; 8 Cowen, R. 192. 

LEVYING WAR, crim. law. The assembling of a body of men for the purpose of 
effecting by force a treasonable object; and all who perform any part 
however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are 
leagued in the general conspiracy, are considered as engaged in levying war, 
within the meaning of the constitution. 4 Cranch R. 473-4; Const. art. 3, s. 
3. Vide Treason; Fries' Trial; Pamphl. This is a technical term, borrowed 
from the English law, and its meaning is the same as it is when used in 
stat. 25 Ed. III.; 4 Cranch's R. 471; U. S. v. Fries, Pamphl. 167; Hall's 
Am. Law Jo. 351; Burr's Trial; 1 East, P. C. 62 to 77; Alis. Cr. Law of 
Scotl. 606; 9 C. & P. 129.   

LEX. The law. A law for the government of mankind in society. Among the 
ancient Romans, this word was frequently used as synonymous with right, jus. 
When put absolutely, lex meant the Law of the Twelve Tables. 

LEX FALCIDIA, civ. law. The name of a law which permitted a testator to 
dispose of three-fourths of his property, but he could not deprive his heir 
of the other fourth. It was made during the reign of Augustus, about the 
year of Rome 714, on the requisition of Falcidius, a tribune. Inst. 2, 22; 
Dig. 35, 2; Code, 6, 50;. and Nov. 1 and 131. Vide article Legitime, and 
Coop. Just. 486; Rob. Frauds, 290, note 113. 

LEX FORI, practice. The law of the court or forum.
     2. The forms of remedies, the modes of proceeding, and the execution of 
judgments, are to be regulated solely and exclusively, by the laws of the 
place where the action is instituted or as the civilians uniformly express 
it, according to the lex fori. Story, Confl. of Laws, Sec. 550; 1 Caines' 
Rep. 402; 3 Johns. Ch. R. 190; 5 Johns. R. 132; 2 Mass. R. 84; 7 Mass. R. 
515; 3 Conn. R. 472; 7 M. R. 214; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 860. 

LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS, contracts. The law of the place where an agreement is 
made. 
     2. Generally, the validity of a contract is to be decided by the law of 
the place where, the contract is made; if valid, there it is, in general, 
valid everywhere. Story, Confl. of Laws, Sec. 242, and the cases there 
cited. And vice versa if void or illegal there, it is generally void 
everywhere. Id Sec. 243; 2 Kent Com. 457; 4 M. R. 584; 7 M. R. 213; 11 M. R. 
730; 12 M. R. 475; 1 N. S. 202; 5 N. S. 585; 6 N. S. 76; 6 L. R. 676; 6 N. 
S. 631; 4 Blackf. R. 89. 
     3. There is an exception to the rule as to the universal validity of 
contracts. The comity of nations, by virtue of which such contracts derive 
their force in foreign countries, cannot prevail in cases where it violates 
the law of our own country, the law of nature, or the law of God. 2 Barn. & 
Cresw. 448, 471. And a further exception may be mentioned, namely, that no 
nation will regard or enforce the revenue laws of another country. Cas. 
Temp. 85, 89, 194. 
     4. When the contract is entered into in one place, to be executed in 
another, there are two loci contractus; the locus celebrate contractus, and 
the locus solutionis; the former governs in everything which relates to the 
mode of construing the contract, the meaning to be attached to the 
expressions, and the nature and validity of the engagement; but the latter 
governs the performance of the agreement. 8 N. S. 34. Vide 15 Serg. & Rawle 
84; 2 Mass. R. 88; 1 Nott & M'Cord, 173; 2 Harr. & Johns. 193, 221; 2 N. H. 
Rep. 42; 5 Id. 401; 2 John. Cas. 355; 5 Pardes. n. 1482; Bac. Abr. Bail in 
Civil Causes, B 5; Com. Dig. 545, n.; 1 Supp. to Ves. jr. 270; 8 Ves. 198; 5 
Ves. 750. 

LEX LONGOBARDORUM. The name of an ancient code in force among the Lombards. 
It contains many evident traces of feudal policy. It survived the 
destruction of the ancient government of Lombardy by Charlemagne, and is 
said to be still partially in force in some districts of Italy. 

LEX MERCATORIA. That system of laws which is adopted by all commercial 
nations, and which, therefore, constitutes a part of the law of the land. 
Vide Law Merchant. 

LEX TALIONIS. The law of retaliation an example of which is given in the law 
of Moses, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, &c. 
     2. Jurists and writers on international law are divided as to the right 
of one nation punishing with death, by way of retaliation, the citizen's or 
subjects of another nation; in, the United States no example of such 
barbarity has ever been witnessed but, prisoners have been kept in close 
confinement in retaliation for the same conduct towards American prisoners. 
Vide Rutherf. Inst. b. 2, c. 9; Mart. Law of Nat. b. 8, c. 1, s. 3, note 1 
Kent, Com. 93. 
     3. Writers on the law of nations have divided retaliation into 
vindictive and amicable: By the former are meant those acts of retaliation 
which amount to a war; the latter those acts of retaliation which correspond 
to the acts of the other nation under similar circumstances. Wheat. Intern. 
Law, pt. 4, c. 1, Sec. 1. 

LEX TERAE. The law of the land. The phrase is used to distinguish this from 
the civil or Roman law. 
     2. By lex terrae, as used in Magna Charta, is meant one process of law, 
namely, proceeding by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men. 2 
Inst. 50; 19 Wend. 659; 4 Dev. R. 15. in the constitution of Tennessee, the 
words "the law of the land" signify a general and public law, operating 
equally upon every member of the community. 10 Yerg. 71. 

LEY. This word is old French, a corruption of loi, and signifies law; for 
example, Termes de la Ley, Terms of the Law. In another, and an old 
technical sense, ley signifies an oath, or the oath with compurgators; as, 
il tend sa ley aiu pleyntiffe. Brit. c. 27. 

LEY-GAGER. Wager of Law. (q.v.)

LIABILITY. Responsibility; the state of one who is bound in law and justice 
to do something which may be enforced by action. This liability may arise 
from contracts either express or implied, or in consequence of torts 
committed. 
     2. The liabilities of one man are not in general transferred to his 
representative's further than to reach the estate in his hands. For example, 
an executor is not responsible for the liabilities of his testator further 
than the estate of the testator which has come to his hands. See Hamm. on 
Part. 169, 170. 
     3. The husband is liable for his wife's contracts made dum sola, and 
for those made during coverture for necessaries, and for torts committed 
either while she was sole or since her marriage with him; but this liability 
continues only during the coverture; as to her torts, or even her contracts 
made before marriage; for the latter, however, she may be sued as her 
executor or administrator, when she assumes that character. 
     4. A master is liable for the acts of his servant while in his employ, 
performed in the usual course of his business, upon the presumption that 
they have been authorized by him; but he is responsible only in a civil 
point of view and not criminally, unless the acts have been actually 
authorized by him. See Bouv. Inst. Index, h.t.; Driver; Quasi Offence; 
Servant. 

LIBEL, practice. A libel has been defined to be "the plaintiff's petition or 
allegation, made and exhibited in a judicial process, with some solemnity of 
law;" it is also, said to be "a short and well ordered writing, setting 
forth in a clear manner, as well to the judge as to the defendant, the 
plaintiff's or accuser's intention in judgment." It is a written statement 
by a plaintiff, of his cause of action, and of the relief he seeks to obtain 
in a suit. Law's Eccl. Law, 147; Ayl. Par. 346; Shelf. on M. & D. 506; Dunl. 
Admr. Pr. 111; Betts. Adm. Pr. 17; Proct. Pr. h.t.; 2 Chit. Pr. 487, 533. 
     2. The libel should be a narrative, specious, clear, direct, certain, 
not general, nor alternative. 3 Law's Eccl. Law. 147. It should contain, 
substantially, the following requisites: 1. The name, description, and 
addition of the plaintiff, who makes his demand by bringing his action. 2 
The name, description, and addition of the defendant. 3. The name of the 
judge with a respectful designation of his office and court. 4. The thing or 
relief, general or special, which is demanded in the suit. 5. The grounds 
upon which the suit is founded. All these things are summed up in Latin, as 
follows; 

      Quis, quid, coram quo, quo jure petitur, et a quo,    
      Recte compositus quique libellus habet: 

which has been translated, 

     Each plaintiff and defendant's name, 
     and eke the judge who tries the same, 
     The thing demanded and the right whereby 
     You urge to have it granted instantly: 
     He doth a libel write and well compose, 
     Who forms the same, emitting none of those.

     3. The form of a libel is either simple or articulate. The simple form 
is, when the cause of action is stated in a continuous narration, when the 
cause of action can be briefly set forth. The articulate form, is when the 
cause of action is stated in distinct allegations, or articles. 2 Law's 
Eccl. Law, 148; Hall's Adm. Pr. 123; 7 Cranch, 349. The material facts 
should be stated in distinct articles in the libel, with as much exactness 
and attention to times and circumstances, as in a declaration at common law. 
4 Mason, 541. Pompous diction and strong epithets are out of place in a 
legal paper designed to obtain the admission of the opposite party of the 
averments it contains, or to lay before the court the facts which the actor 
will prove. 
     4. Although there is no fixed formula for libels and the court will 
receive such an instrument from the party in such form as his own skill or 
that of his counsel may enable him to give it, yet long usage has sanctioned 
forms, which it may be most prudent to adopt. The parts and arrangement of 
libels commonly employed are, 
     5.-1. The address to the court; as, To the Honorable John K. Kane, 
Judge of the district court of the United States, within and for the eastern 
district of Pennsylvania. 
     6.-2. The names and descriptions of the parties. Persons competent to 
sue at common law may be parties libellants, and similar regulations obtain 
in the admiralty courts and the common law courts, respecting those 
disqualified from suing in their own right or name. Married women prosecute 
by their husbands, or by prochein ami, when the husband has an adverse 
interest to hers; minors, by guardians, tutors, or prochein ami; lunatics 
and persons non compos mentis, by tutor, guardian ad litem, or committee; 
the rights of deceased persons are prosecuted by executors or 
administrators; and corporations are represented, and proceeded against as 
at common law. 
     7.-3. The averments or allegations setting forth the cause of action 
should be conformable to the truth, and so framed as to correspond with the 
evidence. Every fact requisite to establish the libellant's right should be 
clearly stated, so that it may be directly met by the opposing party by 
admission, denial or avoidance; this is the more necessary because no proof 
can be given, or decree rendered, not covered by and conformable to the 
allegations. 1 Law's Eccl. Laws, 150; Hall's Pr. 126; Dunl. Adm. Pr. 113; 7 
Cranch, 394. 
     8.-4. The conclusion, or prayer for relief and process; the prayer 
should be for the specific relief desired; for general relief, as is usual 
in bills in chancery; the conclusion should also pray for general, or 
particular process. Law's Eccl. Law, 149; and see 3 Mason, R. 503. 
Interrogatories are sometimes annexed to the libel; when this is the case, 
there is usually a special prayer, that the defendant may be required to 
answer the libel, and the interrogatories annexed and propounded. This, 
however, is a dangerous practice, because it renders the answers of the 
defendant evidence, which must be disproved by two witnesses, or by one 
witness, corroborated by very strong circumstances. 
     9. The libel is the first proceeding in a suit in admiralty in the 
courts of the United States. 3 Mason, R., 504. It is also used in some other 
courts. Vide, generally, Dunl. Adm. Pr. ch. 3; Bett's Adm. Pr. s. 3; Shelf. 
on. M. & D. 606; Hall's Adm. Pr. Index, h.t.; 3 Bl. Com. 100; Ayl. Par. 
Index, h.t.; Com. Dig. Admiralty, E; 2 Roll. &b. 298. 

LIBEL, libellus, criminal law. A malicious defamation expressed either in 
printing or writing, or by signs or pictures, tending to blacken the memory 
of one who is dead, with intent to provoke the living; or the reputation of 
one who is alive, and to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. 
Hawk. b. 1, c. 73, s. 1; Wood's Inst, 444; 4 Bl. Com. 150; 2 Chitty, Cr. 
Law, 867; Holt on Lib. 73; 5 Co. 125; Salk. 418; Ld. Raym. 416; 4. T. R. 
126; 4 Mass. R. 168; 9 John. 214; 1 Den. Rep. 347; 2 Pick. R. 115; 2 Kent, 
Com. 13. It has been defined perhaps with more precision to be a censorious 
or ridiculous writing, picture or sign made with a malicious or mischievous 
intent, towards government magistrates or individuals. 3 John. Cas. 354; 9 
John. R. 215; 5 Binn. 340. 
     2. In briefly considering this offence, we will inquire, 1st. By what 
mode of expression a libel may be conveyed. 2d. Of what kind of defamation 
it must consist. 3d. How plainly it must be expressed. 4th. What mode of 
publication is essential. 
     3.-1. The reduction of the slanderous matter to writing, or printing, 
is the most usual mode of conveying it. The exhibition of a picture, 
intimating that which in print would be libelous, is equally criminal. 2 
Camp. 512; 5 Co. 125; 2 Serg. & Rawle 91. Fixing a gallows at a man's door, 
burning him in effigy, or exhibiting him in any ignominious manner, is a 
libel. Hawk. b. 1, c. 73, s. 2,; 11 East, R. 227. 
     4.-2. There is perhaps no branch of the law which is so difficult to 
reduce to exact, principles, or to compress within a small compass, as the 
requisites of a libel. All publications denying the Christian religion to be 
true; 11 Serg. & Rawle, 394; Holt on Libels, 74; 8 Johns. R. 290; Vent. 293; 
Keb. 607; all writings subversive of morality and tending to inflame the 
passions by indecent language, are indictable at common law. 2 Str. 790; 
Holt on Libels, 82; 4 Burr. 2527. In order to constitute a libel, it is not 
necessary that anything criminal should be imputed to the party injured; it 
is enough if the writer has exhibited him in a ludicrous point of view; has 
pointed him out as an object of ridicule or disgust; has, in short, done 
that which has a natural tendency to excite him to revenge. 2 Wils. 403; 
Bacon's Abr. Libel, A 2;  4 Taunt. 355; 3 Camp. 214; Hardw. 470; 5 Binn. 
349. The case of Villars v. Monsley, 2 Wils. 403, above cited, was grounded 
upon the following verses, which were held to be libelous, namely: 

"Old-Villers, so strong of brimstone you smell, 
 As if not long since you had got out of hell,
 But this damnable smell I no longer can bear,
 Therefore I desire you would come no more here;
 You, old stinking; old nasty, old itchy, old toad,
 If you come any more you shall pay for your board,
 You'll therefore take this as a warning from me,
 And never enter the doors, while they belong to J. P.
 Wilncot, December 4, 1767."

     5. Libels against the memory of the dead which have a tendency to 
create a breach of the peace by inciting the friends and relatives of the 
deceased to avenge the insult of the family, render their authors liable to 
legal animadversion. 5 co. 123; 5 Binn. 281; 2 Chit. Cr. Law, 868; 4 T. R. 
186. 
     6.-3. If the matter be understood as scandalous, and is calculated to 
excite ridicule or abhorrence against the party intended, it is libelous, 
however it may be expressed. 5 East, 463; 1 Price, 11, 17; Hob. 215; Chit. 
Cr. Law, 868; 2 Campb. 512. 
     7.-4. The malicious reading of a libel to one or more persons, it 
being on the shelves in a bookstore, as other books, for sale; and where the 
defendant directed the libel to be printed, took away some and left others; 
these several acts have been held to be publications. The sale of each copy; 
where several copies have been sold, is a distinct publication, and a fresh 
offence.  The publication must be malicious; evidence of the malice may be 
either express or implied. Express proof is not necessary: for where a man 
publishes a writing which on the face of it is libelous, the law presumes he 
does so from that malicious intention which constitutes the offence, and it 
is unnecessary, on the part of the prosecution, to prove any circumstance 
from which malice may be inferred. But no allegation, however false and 
malicious, contained in answers to interrogatories, in affidavits duly made, 
or any other proceedings, in courts of justice, or petitions to the 
legislature, are indictable. 4 Co. 14; 2 Burr. 807; Hawk. B. 1, c. 73, s. 8; 
1 Saund. 131, n. 1; 1 Lev. 240; 2 Chitty's Cr. Law, 869; 2 Serg. & Rawle, 
23. It is no defence that the matter published is part of a document printed 
by order of the house of commons. 9 A. &E. 1. 
     8. The publisher of a libel is liable to be punished criminally by 
indictment; 2 Chitty's Cr. Law, 875; or is subject to an action on the case 
by the party grieved. Both remedies may be pursued at the same time. Vide) 
generally, Holt on Libels; Starkie on Slander; 1 Harr. Dig. Case, I.; Chit. 
Cr. L. Index, h.t.; Chit. Pr. Index, h.t. 

LIBEL OF ACCUSATION. A term used in Scotland to designate the instrument 
which contains the charge against a person accused of a crime. Libels are of 
two kinds, namely, indictments and criminal letters. 
     2. Every libel assumes the form of what is termed in logic, a 
syllogism. It is first stated that some particular kind of act is criminal; 
as, that "theft is a crime of a heinous nature, and severely punishable." 
This proposition is termed the major. It is next stated that the person 
accused is guilty, of the crime so named, "actor, or art and part." This, 
with the narrative of the manner in which, and the time when the offence was 
committed, is called the, minor proposition of the libel. The conclusion is 
that all or part of the facts being proved, or admitted by confession, the 
panel "ought to be punished with the pains of the law, to deter others from 
committing the like crime in all time coming." Burt Man. Pub. L. 300, 301. 

LIBELLANT. The party who fires a libel in a chancery or admiralty case, 
corresponds to the plaintiff in actions in the common law courts, is called 
the libellant. 

LIBELLEE. A party against whom a libel has been filed in chancery 
proceedings, or in admiralty, corresponding to the defendant in a common law 
suit. 

LIBER. A book; a principal subdivision of a literary work: thus, the 
Pandects, or Digest of the Civil Law, is divided into fifty books. 

LIBER ASSISARUM. The book of assizes, or pleas of the crown; being the fifth 
part of the Year Books. (q.v.) 

LIBER FEUD RUM. A code of the feudal law, which was compiled by direction of 
the emperor Frederick Barbarossa, and published in Milan, in 1170. It was 
called the Liber Feudorum, and was divided into five books, of which the 
first, second, and some fragments of the other's still exist and are printed 
at the end of all the modern editions of the Corpus Juris Civilis. Giannone, 
B. 13, c, 3; Cruise's Dig. Prel. Diss. c. 1, Sec. 31. 

LIBER HOMO. A freeman lawfully competent to act as a juror. Raym. 417; Keb. 
563. 

LIBERATE, English practice. A writ which issues on lands, tenements, and 
chattels, being returned under an extent on a statute staple, commanding the 
sheriff to deliver them to the plaintiff, by the extent and appraisement 
mentioned in the writ of extent, and in the sheriff's return thereto. See 
Com dig. Statute Staple, D 6. 

LIBERATION, civil law. This term is synonymous with payment. Dig. 50, 16, 
47. It is the extinguishment of a contract by which he who was bound 
become's free, or liberated. Wolff, Dr. de la Nat. Sec. 749. 

LIBERTI, LIBERTINI. These two words were, at different times, made to 
express among the Romans, the condition of those who, having been slaves, 
had been made free. 1 Brown's Civ. Law, 99. There is some distinction 
between these words. By libertus, was understood the freedman, when 
considered in relation to his patron, who had bestowed liberty upon him and 
he was called libertinus, when considered in relation to the state he 
occupied in society since his manumission. Lec. El. Dr. Rom. Sec. 93. 

LIBERTY. Freedom from restraint. The power of acting as one thinks fit, 
without any restraint or control, except from the laws of nature. 
     2. Liberty is divided into civil, natural, personal, and political. 
     3. Civil liberty is the power to do whatever is permitted by the 
constitution of the state and the laws of the land. It is no other than 
natural liberty, so far restrained by human laws, and no further, operating 
equally upon all the citizens, as is necessary and expedient for the general 
advantage of the public. 1 Black. Com. 125; Paley's Mor. Phil. B. 6, c.5; 
Swifts Syst. 12 
     4. That system of laws is alone calculated to maintain civil liberty, 
which leaves the citizen entirely master of his own conduct, except in those 
points in which the public good requires some direction and restraint. When a

man is restrained in his natural liberty by no municipal laws but those 
which are requisite to prevent his violating the natural law, and to promote 
the greatest moral and physical welfare of the community, he is legally 
possessed of the fullest enjoyment of his civil rights of individual 
liberty. But it must not be inferred that individuals are to judge for 
themselves how far the law may justifiably restrict their individual 
liberty; for it is necessary to the welfare of the commonwealth, that the 
law should be obeyed; and thence is derived the legal maxim, that no man may 
be wiser than the law. 
     5. Natural liberty is the right which nature gives to all mankind, of 
disposing of their persons and property after the manner they judge most 
consonant to their happiness, on condition of their acting within the limits 
of the law of nature, and that they do not in any way abuse it to the 
prejudice of other  men. Burlamaqui, c. 3, s. 15; 1 Bl. Com. 125. 
     6. Personal liberty is the independence of our actions of all other 
will than our own. Wolff, Ins. Nat. Sec. 77. It consists in the power of 
locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to whatever 
place one's inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, 
unless by due course of law. 1 Bl. Com. 134. 
     7. Political liberty may be defined to be, the security by which, from 
the constitution, form and nature of the established government, the 
citizens enjoy civil liberty. No ideas or definitions are more 
distinguishable than those of civil and political liberty, yet they are 
generally confounded. 1 Bl. Com. 6, 125. The political liberty of a state is 
based upon those fundamental laws which establish the distribution of 
legislative and executive powers. The political liberty of a citizen is that 
tranquillity of mind, which is the effect of an opinion that he is in 
perfect security; and to insure this security, the government must be such 
that one citizen shall not fear another. 
     8. In the English law, by liberty is meant a privilege held by grant or 
prescription, by which some men enjoy greater benefits than ordinary 
subjects. A liberty is also a territory, with some extraordinary privilege. 
     9. By liberty or liberties, is understood a part of a town or city, as 
the Northern Liberties of the city of Philadelphia. The same as Fanbourg. 
(q.v.) 

LIBERTY OF THE PRESS. The right to print and publish the truth, from good 
motives, and for justifiable ends. 3 Johns. Cas. 394. 
     2. This right is secured by the constitution of the United States. 
Amendments, art. 1. The abuse of the right is punished criminally, by 
indictment; civilly, by action. Vide Judge Cooper's Treatise on the Law of 
Libel, and the Liberty of the Press, passim; and article Libel. 

LIBERTY OF SPEECH. The right given by the constitution and the laws to 
public support in speaking facts or opinions. 
     2. In a republican government like ours, liberty of speech cannot be 
extended too far, when its object is the public good. It is, therefore, 
wisely provided by the constitution of the United States, that members of 
congress shall not be called to account for anything said in debate; and 
similar provisions are contained in the constitutions of the several states 
in relation to the members of their respective legislatures. This right, 
however, does not extend beyond the mere speaking; for if a member of 
congress were to reduce his speech to writing and cause it to be printed, it 
would no longer bear a privileged character and he might be held responsible 
for a libel, as any other individual. Bac. Ab. Libel, B.* See Debate. 
     3. The greatest latitude is allowed by the common law to counsel; in 
the discharge of his professional duty he may use strong epithets, however 
derogatory to other persons they may be, if pertinent to the cause, and 
stated in his instructions, whether the thing were true or false. But if he 
were maliciously to travel out of his case for the purpose of slandering 
another, he would be liable to an action, and amenable to a just and often 
more efficacious punishment inflicted by public opinion. 3 Chit. Pr. 887. No 
respectable counsel will indulge himself with unjust severity; and it is 
doubtless the duty of the court to prevent any such abuse. 

LIBERUM TENEMENTUM, pleading. The name of a plea in an action of trespass, 
by which the defendant claims the locus in quo to be his soil and freehold, 
or the soil and freehold of a third person, by whose command he entered. 2 
Salk. 453; 7 T. R. 355; 1 Saund. 299, b, note. 

LIBERUM TENEMENTUM, estate. The same as, freehold, (q.v.) or frank 
tenement. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1690. 

LICENSE, contracts. A right given by some competent authority to do an act, 
which without such authority would be illegal. The instrument or writing 
which secures this right, is also called a license. Vide Ayl. Parerg, 353; 
15 Vin. Ab. 92; Ang. Wat. Co. 61, 85. 
     2. A license is express or implied. An express license is one which in 
direct terms authorizes the performance of a certain act; as a license to 
keep a tavern given by public authority. 
     3. An implied license is one which though not expressly given, may be 
presumed from the acts of the party having a right to give it. The following 
are examples of such licenses: 1. When a man knocks at another's door, and 
it is opened, the act of opening the door licenses the former to enter the 
house for any lawful purpose. See Hob. 62. A servant is, in consequence of 
his employment, licensed to admit to the house, those who come on his 
master's business, but only such persons. Selw. N. P. 999; Cro. Eliz. 246. 
It may, however, be inferred from circumstances that the servant has 
authority to invite whom he pleases to the house, for lawful purposes. See 2 
Greenl. Ev. Sec. 427; Entry. 
     4. A license is either a bare authority, without interest, or it is 
coupled with an interest. 1. A bare license must be executed by the party to 
whom it is given in person, and cannot be made over or assigned by him to 
another; and, being without consideration, may be revoked at pleasure, as 
long as it remains executory; 39 Hen. VI. M. 12, page 7; but when carried 
into effect, either partially or altogether, it can only be rescinded, if in 
its nature it will admit of revocation, by placing the other side in the 
same situation in which he stood before he entered on its execution. 8 East, 
R. 308; Palm. 71; S. C. Poph. 151; S. C. 2 Roll. Rep. 143, 152. 
     5.-2. When the license is coupled with an interest the authority 
conferred is not properly a mere permission, but amounts to a grant, which 
cannot be revoked, and it may then be assigned to a third person. 5 Hen. V., 
M. 1, page 1; 2 Mod. 317; 7 Bing. 693; 8 East, 309; 5 B. & C. 221; 7 D. & R. 
783; Crabb on R. P. Sec. 521 to 525; 14 S. & R 267; 4 S. & R. 241; 2 Eq. 
Cas. Ab. 522. When the license is coupled with an interest, the formalities 
essential to confer such interest should be observed. Say. R. 3; 6 East, R. 
602; 8 East, R. 310, note. See 14 S. & R. 267; 4 S. & R. 241; 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 
522; 11 Ad. & El. 34, 39; S. C. 39 Eng, C. L. R. 19. 

LICENSE, International law. An authority given by one of two belligerent 
parties, to the citizens or subjects of the other, to carry on a specified 
trade. 
     2. The effects of the license are to suspend or relax the rules of war 
to the extent of the authority given. It is the assumption of a state of 
peace to the extent of the license. In the country which grants them, 
licenses to carry on a pacific commerce are stricti juris, as being 
exceptions to the general rule; though they are not to be construed with 
pedantic accuracy, nor will every small deviation be held to vitiate the 
fair effect of them. 4 Rob. Rep. 8; Chitty, Law of Nat. 1 to 5, and 260; 1 
Kent, Com. 164, 85. 

LICENSE, pleading. The name of a plea of justification to an action of 
trespass. A license must be specially pleaded, and cannot, like liberum 
tenementum, be given in evidence under the general issue. 2. T. R. 166, 108 

LICENSEE. One to whom a license has been given. 1 M. Q. & S. 699 n. 

LICENTIA CONCORDANDI, estates, conveyancing, practice. When an action is 
brought for the purpose of levying a fine, the defendant, knowing himself to 
be in the wrong, is supposed to make overtures of accommodation to the 
plaintiff, who accepts them; but having given pledges to prosecute his suit, 
applies to the court, upon the return of the writ of covenant, for leave to 
make the matter up; this, which is readily granted, is called the, licentia 
concordandi. 5 Rep. 39; Cruise, Dig. tit. 35, c. 2, 22. 

LICENTIA LOQUENDI. Imparlance. (q.v.)

LICENTIOUSNESS. The doing what one pleases without regard to the rights of 
others; it differs from liberty in this, that the latter is restrained by 
natural or positive law, and consists in doing whatever we please, not 
inconsistent, with the rights of others, whereas the former does not respect 
those rights. Wolff, Inst. Sec. 84. 

LICET SAEPIUS REQUISITUS, pleading. practice. Although often requested. It 
is usually alleged in the declaration that the defendant, licet saepius 
requisitus, &c., he did not perform the contract, the violation of which is 
the foundation of the action. The allegation is generally sufficient when a 
request is not parcel of the contract. Indeed, in such cases it is 
unnecessary even to lay a general request, for the bringing of the suit is 
itself a sufficient request. 1 Saund. 33, n. 2; 2 Saund, 118 note 3; Plowd. 
128; 1 Wils. 33; 2 H. BI. 131; 1 John. Cas. 99, 319; 7 John. R. 462; 18 
John. R. 485; 3 M. & S. 150. Vide Demand. 

LICET. It is lawful; not forbidden by law. Id omne licitum est, quod non est 
legibus prohibitum; quamobrem, quod, lege permittente, fit, poenam non 
meretur. 

LICITATION. A sale at auction; a sale to the highest bidder.

LIDFORD LAW. Vide Lynch Law.

TO LIE. That which is proper, is fit; as, an action on the case lies for an 
injury committed without force; corporeal hereditaments lie in livery, that 
is, they pass by livery; incorporeal hereditaments lie in grant, that is, 
pass by the force of the grant, and without any livery. Vide Lying in grant. 

LIEGE, from the Latin, ligare, to bind. The bond subsisting between the 
subject and chief, or lord and vassal, binding the one to protection and 
just government, the other to tribute and due subjection. The prince or 
chief is called liege lord; the subjects liege men. The word is now applied 
as if the liegance or bond were only to attach the people to the prince. 
Stat. 8 Hen. VI. c. 10; 14 Hen. VIII. c. 2; 1 Bl. Com. 367. 

LIEGE POUSTIE, Scotch law. The condition or state of a person who is in his 
ordinary health and capacity, and not a minor, nor cognosced as an idiot or 
madman, nor under interdiction. He is then said to be in liege poustie, or 
in legitima potestati, and he has full power of disposal of his property. 1 
Bell's Com. 85, 5th ed.; 6 Clark & Fin. 540. Vide Sui juris. 

LIEN, contracts. In its most extensive signification, this term includes 
every case in which real or personal property is charged with the payment of 
any debt or duty; every such charge being denominated a lien on the 
property. In a more limited sense it is defined to be a right of detaining 
the property of another until some claim be satisfied. 2 East 235; 6 East 
25; 2 Campb. 579;  2 Meriv. 494; 2 Rose, 357; 1 Dall. R. 345. 
     2. The right of lien generally arises by operation of law, but in some 
cases it is created by express contract. 
     3. There are two kinds of lien; namely, particular and general. When a 
person claims a right to retain property, in respect of money or labor 
expended on such particular property, this is a particular lien. Liens may 
arise in three ways: 1st. By express contract. 2d. From implied contract, as 
from general or particular usage of trade. 3d. By legal relation between the 
parties, which may be created in three ways; When the law casts an 
obligation on a party to do a particular act, and in return for which, to 
secure him payment, it gives him such lien; 1 Esp. R. 109; 6 East, 519; 2 
Ld. Raym. 866; common carriers and inn keepers are among this number. 2. 
When goods are delivered to a tradesman or any other, to expend his labor 
upon, he is entitled to detain those goods until he is remunerated for the 
labor which he so expends. 2 Roll. Ab. 92; 3 M. & S. 167; 14 Pick. 332; 3 
Bouv. Inst. n. 2514. 3. When goods have been saved from the perils of the 
sea, the salvor may detain them until his claim for salvage is satisfied; 
but in no other case has the finder of goods, a lien. 2 Salk. 654; 5 Burr. 
2732; 3 Bouv. Inst. n. 2518. General liens arise in three ways; 1. By the 
agreement of the parties. 6 T. R.14; 3 Bos. & Pull. 42. 2. By the general 
usage of trade. 3. By particular usage of trade. Whitaker on Liens 35; Prec. 
Ch. 580; 1 Atk. 235; 6 T. R. 19. 
     4. It may be proper to consider a few, general principles: 1. As to the 
manner in which a lien may be acquired. 2. To what claims liens properly 
attach. 3. How they may be lost. 4. Their effect. 
     5.-1. How liens may be acquired. To create a valid lien, it is 
essential, 1st. That the party to whom or by whom it is acquired should have 
the absolute property or ownership of the thing, or, at least, a right to 
vest it. 2d. That the party claiming the lien should have an actual or 
constructive, possession, with the assent of the party against whom the 
claim is made. 3 Chit. Com. Law, 547; Paley on Ag. by Lloyd, 137; 17 Mass. 
R. 197; 4 Campb. R. 291; 3 T. R. 119 and 783; 1 East, R. 4; 7 East, R. 5; 1 
Stark. R. 123; 3 Rose, R. 955; 3 Price, R. 547; 5 Binn. R. 392. 3d. That the 
lien should arise upon an agreement, express or implied, and not be for a 
limited or specific purpose inconsistent with the express terms, or the 
clear, intent of the contract; 2 Stark. R. 272; 6 T. R. 258; 7 Taunt. 278;. 
5 M. & S. 180; 15 Mass. 389, 397; as, for example, when goods are deposited 
to be delivered to a third person, or to be transported to another place. 
Pal. on Ag. by Lloyd, 140. 
     6.-2. The debts or claims to which liens properly attach. 1st. In 
general, liens properly attach on liquidated demands, and not on those which 
sound only in damages; 3 Chit. Com. Law, 548; though by an express contract 
they may attach even in such a case as, where the goods are to be held as an 
indemnity against a future contingent claim or damages. Ibid. 2d. The claim 
for which the lien is asserted, must he due to the party claiming it in his 
own right, and not merely as agent of a third person. It must be a debt or 
demand due from the very person for whose benefit the party is acting, and 
not from a third person, although the goods may be claimed through him. Pal. 
Ag. by Lloyd, 132. 
     7.-3. How a lien may be lost. 1st. It may be waived or lost by any 
act or agreement between the parties, by which it is surrendered, or becomes 
inapplicable. 2d. It may also be lost by voluntarily parting with the 
possession of the goods. But to this rule there are some exceptions; for 
example, when a factor by lawful authority sells the goods of his principal, 
and parts with the possession under the sale he is not, by this act, deemed 
to lose his lien, but it attaches to the proceeds of the sale in the hands 
of the vendee. 
     8.-4. The effect of liens. In general, the right of the holder of the 
lien is confined to the mere right of retainer. But when the creditor has 
made advances on the goods of a factor, he is generally invested with the 
right to sell. Holt's N P. Rep. 383; 3 Chit. Com. Law, 551; 2 Liverm. Ag. 
103; 2 Kent's Com. 642, 3d ed. In some cases where the lien would not confer 
power to sell, a court of equity would decree it. 1 Story Eq. Jur. Sec. 566; 
2 Story, Eq. Jur. Sec. 1216; Story Ag. Sec. 371. And courts of admiralty 
will decree a sale to satisfy maritime liens. Ab. Sh. pt. 3, c10. Sec. 2; 
Story, Ag. Sec. 371. 
     9. Judgments rendered in courts of record are generally liens on the 
real estate of the defendants or parties against whom such judgments are 
given. In  Alabama, Georgia and Indiana, judgment is a lien; in the last 
mentioned state, it continues for ten years from January 1, 1826, if it was 
rendered from that time; if, after ten years from the rendition of the 
judgment, and when the proceedings are stayed by order of the court, or by 
an agreement recorded, the time of its suspension is not reckoned in the ten 
years. A judgment does not bind lands in Kentucky, the lien commences by the 
delivery of execution to the sheriff, or officer. 4 Pet. R. 366; 1 Dane's R. 
360. The law seems to be the same in Mississippi. 2 Hill. Ab. c. 46, s. 6., 
In New Jersey, the judgments take priority among themselves in the order the 
executions on them have been issued. The lien of a judgment and the decree 
of a court of chancery continue a lien in New York for ten years, and bind 
after acquired lands. N. Y. Stat. part 3, t. 4, s. 3. It seems that a 
judgment is a lien in North Carolina, if an elegit has been sued out, but 
this is perhaps not settled. 2 Murph. R. 43. The lien of a judgment in Ohio 
is confined to the county, and continues only for one year, unless revived. 
It does not, per se, bind after acquired lands. In Pennsylvania, it 
commences with the rendering of judgment, and continues five years from the 
return day of that term. It does not, per se, bind after acquired lands. It 
may be revived by scire facias, or an agreement of the parties, and terre 
tenants, written and filed. In South Carolina and Tennessee a judgment is 
also a lien. In the New England states, lands are attached by mesne process 
or on the writ, and a lien is thereby created. See 2 Hill. Ab. c. 46. 
    10. Liens are also divided into legal and equitable. The former are 
those which may be enforced in a court of law; the latter are valid only in 
a court of equity. The lien which the vendor of real estate has on the 
estate sold, for the purchase money remaining unpaid, is a familiar example 
of an equitable lien. Math. on Pres. 392. Vide Purchase money. Vide, 
generally, Yelv. 67, a; 2 Kent, Com. 495; Pal Ag. 107; Whit. on Liens; Story 
on Ag. ch. 14, Sec. 351, et seq: Hov. Fr. 35. 
    11. Lien of mechanics and material men. By virtue of express statutes in 
several of the states, mechanics and material men, or persons who furnish 
materials for the erection of houses or other buildings, are entitled to a 
lien or preference in the payment of debts out of the houses and buildings 
so erected, and to the land, to a greater or lessor extent, on which they 
are erected. A considerable similarity exists in the laws of the different 
states which have legislated on this subject. 
    12. The lien generally attaches from the commencement of the work or the 
furnishing of materials, and continues for a limited period of time. In some 
states, a claim must be filed in the office of the clerk or prothonotary of 
the court, or a suit brought within a limited time. On the sale of the 
building these liens are to be paid pro rata. In some states no lien is 
created unless the work done or the goods furnished amount to a certain 
specified sum, while in others there is no limit to the amount. In general, 
none but the original contractors can claim under the law; sometimes, 
however, sub-contractors have the same right. 
    13. The remedy is various; in some states, it is by scire facias on the 
lien, in others, it is by petition to the court for an order of sale: in 
some, the property is subject to foreclosure, as on a mortgage; in others, 
by a common action. See 1 Hill. Ab. ch. 40, p. 354, where will be found an 
abstract of the laws of the several states, except the state of Louisiana; 
for the laws of that state, see Civ. Code of Louis. art. 2727 to 2748. See 
generally, 5 Binn. 585; 2 Browne, R. 229, n. 275; 2 Rawle  R. 316; Id. 343; 
3 Rawle, R. 492; 5 Rawle R. 291; 2 Whart. R. 223; 2 S. & R. 138; 14 S. & R. 
32; 12 S. & R. 301; 3 Watts, R. 140, 141; Id. 301; 5 Watts, R. 487; 14 Pick. 
P,. 49; Serg. on Mech. Liens. 

LIEU, place. In lieu of, instead, in the place of.

LIEUTENANT. This word has now a narrower meaning than it formerly had; its 
true meaning is a deputy, a substitute, from the French lieu, (place or 
post) and tenant (holder). Among civil officers we have lieutenant 
governors, who in certain cases perform the duties of governors; (vide, the 
names of the several states,) lieutenants of police, &c. Among military men, 
lieutenant general was formerly the title of a commanding general, but now 
it signifies the degree above major general. Lieutenant colonel, is the 
officer between the colonel and the major. Lieutenant simply signifies the 
officer next below a captain. In the navy, a lieutenant is the second 
officer next in command to the captain of a ship. 

LIFE. The aggregate of the animal functions which resist death. Bichat. 
     2. The state of animated beings, while they possess the power of 
feeling and motion. It commences in contemplation of law generally as soon 
as the infant is able to stir in the mother's womb; 1 Bl. Com. 129; 3 Inst. 
50; Wood's Inst. 11; and ceases at death. Lawyers and legislators are not, 
however, the best physiologists, and it may be justly suspected that in fact 
life commences before the mother can perceive any motion of the foetus. 1 
Beck's Med. Jur. 291. 
     3. For many purposes, however, life is considered as begun from the 
moment of conception in ventre sa mere. Vide Foetus. But in order to acquire 
and transfer civil rights the child must be born alive. Whether a child is 
born alive, is to be ascertained from certain signs which are always 
attendant upon life. The fact of the child's crying is the most certain. 
There may be a certain motion in a new born infant which may last even for 
hours, and yet there may not be complete life. It seems that in order to 
commence life the child must be born with the ability to breathe, and must 
actually have breathed. 1 Briand, Med. Leg. 1ere partie, c. 6, art. 1. 
     4. Life is presumed to continue at least till one hundred years. 9 
Mart. Lo. R. 257 See Death; Survivorship. 
     5. Life is considered by the law of the utmost importance, and its most 
anxious care is to protect it. 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 202-3. 

LIFE ANNUITY. An annual income to be paid during the continuance of a 
particular life. 

LIFE-ASSURANCE. An insurance of a life, upon the payment of a premium; this 
may be for the whole life, or for a limited time. On the death of the person 
whose life has been insured, during the time for which it is insured, the 
insurer is bound to pay to the insured. the money agreed upon. See 1 Bouv. 
Inst. n. 1231. 

LIFE-ESTATE. Vide Estate for life, and 3 Saund. 338, h. note; 2 Kent Com. 
285; 4 Kent, Com. 23.; 1 Hov. Suppl. to Ves. jr. 371, 381; 2 Id. 45, 249, 
330, 340, 398, 467; 8 Com. Dig. 714. 

LIFE-RENT, Scotch law. A right to use and enjoy a thing during life, the 
substance of it being preserved. A life-rent cannot, therefore, be 
constituted upon things which perish in the use; and though it may upon 
subjects which gradually wear out by time, as household furniture, &c., yet 
it is generally applied to heritable subjects. Life-rents are divided into 
conventional and legal. 
     2.-1. The conventional are either simple or by reservation. A simple 
life-rent, or by a separate constitution, is that which is granted by the 
proprietor in favor of another. A life-rent by reservation is that which a 
proprietor reserves to himself, in the same writing by which he conveys the 
fee to another. 
     3.-2. Life-rents, by law, are the terce and the courtesy. See Terce; 
Courtesy. 

LIGAN or LAGAN. Goods cast into the sea tied to a buoy, so that they may be 
found again by the owners, are so denominated. When goods are cast into the 
sea in storms or shipwrecks, and remain there without coming to land, they 
are distinguished by the barbarous names of jetsam, (q.v.) flotsam, (q.v.) 
and ligan. 5 Rep. 108; Harg. Tr. 48; 1 Bl. Com. 292. 

LIGEANCE. The true and faithful obedience of a subject to his sovereign, of 
a citizen to his government. It signifies also the territory of a sovereign. 
See Allegiance. 

LIGHTERMAN. The owner or manager of a lighter. A lighterman is considered as 
a common Carrier. See Lighters. 

LIGHTERS, commerce. Small vessels employed in loading and unloading larger 
vessels. 
     2. The owners of lighters are liable, like other common carriers for 
hire; it is a term of the contract on the part of the carrier or lighterman, 
implied by law, that his vessel is tight and fit for the purpose or 
employments for which he offers and holds it forth to the public; it is the 
immediate foundation and substratum of the contract that it is so: the law 
presumes a promise to that effect on the part of the carrier without actual 
proof, and every principle of sound policy and public convenience requires 
it should be so. 5 East, 428; Abbott on Sh. 225; 1 Marsh. on Ins. 254; Park 
on Ins. 23; Wesk. on Ins. 328. 

LIGHTS. Those openings in a wall which are made rather for the admission of 
light, than to look out of. 6 Moore, C. B. 47; 9 Bing. R. 305; 1 Lev. 122; 
Civ. Code of Lo. art. 711. See Ancient Lights; Windows. 

LIMBS. Those members of a man which may be useful to him in flight, and the 
unlawful deprivation of which by another amounts to a mayhem at common law. 
1 Bl. Com. 130. If a man, se defendendo, commit homicide, he will be 
excused; and if he enter into an apparent contract, under a well-grounded 
apprehension of losing his life or limbs, he may afterwards avoid it. 1 Bl. 
130. 

LIMITATION, estates. When an estate is so expressly confined and limited by 
the words of its creation, that it cannot endure for a longer time than till 
the contingency shall happen, upon which the estate is to fail, this is 
denominated a limitation; as, when land is granted to a man while he 
continues unmarried, or until the rents and profits shall have made a 
certain sum, and the like; in these cases the estate is limited, that is, it 
does not go beyond the happening of the contingency. 2 Bl. Com. 155; 10 Co. 
41; Bac. Ab. Conditions, H; Co. Litt. 236 b; 4 Kent. Com. 121; Tho. Co. 
Litt. Index, h.t.; 10 Vin. Ab. 218; 1 Vern. 483, n. 4; Ves. Jr. 718. 
     2. There is a difference between a limitation and a condition. When a 
thing is given until an event shall arrive, this is called a limitation; but 
when it is given generally, and the gift is to be defeated upon the 
happening of an uncertain event, then the gift is conditional. For example, 
when a man gives a legacy to his wife, while, or as long as, she shall 
remain his widow, or until she shall marry, the estate is given to her only 
for the time of her widowhood and, on her marriage, her right to it 
determines. Bac. Ab. Conditions, H. But if, instead of giving the legacy to 
the wife, as above mentioned, the gift had been to her generally with a 
proviso, or on condition that she should not marry, or that if she married 
she should forfeit her legacy, this would be a condition, and such condition 
being in restraint of marriage, would be void. 

LIMITATION, remedies. A bar to the alleged right of a plaintiff to recover 
in an action, caused by the lapse of a certain time appointed by law; or it 
is the end of the time appointed by law, during which a party may sue for 
and recover a right. It is a maxim of the common law, that a right never 
dies and, as far as contracts were concerned, there was no time of 
limitation to actions on such contracts. The only limit there was to the 
recovery in cases of torts was the death of one of the parties; for it was a 
maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona. This unrestrained power of 
commencing actions at any period, however remote from the original cause of 
action, was found to encourage fraud and injustice; to prevent which, to 
assure the titles to land, to quiet the possession of the owner, and to 
prevent litigation, statutes of limitation were passed. This was effected by 
the statutes of 32 Hen. VIII. c. 2, and 21 Jac, I. c. 16. These statutes 
were adopted and practiced upon in this country, in several of the states, 
though they are now in many of the states in most respects superseded by the 
enactments of other acts of limitation. 
     2. Before proceeding to notice the enactments on this subject in the 
several states, it is proper to call the attention of the reader to the 
rights of the government to sue untrammeled by any statue of limitations, 
unless expressly restricted, or by necessary implication included. It has 
therefore been decided that the general words of a statute ought not to 
include the government, or affect its rights, unless the construction be 
clear and indisputable upon the text of the act; 2 Mason's R. 314; for no 
laches can be imputed to the government. 4 Mass. R. 528; 2 Overt. R. 352; 1 
Const. Rep. 125; 4 Henn. & M. 53; 3 Serg. & Rawle, 291; 1 Bay's R. 26. The 
acts of limitation passed by the several states are not binding upon the 
government of the United States, in a suit in the courts of the United 
States. 2 Mason's R. 311. 
     3. For the following abstract of the laws of the United States and of 
the several states, regulating the limitations of actions, the author has 
been much assisted by the appendix of Mr. Angell's excellent treatise on the 
Limitation of Actions. 
     4. United States. 1. On contracts. All suits on marshals' bonds shall 
be commenced and prosecuted within six years after the right of action shall 
have accrued, and not after; saving the rights of infants, femes covert, and 
persons non compos mentis, so that they may sue within three years after 
disability removed. Act of April 10, 1806, s. 1. 
     5.-2. On legal proceedings. Writs of error must be brought within 
five years after judgment or decree complained of; saving in cases of 
disability the right to bring them five years after its removal. Act of 
September 24, 1789, s. 22. And the like limitation is applied to bills of 
review. 10 Wheat. 146. 
     6.-3. Penalties. Prosecutions under the revenue laws, must be 
commenced within three years. Act of March 2, 1799, Act of March 1, 1823. 
Suits for penalties respecting copyrights, within two years. Act of April 
29, 1802, s. 3. Suits in violation of the provisions of the act of 1818, 
respecting the slave trade, must be commenced within five years. Act of 
April 20, 1818, s. 9. 
     7.-4. Crimes. Offences punishable by a court martial must be 
proceeded against within two years unless the person by reason of having 
absented himself, or some other manifest impediment, has not been amenable 
to justice within that period. The act of April 30, 1790, s. 31, limits the 
prosecution and trial of treason or other capital offence, willful murder or 
forgery excepted, to three years next after their commission; and for 
offences not capital to two years, unless the party has fled from justice. 2 
Cranch, 336. 
     8. Alabama. 1. As to real estate. 1. After twenty years after title 
accrued, no entry can be made into lands. 2. No action for the recovery of 
land can be maintained, if commenced after thirty years after title accrued. 
3. Actions on claims by virtue of any title which has not been confirmed by 
either of the boards of commissioners of the United States, for adjusting 
land claims &c., and not recognized or confirmed by any act of congress, are 
barred after three years; there is a proviso as to lands formerly in West 
Florida, and in favor of persons under disabilities. 
     9.-2. As to personal actions. 1. Actions of trespass, quare clausum 
fregit; trespass; detinue; trover; replevin for taking away of goods and 
chattels; of debt, founded on any lending or contract, without specialty, or 
for arrearages of rent on a parol demise of account and upon the case, 
(except actions for slander, and such as concern the trade of merchandise 
between merchant and merchant, their factors or agents, are to be commenced 
within six years next after the cause of action accrued, and not after. 
    10.-2. Actions of trespass for assaults, menace, battery, wounding and 
imprisonment, or any of them, are limited to two years. 
    11.-3. Actions for words to one year.
    12.-4. Actions of debt or covenant for rent or arrearages of rent, 
founded upon any lease under seal, or upon any single or penal bill for the 
payment of money only, or on any obligation with condition for the payment 
of money only, or upon any award under the hands and seals of arbitrators, 
are to be commenced within sixteen years after the cause of action accrued, 
and not after; but if any payment has been made on the same at any time, 
then sixteen years from the time of such payment. 
    13.-5. Judgments cannot be revived after twenty years. 
    14.-6. A new action must be brought within one year when the former 
has been reversed on error, or the judgment has been arrested. 
    15.-7. Actions on book accounts must be commenced within three years, 
except in the case of trade or merchandise between merchant and merchant, 
their factors or agents. 
    16.-8. Writs of error must be sued out within three years after final 
judgment. 
    17. Arkansas. 1. As to lands. No action for the recovery of any lands or 
tenements, or for the recovery of the possession thereof, shall be 
maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, 
or grantor, was seised or possessed of the promises in question within ten 
years before the commencement of such suit. Act of March 3, 1838, s. 1. Rev. 
Stat. 527. No entry upon lands or tenements shall be deemed sufficient or 
valid as a claim, unless an action be commenced thereon within one year 
after such entry, and within ten years from the time when the right to make 
such entry descended and accrued. Id. s. 2. The right of any person to the 
possession of any lands or tenements, shall not be impaired or affected by a 
descent cast in consequence of the death of any person in possession of such 
estate. Id. s. 3. 
    18. The savings are as follows: If any person entitled to commence any 
action in the preceding sections specified, or to make an entry, be, at the 
time such title shall first descend or accrue; first, within the age of 
twenty-one years; second, insane; third, beyond the limits of the state; or, 
fourth, a married woman; the time during which such disabilities shall 
continue, shall not be deemed any portion of the time in this act limited 
for the commencement of such suit, or the making of such entry; but such 
person may bring such action, or make such entry, after the time so limited, 
and within five years after such disability is removed, but not after that 
period. Id. S. 4. If any person entitled to commence any such action, or 
make such entry, die during the continuance of such disability specified in 
the preceding section, and no determination or judgment be had of the title, 
right, or action to him accrued, his heirs may commence such action, or make 
such entry, after the time in this act limited for that purpose, and within 
five years after his death, and not after that period. Id. s. 5, Rev. Stat. 
527. 
    19.-2. As to personal actions. 1. The following actions shall be 
commenced within three years after the cause of action shall accrue: first, 
all actions founded upon any contract, obligation, or liability, (not under 
seal,) excepting such as are brought upon the judgment or decree of some 
court of record of the United States, of this, or some other state; second, 
all actions upon judgments rendered in any court not being a court of 
record; third, all actions for arrearages of rent, (not reserved by some 
instrument under seal); fourth, all actions of account, assumpsit, or on the 
case, founded on any contract or liability, expressed or implied; fifth, all 
actions of trespass on lands, or for libels; sixth, all actions for taking 
or injuring any goods or, chattels. Id. s. 6, Rev. Stat. 527, 528. 
    20.-2. The following actions shall be commenced within one year after 
the cause of action shall accrue, and not after: first, all special actions 
on the case for criminal conversation, assault and battery and false 
imprisonment; second, all actions for words spoken, slandering the character 
of another; third, all words spoken whereby special damages are sustained. 
Id. s. 7. 
    21.-3. All actions against sheriffs or other officers, for the escape 
of any person imprisoned on civil process, shall be commenced within one 
year from the time of such escape, and not after. Id. s. 8. 
    22.-4. All actions against sheriffs and coroners, upon any liability 
incurred by them, by doing any act in their official capacity, or by the 
omission of any official duty, except for escapes, shall be brought within 
two years after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not thereafter. 
Id. s. 9. 
    23.-5. All actions upon penal statutes where the penalty or any part 
thereof, goes to the state, or any county, or person suing for the same, 
shall be commenced within two years after the offence shall have been 
committed, or the cause of action shall have accrued. Id. s. 10. 
    24.-6. All actions not included in the foregoing provisions, shall be 
commenced within five years after the cause of action shall have accrued. 
Id. s. 11. 
    25.-7. In all actions of debt, account or assumpsit, brought to 
recover any balance due upon a mutual, open account current, the cause of 
action shall be deemed to have accrued from the time of the last item proved 
in such account Id. s. 12. 
    26. The savings are as follows: 1. If any person entitled to bring any 
action in the preceding seven sections mentioned, except in actions against 
sheriffs for escapes, and actions of slander, shall, at the time of action 
accrued, be either within the age of twenty-one years, or insane, or beyond 
the limits of this state, or a married woman, such person shall be at 
liberty to bring such action within the time specified in this act, after 
such disability is removed. Id. s. 13. 
    27.-2. If any person entitled to bring an action in the preceding 
provisions of this act specified, die before the expiration of the time 
limited for the commencement of such suit, and such cause of action shall 
survive to his representatives, his executors or administrators may, after 
the expiration of such time, and within one year after such death, commence 
such suit, but not after that period. Id. s. 19. 
    28.-3. If at any time when any cause of action specified in this act 
accrues against any person, he be out of the state, such action may be 
commenced within the times herein respectively limited, after the return of 
such person into the state; and if, after such cause of action shall have 
accrued, such person depart from, and reside out of the state, the time of 
his absence shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time limited for 
the commencement of such action. Id. s. 20. If any person, by leaving the 
county absconding or concealing himself, or any other improper act of his 
own, prevent the commencement of any action in this act specified, such 
action may be commenced within the times respectively limited, after the 
commencement of such action shall have ceased to be so prevented. Id. s. 26. 
    29.-4. None of the provisions of this act shall apply to suit's 
brought to enforced payment on bills, notes, or evidences of debt issued by 
any bank, or moneyed corporation. Id. s. 18. 
    30. Connecticut. 1. As to lands. No person can make an entry into lands 
after fifteen years next after his right or title first accrued to the same; 
and no such entry is valid unless an action is afterwards commenced 
thereupon, and is prosecuted with effect within one year next after the 
making thereof; there is a proviso in favor of disabled persons, who may sue 
within five years after the disability has been removed. 
    31.-2. As to personal actions. 1. In actions on specialties and 
promissory notes, not negotiable, the limitation is seventeen years, with a 
saving that "persons legally incapable to bring an action on such bond or 
writing at the accruing of the right of action, may bring the same within 
four years after becoming legally capable." 
    32.-2. Actions of account, of debt on book, on simple contract, or 
assumpsit, founded on an implied contract, or upon any contract in writing, 
not under seal, (except promissory notes not negotiable,) within six years, 
saving as above three years. 
    33.-3. In trespass on the case, six years, but no savings.
    34.-4. Actions founded upon express contracts not reduced to writing; 
upon trespass; or upon the case for word; three years and no savings. 
    35.-5. Actions founded on penal statutes one year after the commission 
of the offence. 
    36.-6. A new suit must be commenced within one year after reversal of 
the former, or when it was arrested. 
    37. Delaware. 1. As to lands. Twenty years of adverse possession of land 
is a bar. The general principles of the English law on this subject, have 
been adopted in this state. 
    38.-2. As to personal actions. All actions of trespass quare clausum 
fregit; of detinue; trover and replevin, for taking away goods or chattels; 
upon account and upon the case; (other than actions between merchant and 
merchant, their factors and servants, relating to merchandise;) upon the 
case for words; of debt grounded upon any lending or contract without 
specially; of debt for arrearages of rent; and all actions of trespass, 
assault, battery, menace, wounding or imprisonment, shall be commenced and 
sued within three years next after the cause of such action or suit accrues, 
and not after. 
    39. The 2d section of the same act contains a saving, in favor of 
persons who, at the time of the cause of action accrued, are within the age 
of twenty-one years; femes covert; persons of insane memory, or imprisoned. 
Such persons must bring their actions within one year next after the removal 
of such disability as aforesaid. 
    40. In the 3d section of the same act, provision is made, that no person 
not keeping a day book, or regular book of accounts, shall be admitted to 
prove or require payment of any account of longer standing than one year 
against the estate of any person dying within the state, or if it consist of 
many particulars, unless every charge therein shall have accrued within 
three years next before the death of the deceased, and unless the truth and 
justice thereof shall be made to appear by one, sufficient witness; and in 
case of a regular book of accounts, unless such account shall have accrued 
or arisen within three years before the death of the deceased person. 
    41. In section 6th, there is a saving of the rights or demands of 
infants, femes covert, persons of insane memory, or imprisoned, so their 
accounts be proved and their claims prosecuted within one year after the 
removal of such disability. 
    42. By a supplementary act, it is declared, that nothing contained in 
this act, shall extend to any intercourse between merchant and merchant, 
according to the usual course of mercantile business nor to any demands 
founded on mortgages: bonds, bills, promissory notes, or settlements under 
the hands of the parties concerned. 
    43. All actions upon administration, guardian and testamentary bonds, 
must be commenced within six years after passing the said bonds; and actions 
on sheriff's recognizances, within seven years after the entering into such 
recognizances, and not after; saving in all these cases, the rights of 
infants, femes covert, persons of insane memory, or imprisoned, of bringing 
such actions on administration, guardian or testamentary bonds, within three 
years after the removal of the disability, and on sheriff's recognizances 
within one year after such disability removed. 
    44. No appeal can be taken from any interlocutory order, or final 
decrees of the chancellor, but within one year next after making and signing 
the final decree, unless the person entitled to such appeal be an infant, 
feme covert, non compos mentis, or a prisoner. 
    45. No writ of error, can be brought upon any judgment, but within five 
years after the confessing, entering or rendering thereof, unless the person 
entitled to such writ, be an infant, feme covert, non compos mentis, or a 
prisoner, and then within five years exclusive of the time of such 
disability. Constitution, article 5, s. 13. 
    46. There is no saving in favor of foreigners or citizens of other 
states. The courts of this state have adopted the general principles of the 
English law. 
    47. Florida. 1. As to lands. Writs of formedon in descender, remainder, 
or reverter, must be brought within twenty years. Act of Nov. 10, 1828, sec. 
1, Duval; 154. Infants, femes covert, persons non compos mentis, or 
prisoners, may. sue within ten years after disability is removed. Id. s. 2. 
A writ of right on seisin of ancestor or predecessor within fifty years; 
other possessory action on seisin of ancestor or predecessor, within forty 
years; real action on plaintiff's possession or seisin within thirty years. 
Id. sec. 3. 
    48.-2. As to personal actions. All actions upon the case, other than 
for slander, actions for accounts, for trespass, debt, detinue, and replevin 
for goods and chattels, and actions of trespass quare clausum fregit, within 
five years. Actions of trespass, assault, battery, wounding and 
imprisonment, or any of them, within three years; and actions for words 
within one year. Id. s. 4. There is a saving in favor of infants, femes 
covert, persons non compos mentis, imprisoned, or beyond seas, or out of the 
country, who may bring suit within the same time after the disability has 
been removed. All actions on book accounts shall be brought within two 
years. 
    49.-3. As to crimes. All offences not punishable with death, shall be 
prosecuted within two years. Act of Feb. 10, 1882, s. 78. All actions, suits 
and presentments upon penal acts of the general assembly, shall be 
prosecuted within one year. Act of Nov. 19, 1828, s. 18. 
    50. Georgia. 1. As to lands. Seven years' adverse possession of lands is 
a bar, with a saving in favor of infants, femes covert, persons non compos 
mentis, imprisoned or beyond seas. 
    51.-2. As to personal actions. Twenty years is a bar in personal 
actions, on bonds under seal; other obligations not under seal, six years; 
trespass quare clausum fregit, three years trespass, assault and battery, 
two years; slander and qui tam actions, six months. There are savings in 
favor of infants, femes covert, persons non compos mentis, imprisoned and 
beyond seas. 
    52. No other savings in favor of citizens of other states or foreigners. 
    53. As to crimes. In cases of murder there is no limitation. In all 
other criminal cases where the punishment is death or perpetual 
imprisonment, seven years; other felonies, four years; cases punishable by 
fine and imprisonment, two years. Prince's Dig. 573-579. Acts of 1767, 1813, 
and 1833. See 1 Laws of Geo. 33; 2 Id. 344; 3 Id. 30; Pamphlet Laws, 1833, 
p. 143. 
    54. Illinois. 1. As to lands. No statute on this subject. 
    55.-2. As to personal actions. All actions of trespass quare clausum 
fregit; all actions of trespass, detinue, actions sur trover, and replevin 
for taking away goods and chattels, all actions of account, and upon the 
case, other than such accounts as concern the trade of merchandise between 
merchant and merchant, their factors and servants; all actions of debt, 
grounded upon any lending or contract without specialty; all actions of debt 
for arrearages of rent; all actions of assault, menace, battery, wounding, 
and imprisonment, or any of them, which shall be sued or brought, shall be 
commenced within the following times, and not after actions upon the case, 
other than for slander; actions of account, and actions of trespass, debt, 
detinue and replevin for goods and chattels, and actions of trespass quare 
clausum fregit, within five years next after the cause of action or suit, 
and not after; and the actions of trespass for assault, battery, wounding, 
imprisonment, or any of them, within three years next after cause of action 
or suit, and not after; and actions for slander, within one year next after 
the words spoken. There are no savings, by the statute, in favor of citizens 
of other states, or foreigners. 
    56. Indiana. 1. As to lands. "No action of ejectment shall be commenced 
for the recovery of lands or tenements against any person or persons who may 
have been in the quiet and peaceable possession of the same under an adverse 
title for twenty years, either in his own right, or the right of any other 
person or persons under whom he claims; and any action of ejectment 
commenced against the provisions of this act shall be dismissed at the cost 
of the party commencing the same. Provided, however, that this act shall not 
be so construed as to affect any person who may be a feme covert, non compos 
mentis, a minor, or any person beyond the seas, within five years after such 
disability is removed." Rev. Code, c. 36, see. 3, January 13, 1831. 
    57.-2. As to personal actions. "All actions of debt on simple 
contract, and for rent in arrear, action on the case, (other than slander,) 
actions of account, trespass quare clausum fregit, detinue, and replevin for 
goods and chattels, shall be commenced within five years after the cause of 
action accrued, and not after. All actions of trespass, for assault and 
battery, and for wounding and imprisonment, shall be commenced within three 
years, and not after." Rev. Code, 6. 81, sec. 12, January 29, 1831. 
    58.-3. Crimes. "All criminal prosecutions for offences, the affixed 
penalty of which is three dollars, or less, shall be commenced within thirty 
days," &c. "All prosecutions for offences, except those the fixed penalties 
of which do not exceed three dollars, and except treason, murder, arson, 
burglary, man stealing, horse stealing, and forgery, shall be instituted 
within two years, &c." Revised Code, c. 26, Feb. 10, 1831. 
    59.-4. Penal actions. "All actions upon any act of assembly, now or 
hereafter to be made, when the right is limited to the party aggrieved, 
shall be commenced within two years, &c., and all actions of slander shall 
be commenced within one year, &c., saving the right of infants, femes 
covert, persons non compos mentis, or without the jurisdiction of the United 
States, until one year after their several disabilities are removed." Sec. 
12. 
    60.-5. Savings. Provided, that no statute of limitation shall ever be 
pleaded as a bar, or operate as such on an instrument or contract in 
writing, whether the same be sealed or unsealed, nor to running accounts 
between merchant and merchant. Rev. Code, eh. 81, s. 12. 
    61. And provided further, that on all contracts made in this state, if 
the defendant shall be without the same when the cause of action accrued, 
said action shall not be barred until the times above limited shall have 
expired, after the defendant shall have come within the jurisdiction 
thereof, and on all contracts made without the state, if the defendant shall 
have left the state or territory when the same was made, and come within the 
jurisdiction of this state before the cause of action accrued thereon, the 
plaintiff shall not be barred his right of action, until the time above 
limited after the said demand shall have been brought within the 
jurisdiction of this state. Rev. Code, ch. 81, s. 12. 
    62. Kentucky. 1. As to lands. The act of limitation takes effect in a 
writ of right or other possessory action, in thirty years from the seisin of 
the demandant or his ancestors. In ejectment, in twenty years. See 1 Litt. 
380, and Sessions Acts 1838-9, page 330. In the action of ejectment, there 
is a saving in favor of infants; persons insane or imprisoned; femes covert, 
to whom lands have descended during the coverture, when their cause of 
action accrued. These persons may sue within three years after the removal 
of the disability. 5 Litt. 90; Id. 97. There is no saving, in favor of non-
residents or absent persons. 5 Litt. 90; 4 Bibb, 561. But when the 
possession has been held for seven years under a connected title in law or 
equity deducible of record from the commonwealth, claiming title under an 
adverse entry, survey or patent, no writ of ejectment or other possessory 
action can be commenced. In this case there is a saying in favor of infants, 
&c., as above, and of persons out of the United States, in the service of 
the United States, or of this state, who may bring actions seven years after 
the removal of the disability. 4 Litt. 55. 
    63.-2. As to personal actions. The act of limitation operates on 
simple contracts (except store accounts) in five years. Torts to the person, 
three years. Torts, except torts to the person, five years. Slander, one 
year. Store accounts, one year from the delivery of each article; except in 
cases of the death of the creditor or debtor before the expiration of one 
year, when the further time of one year is allowed after such death. 
    64. Savings in such actions of simple contracts, tort, slander, and upon 
store account, in favor of infants, femes covert, persons imprisoned or 
insane at the time such action accrued, who have the full time aforesaid 
after the removal of their respective disabilities to commence their suit. 
But if the defendant, in any of said personal actions, absconds, or conceals 
himself by removal out of the country or county where he resides when the 
cause of action accrues, or by any other indirect ways or means defeats or 
obstructs the bringing of such suit or action, such defendant shall not be 
permitted to plead the act of limitations. 1 Litt. 380. There is no saving 
in favor of non-residents or persons absent. Act of 1823, s. 3, Session 
Acts, p. 287. 
    65. Louisiana. The Civil Code, book 3, title 23, chapter 1, section 3, 
provides as follows: 
    66.-I. Of the prescription of one year. Art. 3499. The action of 
justices of the peace and notaries, and persons performing their duties, as 
well as constables, for the fees and emoluments which are due to them in 
their official capacity that of muters and instructors in the arts and 
sciences, for lessons which they give by the month; that of innkeepers and 
such others, on account of lodging and board which they furnish; that of 
retailers of provisions and liquors; that of workmen, laborers, and 
servants, for the payment of their wages; that for the payment of the 
freight of ships and other vessels, the wages of the officers, sailors, and 
others of the crew; that for the supply of wood and other things necessary 
for the construction, equipment, and provisioning of ships and other 
vessels, are prescribed by one year. 
    67.-3500. In the cases mentioned in the preceding article, the 
prescription takes place, although there may have been a regular continuance 
of supplies, or of labor, or other service. It only ceases, from the time 
when there has been an account acknowledged, a note or bond, or a suit 
instituted. However, with respect to the wages of officers, sailors, and 
others of the crew of a ship, this prescription runs only from the day when 
the voyage is completed. 
    68.-3501. The actions for injurious words, whether verbal or written, 
and that for damages caused by slaves or animals, or resulting from offences 
or quasi offences; that which a possessor may institute, to have himself 
maintained or restored to his possession, when he has been disturbed or 
evicted; that for the delivery of merchandise or other effects, shipped on 
board any kind of vessels; that for damage sustained by merchandise on board 
ships, or which may have happened by ships running foul of each other, are 
prescribed by one year. 
    69.- 3502. The prescription mentioned in the preceding article, runs, 
with respect to the merchandise injured or not delivered from the day of the 
arrival of the vessel, or that on which she ought to have arrived; and in 
the other cases, from that on which the injurious words, disturbance, or 
damage were sustained. 
    70.-II. Of the prescription of three years. Art. 3503. The action for 
arrearages of rent charge, annuities and alimony, or of the hire of movables 
or immovables; that for the payment of money lent; for the salaries of 
overseers, clerks, secretaries, and of teachers of the sciences, for lessons 
by the year or quarter; that of physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries, for 
visits, operations, and medicines: that of parish judges sheriffs, clerks, 
and attorneys, for their fees and emoluments, are prescribed by three years, 
unless there be an account acknowledged, a note or bond given, or an action 
commenced before that time. 
    71.-3504. The action of parties against their attorneys for the return 
of papers delivered to them for the interest of their suits, is prescribed 
also by three years, reckoning from the day when judgment was rendered in 
the suit, or from the revocation of the powers of the attorneys. 
    72.-III. Of the prescription of five years. Art. 3505. Actions on 
bills of exchange, notes payable to order or bearer, except bank notes, 
those on all effects negotiable or transferable by endorsement or delivery, 
are prescribed by five years, reckoning from the day when these engagements 
were payable. 
    73.-3506. The prescription mentioned in the preceding article, and 
those described above in the paragraphs, I. and II., run against minors and 
interdicted persons, reserving, however, to them their recourse against 
their tutors or curators. They run also against persons residing out of the 
state. 
    74.-3507. The action of nullity or rescission of contracts, 
testaments, or other acts; that for the reduction of excessive donations; 
that for the rescission of partitions and guaranty of the portions, are 
prescribed by five years when the person entitled to exercise them is in the 
state, and ten years if he be out of it. This prescription only commences 
against minors after their majority. 
    75.-IV. Of the prescription of ten years. Art. 3508. In general, all 
personal actions, except those above enumerated, are prescribed by ten 
years, if the creditor be present, and by twenty years, if he be absent. 
    76.-3509. The action against an undertaker or architect, for defect of 
construction of buildings of brick or stone, is prescribed by ten years. 
    77.-3610. If a master suffer a slave to enjoy his liberty for ten 
years, during his residence in the state, or for twenty years while out of 
it, he shall lose all right of action to recover possession of the slave, 
unless the slave be a runaway or fugitive. 
    78.-3511. The rights of usufruct, use and habitation, and services, 
are lost, by non-use for ten years, if the person having a right to enjoy 
them, be in the state, and by twenty years, if he be absent. 
    79.-V. Of the prescription of thirty years. Art. 3512. All actions for 
immovable property, or for an entire estate as a succession, are prescribed 
by thirty years, whether the parties be present, or absent from the state. 
    80.-3513. Actions for the revindication of slaves are prescribed by 
fifteen years, in the same manner as in the preceding article. 
    81.-VI. Of the rules relative to the prescription operating a 
discharge from debts. Art. 3514. In cases of prescription releasing debts, 
one may prescribe against a title created by himself, that is, against an 
obligation which be has contracted. 
    82.-3515. Good faith not being required on the part of the person 
pleading this prescription, the creditor cannot compel him or his heirs to 
swear whether the debt has or has not been paid, but can only blame himself 
for not having taken his measures within the time directed by law; and it 
may be that the debtor may not be able to take any positive oath on the 
subject. 
    83.-3516. The prescription releasing debts is interrupted by all such 
causes as interrupt the prescription by which property is acquired, and 
which have been explained in the first section of this chapter. It is also 
interrupted by the causes explained in the following articles. 
    84.-3517. A citation served upon one joint debtor or his 
acknowledgment of the debt, interrupts the prescription with regard to all 
the others and, even their heirs. A citation served on one of the heirs of a 
joint debtor, or the acknowledgment of such heir, does not interrupt the 
prescription with regard to the other heirs, even if the debt was by 
mortgage, if the obligation be not indivisible. This citation or 
acknowledgment does not interrupt the prescription, with regard to the other 
co-debtors, except for that portion for which such heir is bound. To 
interrupt this prescription for the whole, with regard to the other co-
debtors, it is necessary, either that the citations be served on all, or the 
acknowledgment be made by all the heirs. 
    85.-3518. A citation served on the principal debtor, or his 
acknowledgment, interrupts the prescription on the part of the surety. 
    86.-3519. Prescription does not run against minors and persons under 
interdiction, except in the cases specified above. 
    87.-3520. Prescription runs against the wife, even although she be not 
separated of property by marriage contract or by authority of law, for all 
such credits as she brought in marriage to her husband, or for whatever has 
been promised to her in dower; but the husband continues responsible to her. 
    88. Maine. 1. As to real actions. The writ of right is limited to thirty 
years writ of ancestral seisin, twenty-five years writ of entry on party's 
own seisin, twenty years. Stat. of Maine, eh. 62, Sec. 1, 2, 3. But by the 
revised statutes, all real actions are limited to twenty years, from the 
time the right accrues. They took effect on the first day of April, 1843. 
Rev. Stat. T. 10, ch. 140, Sec. 1. And writs of right and of formedon are 
abolished after that time. Rev. Stat. ch. 145, Sec. 1. 
    89.-2. As to personal actions. When founded on simple contract, they 
are limited after six years; Rev. Stat. T. 10, ch. 146, Sec. 1; on 
specialties, twenty years. Id. Sec. 11. Personal actions founded on torts 
are limited to six years, except trespass for assault and battery, false 
imprisonment, slanderous words and libels, which are limited to two years. 
Id. Sec. 1. 
    90.-3. As to penal actions. When brought by individuals having an 
interest in the penalty or forfeiture, they are limited to one year; Rev. 
Stat. T. 10, c. 146, Sec. 15; when prosecuted by the state, two years. Id. 
Sec. 16. 
    91.-4. As to crimes. Prosecutions for crimes must be commenced within 
six years when the party charged has publicly resided within the state, 
except in cases of treason, murder, arson, and manslaughter. Rev. Stat. T. 
12, c. 167, 15. 
    92. Maryland. 1. As to lands. The statute of 21 Jac. I. c. 16, is in 
force in this state. 
    93.-2. As to personal actions. By the Act of Assembly, 1715, c. 23, 
actions of account; upon the case; or simple contract; or book debt or 
account; and of debt not of specialty; detinue and replevin for taking away 
goods and chattels; and trespass quare clausum fregit; must be brought 
within three years ensuing the cause of action, and not after; other actions 
of trespass, of assault, battery, wounding and imprisonment, within one year 
from the time of the cause of action accruing; from these provisions are 
excepted, however, such accounts as concern the trade of merchandise between 
merchant and merchant, their factors and servants which are not resident 
within this [province] state. This statute also enacts, that no bill, bond, 
judgment, or recognizance, statute merchant or of the staple, or other 
specialty whatsoever, (except such as shall be taken in the name or for the 
use of our sovereign the king, &c.) shall be "good and pleadable, or 
admitted in evidence" against any person of this [province] state, after the 
principal debtor and creditor have both been dead twelve years, or the debt 
or thing in action above twelve years standing. 
    94. Persons laboring under the impediments of infancy, coverture, 
insanity or imprisonment, are not barred until five years after the 
disability has been removed. And when a personal action abates by the death 
of the defendant, the plaintiff may at any time renew his suit, provided it 
be commenced without delay after letters testamentary have been granted. 
    95. Defendants, when absent from the state at the time the cause of 
action accrued, cannot compute the time of their absence in order to bar the 
plaintiff, but the latter may prosecute the same after the presence in the 
state of the persons liable thereto, within the time or times limited by the 
acts of limitation in such actions. 
    96. Massachusetts. By the Revised Statutes, ch. 120, it is provided as 
follows, to wit: 
    97.-1. The following actions shall be commenced within six years next 
after the cause of action shall accrue, and not afterwards 
    98. First, all actions of debt, founded upon any contract, or liability 
not under seal, except such as are brought upon the judgment or decree of 
some court of record of the United States, or of this, or some other of the 
United States: 
    99. Secondly, all actions upon judgments rendered in any court, not 
being a court of record: 
   100. Thirdly, all actions for arrears of rent:
   101. Fourthly, all actions of assumpsit, or upon the case, founded on 
any contract or liability, express or implied: 
   102. Fifthly, all actions for waste and for trespass upon land: 
   103. Sixthly, all actions of replevin and all other actions for taking, 
detaining or injuring goods or chattels: 
   104. Seventhly, all other actions on the case, except actions for 
slanderous words and for libels. 
   105.-2. All actions for assault and battery, and for false 
imprisonment, and all actions for slanderous words and for libels, shall be 
commenced within two years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and 
not afterwards. 
   106.-3. All actions against sheriffs, for the misconduct or negligence 
of their deputies, shall be commenced within four years next after the cause 
of action shall accrue, and not afterwards. 
   107.-4. None of the foregoing provisions shall apply to any action 
brought upon a promissory note, which is signed in the presence of an 
attesting witness, provided the action be brought by the original payee, or 
by his executor or administrator, nor to an action brought upon any bills, 
notes, or other evidences of debt, issued by any bank. 
   108.-5. In all actions of debt or assumpsit brought to recover the 
balance due upon a mutual and open account current, the cause of action 
shall be deemed to have accrued, at the time of the last item proved in such 
account. 
   109.-6. If any person entitled to bring any of the actions before 
mentioned in this chapter shall, at the time when the cause of action 
accrues, be within the age of twenty-one years, or a married woman, insane, 
imprisoned, or absent from the United States, such person may bring the said 
actions within the times in this chapter respectively limited, after the 
disability shall be removed, or within six years after the disability 
mentioned in the preceding section. 
   110.-7. All personal actions on any contract, not limited by the 
foregoing sections, or by any other law of this commonwealth, shall be 
brought within twenty years after the accruing of the cause of action. 
   111.-8. When any person shall be disabled to prosecute an action in the 
courts of this commonwealth, by reason of his being an alien subject or 
citizen of any country at war with the United States, the time of the 
continuance of such war shall not be deemed any part of the respective 
periods, herein limited for the commencement of any of the actions before 
mentioned. 
   112.-9. If, at the time when any cause of action, mentioned in this 
chapter, shall accrue against any person, he shall be out of the state, the 
action may be commenced within the time herein limited therefor, after such 
person shall come into the state and if after any cause of action shall have 
accrued, the person against whom it has accrued shall be absent from and 
reside out of the state, the time of his absence shall not be taken as any 
part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
   113.-10. If any person, entitled to bring any of the actions, before 
mentioned in this chapter, or liable to any such action, shall die before 
the expiration of the time herein limited therefor, or within thirty days 
after the expiration of the said time, and if the cause of action does by 
law survive, the action may be commenced by or against the executor or 
administrator of the deceased person, as the case may be, at anytime within 
two years after the grant of letters testamentary or of administration, and 
not afterwards, if barred by the provisions of this chapter. 
   114.-11. If, in any action duly commenced within the time in this 
chapter limited and allowed therefor, the writ shall fail of a sufficient 
service or return, by any unavoidable accident, or by any default or neglect 
of the officer to whom it is committed, or if the writ shall be abated, or 
the action otherwise avoided or defeated, by the death of any party thereto, 
or for any matter of form, or if after a verdict for the plaintiff, the 
judgment shall be arrested, or if a judgment for the plaintiff shall be 
reversed on a writ of error, the plaintiff may commence a new action for 
the same cause, at any time within one year after the abatement or other 
determination of the original suit, or after the reversal of the judgment 
therein; and if the cause of action does by law survive, his executor or 
administrator may, in case of his death, commence such new action within the 
said one year. 
   115.-12. If any person, who is liable to any of the actions mentioned 
in this chapter, shall fraudulently conceal the cause of such action from 
the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the action may be commenced, 
at any time within six years after the person who is entitled to bring the 
same, shall discover that he has such cause of action, and not afterwards. 
   116. Michigan. 1. As to lands. Sec. 1. In all real actions the statute of 
limitation takes effect as follows, to wit: In all actions for the recovery 
of land the statute runs after twenty years from the time the cause of 
action accrued, or within twenty-five years after the plaintiff or those 
from, by or under whom he claims, shall have been seised or possessed of the 
premises, except as specified below. 
   117.-Sec. 2. If the right or title accrued to an ancestor or 
predecessor of the person who brings the action or makes the entry upon the 
land, or to any other person from, by or under whom he claims, the said 
twenty-five years shall be computed from the time when the right or title so 
first accrued to such ancestor, predecessor or other person. 
   118.-Sec. 3. The right to bring an action for the recovery of land or 
to make an entry thereon shall be deemed first to accrue when any person is 
disseised, at the time of such disseisin. 
   119. When any person claims as heir or devisee of one who died seised, 
his right shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of such death; unless 
there is a tenancy by the curtesy or other estate, intervening after the 
death of such ancestor or devisor, in which case the right shall be deemed 
to accrue when such intermediate estate shall expire, or when it would have 
expired by its own limitation. 
   120. When there is such an intermediate estate, and in all other cases 
when the party claims by force of any remainder or reversion, his right, so 
far as it is affected by the limitation herein prescribed, shall be deemed 
to accrue when the intermediate or precedent estate would have expired by 
its own limitation, notwithstanding any forfeiture thereof for which he 
might have entered at an earlier time; but if the person claims by reason of 
any forfeiture or breach of the condition, the statute runs from the time 
when the forfeiture was incurred or the condition was broken. 
   121. In all other cases not otherwise provided for, the right shall be 
deemed to accrue when the claimant or the person under whom he claims first 
became entitled to the possession of the premises, under the title upon 
which the entry or action is founded. 
   122.- Sec. 4. If any minister or other sole corporation shall be 
disseised, any of his successors may enter upon the premises, or bring an 
action for the recovery thereof at any time within five years after death, 
resignation or removal of the person so disseised, notwithstanding the 
twenty-five years after such disseisin shall have expired. 
   123.-Sec. 5. If the person first entitled to make such entry or bring 
such action shall die within the age of twenty-one years, or be a married 
woman, insane, imprisoned in the state prison, or absent from the United 
States, and no determination or judgment shall have been had of or upon the 
title, right or action which accrued to him, the entry may be made or the 
action brought by his heirs, or any other person claiming from, by or under 
him, at any time within ten years after his death, notwithstanding the said 
twenty-five years shall have expired. 
   124.- Sec. 6. No person shall be deemed to have been in possession of any 
lands within the meaning of the foregoing provisions merely by reason of 
having made an entry thereon, unless he shall have continued open and 
peaceable possession of the premises for the space of one year next after 
such entry, or unless an action shall be commenced upon such entry and 
seisin within one year after he shall be ousted or dispossessed of the 
premises. R. S., p. 573 and 574. 
    125. No actions for the recovery of an estate sold by an executor or 
administrator shall be maintained by the heir or other person claiming under 
the deceased testator or intestate, unless it be commenced within five years 
next after the sale. And no actions for any estate sold by a guardian shall 
be maintained by the ward or any other person claiming under him, unless it 
be commenced within five years after the termination of the guardianship. 
Except that persons out of the state and minors and others under any legal 
disability to sue at the time when the right of action shall first accrue, 
may commence such action at any time within five years after the disability 
is removed, or after their return to the state. R. S., p. 317, see. 35. 
   126.-2. As to personal actions. The following actions shall be 
commenced within six years next after the cause of action shall accrue and 
not afterwards, to wit: 
   127.-1st. All actions of debt founded upon any contract or liability 
not under seal, except such as are brought upon the judgment or decree of 
some court of record, or of general equity jurisdiction of the United 
States, or of this or some other of the United States. 
   128.-2d. All actions upon judgments rendered in any court other than 
those above excepted. 
   129.-3rd. All actions for arrears of rent. 
   130.-4th. All actions of assumpsit or upon the case founded on any 
contract or liability express or implied. 
   131.-6th. All actions for waste. 
   132.-6th. All actions of replevin and trover and all other actions for 
taking, detaining, or injuring goods and chattels. 
   133.-7th. All other actions on the case, except actions for slanderous 
words or for libels. 
   134.-Sec. 2. All actions for trespass upon land or for assault and 
battery, and for false imprisonment, and all actions for slanderous words 
and for libels, shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of 
action shall, accrue and ]lot afterwards. 
   135.-Sec. 3. All actions against sheriffs for the misconduct or neglect 
of their deputies shall be commenced within four years next after the cause 
of action shall accrue and not afterwards. 
   136.-Sec. 4. None of the foregoing provisions shall apply to any action 
brought, upon any bills, notes or other evidence of debt issued by any bank. 
   137.-Sec. 5. In all actions of debt or assumpsit brought to recover the 
balance due upon mutual and open account current the cause of action shall 
be deemed to have accrued at the time of the last item proved in such 
account. 
   138.-Sec. 6. If any person entitled to bring any of the actions before 
mentioned in this chapter shall, at the time when the cause of action 
accrues, be within the age of twenty-one years, or a married woman, insane, 
imprisoned in the state prison, or absent from the United States, such 
person may bring the said actions within the time in this chapter 
respectively limited after the disability shall be removed. 
   139.-Sec. 7. All personal actions or any contract not limited by the 
foregoing sections or by an other laws of this state shall be brought within 
twenty years after the accruing of the cause of action. 
   140.-Sec. 8. When any person shall be disabled to prosecute an action 
in the courts of this state by reason of his being an alien subject or 
citizen of any country at war with the United States, the time of the 
continuance of such war shall not be deemed any part of the respective 
period herein limited for the commencement of an of the actions before 
mentioned. 
   141.-Sec. 9. If at the time when a cause of action mentioned in this 
chapter shall accrue against any person, he shall be out of the state, the 
action may be commenced within the time herein limited therefor after such 
person shall come into this state. And if, after any cause of action shall 
have accrued, the person against whom it has accrued shall be absent from, 
and reside out of the state, the time of his absence shall not be taken as 
any part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
   142.-Sec. 10. If any person entitled to bring any of the actions before 
mentioned shall die before the expiration of the time herein limited or 
within thirty days after the expiration of the said time, and if the cause 
of action does by law survive; the action may be commenced by or against the 
executor or administrator of the deceased person as the case may be, at any 
time within two years after the granting of the letters testamentary or of 
administration, and not afterwards, if barred by the provisions of this 
chapter. 
   143.-Sec. 11. If in any action, duly commenced within the time limited 
in this chapter and allowed therefor, the writ shall fail of a sufficient 
service or return, by an unavoidable accident or by any default or neglect 
of the officer to whom it is committed, or if the suit shall be abated, or 
the action otherwise avoided or defeated by the death of any party thereto, 
or for any other matter of form, or if after a verdict for the plaintiff the 
judgment shall be arrested, or if a judgment for the plaintiff shall be 
reversed on a writ of error, the plaintiff may commence a new action for the 
same cause at any time within one year after the abatement or other 
determination of the original suit or after the reversal of the judgment 
therein. And if the cause of action does by law survive, the executor or 
administrator may in case of his death commence such action within said one 
year. 
   144.-Sec. 12. In case of the fraudulent concealment of the right of 
action, such action may be commenced at any time within six years after the 
person entitled to the same shall discover that he has such cause of action. 
R. S., p. 576, 577 and 578. 
   145.-Sec. 21. All actions and suits for any penalty or forfeiture on 
any penal statute brought by any person to whom the penalty or forfeiture is 
given in the whole or in part, shall be commenced within one year next after 
the offence was committed, and not afterwards. 
   146.-Sec. 22. If the penalty or forfeiture is given in whole or in part 
to the state, a suit therefor may be commenced by or in behalf of the state 
at any time within two years after the offence was committed and not 
afterwards. Rev. Stat., p. 579. 
   147.-3. As to crimes. The statute of limitations in criminal cases 
takes effect after six years from the time the offence was committed; but 
any period during which the party charged was not usually and publicly 
resident within this state shall not be reckoned as a part of the six years. 
In case of murder, however, there is no limitation. Rev. Stat., p. 666, sec. 
15. 
   148. Mississippi. 1. As to lands. Real, possessory, ancestral and mixed 
actions for lands, tenements, or hereditaments must be instituted within 
twenty years next after the right or title thereto, or cause of action 
accrued. How. & Hutch. page 568, ch. 43, sec. 88, L. 1822. Right or title 
of entry is barred after twenty years. Id. sec. 89, L. 1822. Fifty years 
actual possession uninterruptedly continued by occupancy, descent, 
conveyance or otherwise, vests a complete title in the occupier. Id. sec. 
90, L. 1822. Real estate, which may have escheated to the state, must be 
claimed within two years next after the inquisition, or it will be sold. 
How. & Hutch. page 263, ch. 34, sec. 84, L. 1822. If real estate escheat to 
the state and be sold, the moneys arising from such sale may be claimed 
within twelve years next from the day of such sale; Id. sec. 87, L. 1822; 
and moneys arising from sale of personal estate, escheated, may be claimed 
within six years next after the sale thereof. Ib. All persons claiming real 
estate escheated, either by descent or otherwise, must appear and traverse 
the office of inquest within twelve years from the date thereof, and in case 
of personal estate, within six years, or they will be forever barred of 
their claim. Id. sec. 88, L. 1822. 
   149.-2. As to personal actions. 1st. On contracts. These are, 1. 
Actions on simple contracts must be commenced and sued within six years next 
after the cause of action accrued. Except such actions as concern the trade 
or merchandise between merchant and merchant, their factors, agents and 
servants where there are mutual dealings and mutual credits. How. & Hutch. 
page. 569, ch. 43, sec. 91, L. 1822 How. Rep. 2, 786. 
   150. Actions founded upon any account for goods, wares or merchandise, 
sold and delivered, or for any articles charged in any store account, must 
be commenced and sued within three years next after cause of action accrued. 
Post-dating any article in such account is highly penal. How. & Hutch. page 
570, ch. 43, sec. 98, L. 1822. 
   151.-2. Actions on specialties must be commenced and sued within 
sixteen years next after cause of action accrued. How. & Hutch. page 569, 
ch. 43, sec. 95, L. 1822. 
   152. Judgments recovered in any court of record as well without as within 
this state, may be revived by scire facias, or an action of debt brought 
thereon within twenty years next after the date of such judgment. How. & 
Hutch. pages 570 and. 574, ch. 43, sec. 96 and 111, Laws 1822 and 1830. This 
extends to decrees of the chancery court. How. Rep. 4, 31. 
   153.-3. Suits on bonds, or recognizances against sureties for public 
officers must be commenced and sued within five years next after cause of 
action accrued. Id. sec. 97, page 570, L. 1822. 
   154.-2d. On torts. Actions for torts affecting the person must be sued 
within two years next after cause accrued. How. & Hutch. page 569, ch. 43, 
sec. 92, L. 1822. Actions of slander for words spoken or written must be 
sued within one year. Id. sec. 93, L. 1822; How. Rep. 2, 698. Actions of 
trespass quare clausum fregit; trespass; detinue; trover; replevin, for 
taking away goods and chattels, actions on the case, must be sued within six 
years next after cause of action accrued. Id. How. & Hutch. page 569, ch. 
43, sec. 91, L. 1822. 
   155.-3. As to penal actions. Penal actions are limited to twelve months 
from the time of incurring the fine or forfeiture. (Persons absconding or 
fleeing from justice are excepted:) How. & Hutch 49, see. 19, L. 1822. 
   156.-4. As to crimes. Indictments, presentments or informations for 
offences (crimes) must be found or exhibited within one year next after the 
offence committed, (except for willful murder, arson, forgery, counterfeiting
and larceny; as to which there is no limitation.) How. & Hutch. p. 668, ch. 
49; sec. 19, L. 1822. 
   157. Missouri. 1. As to lands. That from henceforth no person or persons 
whatsoever shall make entry into any lands, tenements or hereditaments, 
after the expiration of twenty years next after his, her or their right or 
title to the same first descended or accrued; nor shall any person or 
persons whatsoever have or maintain any writ of right, or any other real or 
possessory writ or action for any lands, tenements, or hereditaments of the 
seisin or possession of him, her or them, his, her or their ancestors or 
predecessors, nor declare or allege any other seisin or possession of him, 
her or them, his, her or their ancestors or predecessors, than within twenty 
years next before such writ, action, or suit, so hereafter to be sued, 
commenced or brought. Act of 1848. Infants, femes covert, persons of unsound 
memory, imprisoned, beyond seas, or without the jurisdiction of the United 
States, may sustain such actions commenced within twenty years after the 
disability has been removed. 
   158.-2. As to personal actions. In all actions upon the case (other 
than for slander;) actions for accounts, (other than such accounts as 
concern the trade of merchandise between merchant and merchant, their 
factors and servants;) actions for debt, grounded upon any lending or 
contract without specialty, or of debt for arrearages of rent; and actions 
of trespass quare clausum fregit, shall be brought within five years after 
the cause of action shall accrue. 
   159. All actions upon accounts for goods, wares and merchandise sold and 
delivered, or for any article in any store account; all actions of trespass 
vi et armis, assault and battery, and imprisonment, shall be brought within 
two years after the cause of action shall accrue. 
   160. Actions on the case for words, one year after the words spoken; and 
writs of error shall be brought within five years after the judgment or 
order of complaint shall be rendered and not after. Act of July 4, 1807. 
   161. The plaintiff may within one year commence a new suit when a former 
judgment has been reversed, or the plaintiff has suffered a nonsuit. 
   162.-3. As to criminal actions. Actions, suits, indictments, or 
informations, (if the punishment be fine and imprisonment,) must be brought 
within two years after the offence has been committed, and not after. 
   163. New Hampshire. 1. As to lands. No action can be maintained for the 
recovery of lands, unless upon a seisin within twenty years, except by 
persons under disability, that is, by those under twenty-one years of age, 
femes covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or without the limits of the 
United States, who may sue within five years after the disability has been 
removed. 
   164.-2. As to personal actions. Actions in general are limited to be 
brought within six years after they have accrued; but actions of trespass, 
assault and battery, are limited to three years and actions of slander to 
two. Infants, femes covert, persons imprisoned, or beyond sea, without the 
limits of the United States, or non compos mentis, may bring an action 
within the same time, after the disability has been removed. When the 
defendant has left the state before the action accrued, and left no property 
there which could have been attached, then the whole time is allowed after 
his return. 
   165. New Jersey. 1. As to lands. By the act of June 5, 1787, it was 
enacted, 
   166.-1. At the aforesaid date, that sixty years actual possession of 
lands, tenements or other real estate uninterruptedly continued by 
occupancy, descent, conveyance or otherwise, in whatever way or manner such 
possession might have commenced or been continued, shall vest a full and 
complete right and title in every actual possessor or occupier of such 
lands, tenements or other real estate, and shall be a good and sufficient 
bar to all claims that may be made or actions commenced, by any person or 
persons whatsoever for the recovery of such lands, &c. 
   167.-2. And that thirty years' actual possession of lands, &c. 
uninterruptedly continued as aforesaid, wherever such possession commenced 
or is founded upon a proprietary right duly laid thereon, and recorded in 
the surveyor general's office of the division in which such location was 
made, or in the secretary's office, agreeably to law; or, wherever such 
possession was obtained by a fair bona fide purchase of such land, &c. of 
any person in possession, and supposed to have a legal right and title 
thereto, or of the agent or agents of such person or persons, shall be a 
good and sufficient bar to all prior locations, rights, titles, conveyances 
or claims whatever, not followed by actual possession as aforesaid, and 
shall vest an absolute right and title in the actual possessor or occupier 
of all such lands, &c. 
   168. Provided, That if any person or persons having a right or title to 
lands, &c. shall, at the time of the said right or title first descended or 
accrued, be within twenty-one years of age, feme covert, non compos, 
imprisoned, or without the United States, then such person or persons, and 
his heir or heirs may, notwithstanding the aforesaid times are expired, be 
entitled to his or their action for the same, so as such person or persons, 
or his or their heirs, commence or sue forth his or their actions within 
five years, after his or their full age, discoverture, coming of sound mind, 
enlargement out of prison, or coming within any of the United States, and at 
no other time. 
   169. And provided that any citizens of this, or any of the United States, 
and his or their heirs, having such right, &c. may, notwithstanding the 
aforesaid times expired, commence his or their action for such lands, &c., 
at any time within five years next after the passing of this act, and not 
afterwards. 
   170. By the act of February 7, 1799, s. 9, it is enacted, that no person 
who now hath, or hereafter may have, any right or title of entry, into 
lands, tenements or hereditaments, shall make entry therein, but within 
twenty years next after such right or title shall accrue, and such person 
shall be barred from any entry afterwards. 
   171. Provided, That the time during which the person who hath or shall 
have such right or title of entry shall have been under the age of twenty-
one years, feme covert, or insane, shall not be computed as part of the said 
limited period of twenty years. 
   172. By section 10, of the same act, from and after the first day of 
January, 1803, every real, possessory, ancestral, mixed or other action for 
any lands, tenements or hereditaments, shall be brought or instituted within 
twenty years next after the, right or title thereto or cause of such action 
shall accrue, and not after. 
   173. Provided, That the time during which the person who hath or shall 
have such right or title or cause of action, shall have been under the age 
of twenty-one years, feme covert, or insane, shall not be computed as part 
of the said twenty years. 
   174.-Section 11. That if a mortgagee and those under him be in 
possession, of lands, &c. contained in the mortgage or any part thereof, for 
twenty years after default of payment, then the right or equity of 
redemption therein, shall be barred, forever. 
   175.-Section 13. That no person or persons, bodies politic or 
corporate, shall be sued or impleaded by the state of New Jersey, for any 
land, &c. or any rents, revenues, or profits thereof, but within twenty 
years after the right, title or cause of action to the same shall accrue and 
not after. 
   176.-2. As to personal actions. It is enacted that all actions of 
trespass quare clausum fregit; trespass; detinue; trover; replevin; debt, 
founded on any lending or contract without specialty, or for arrearages of 
rent due on a parol demise; of account, (except such actions as concern the 
trade of merchandise between merchant and merchant, their factors, agents 
and servants;) and on the case, (except actions for slander,) shall be 
commenced and sued within six years next after the cause of such actions 
shall have accrued, and not after. That all actions of trespass for assault, 
menace, battery, wounding and imprisonment, or any of them, shall be 
commenced and sued within four years next after the cause of such actions 
shall have accrued and not after. That every action upon the case for words, 
shall be commenced and sued within two years next after the words spoken, 
and not after. Persons within the age of twenty-one years, femes covert or 
insane, may institute such actions within such time as is before limited 
after his or her coming to or being of full age, discoverture, or sane 
memory, 
   177. The act of February 7, 1799, s. 6, provides that every action of 
debt, or covenant for rent, or arrearages of rent, founded upon lease under 
seal; debt on any bill or obligation for the payment of money only, or upon 
any award, under the hands and seals of arbitrators, for the payment of 
money only, shall be commenced and sued within sixteen years next after the 
cause of such action shall have accrued, and not after; but if any payment 
shall have been made on any such lease, specialty or award, within or after 
the said period of sixteen years, then an action, instituted on such lease, 
specialty or award, within sixteen years after such payment, shall be 
effectual in law, and not after. Provided, That the time during which the 
person, who is or shall be entitled to any of the actions specified in this 
section, shall have been within the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, or 
insane, shall not be taken or computed as part of the said limited period of 
sixteen years. 
   178. As to crimes. By the statute passed February 17,1829, Harr. Comp. 
243, all indictments for offences punishable with death, (except murder,) 
must be found within three years, and all offences not punishable with 
death, must be brought within two years; except, as to both, where the 
offender flies. 
   179.-4. As to penal actions. By the statute of February 7, 1799, Rev. 
Laws, 410, all popular and qui tam actions, and also all actions on penal 
statutes by the party grieved, must be brought within two years. 
   180. New York. The provisions limiting the time of commencing actions, 
are contained in the Revised Statutes, part 3, chapter 4, tit. 2, and are 
substantially as follows: 
   181.-1. As to lands. The people of this state will not sue or implead 
any person for, or in respect to any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or 
for the issues or the profits thereof, by reason of any right or title of 
the said people to the same, unless, 1. Such right shall have accrued within 
twenty years before any suit, or other proceeding for the same shall have 
been commenced; or unless, 2. The said people or those from whom they claim, 
shall have received the rents and profits of such real estate, or some part 
thereof, within the said space of twenty years. Grantees of the state cannot 
recover, if the state could not; and when patents granted by the state are 
declared void for fraud, a suit may be brought at any time within twenty 
years thereafter. 
   182. No action for the recovery of any lands, tenements, or 
hereditaments, or for the recovery of the possession thereof, shall be 
maintained, unless it appear that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor 
or grantor, was seised or possessed of the premises in question within 
twenty years before the commencement of such action. 
   183. No avowry or cognizance of title of real estate, or to any rents or 
services, shall be valid, unless it appear that the person making the 
avowry, or the person in whose right the cognizance is made, or the 
ancestor, predecessor, or grantor of such person, was seised or possessed 
of the premises in question, within twenty years before committing the act, 
in defence of which the avowry or cognizance is made. 
   184. No entry upon real estate shall be deemed sufficient or valid as a 
claim, unless an action be commenced thereupon within one year after the 
making of such entry, and within twenty years from the time when, the right 
of making such entry accrued. 
   185. All writs of scire facias upon fines, heretofore levied, of any 
manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall be sued out within twenty 
years next after the title or cause of action first descended or fallen, and 
not after that period. 
   186. If any person entitled to commence any action as above specified, or 
to make any entry, avowry, or cognizance, be at the time such title shall 
first descend or accrue, either, 1. Within the age of twenty-one years or, 
2. Insane; or, 3. Imprisoned on any criminal charge or in execution upon 
some conviction of a criminal offence for any term less than for life; or, 
4. A married woman; the time during which such disability shall continue 
shall not be deemed any portion of the time above limited, for the 
commencement of such suit, or the making such entry, avowry, or cognizance; 
but such person may bring such action, or make such entry, avowry, or 
cognizance, after the said time so limited, and within ten years after such 
disability removed and not after. In case of the death of the person 
entitled to such action, &c., before any determination or judgment in the 
case, his heirs may institute the same within ten years after his death, but 
not after. Rev. Statutes, part 3, c. 4, tit. 2, article 1. 
   187. The 68th section of the act "to simplify and abridge the practice, 
pleadings and proceedings of the courts of this state," (New York,) passed 
the 12th of April 1848, known as the Code of Procedure, enacts that the 
provisions of the Revised Statutes, contained in the article entitled, "Of 
the time of commencing actions relating property," shall, until otherwise 
provided by statute, continue in force, and be applicable to actions for the 
recovery of real property. 
   188.-2. Other actions than for the recovery of real property, and 
actions already commenced, or cases where the right of action has accrued, 
to which the statutes in force when the said act was passed shall be 
applicable, according to the subject of the action, and without regard to 
the form, must be commenced within the times as provided for in part 2, t. 
2, c. 3 and 4, of the code of procedure in the following sections, namely: 
     Sec. 70. Within twenty years: 
     1. An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United 
States, or of any state or territory within the United States. 2. An action 
upon a sealed instrument. 
     Sec.  71. Within six years: 
     1. An action upon a contract, obligation or liability, express or 
implied; excepting those mentioned in section seventy. 
     2. An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty 
or forfeiture. 
     3. An action for trespass upon real property.
     4. An action for taking, detaining or injuring any goods or chattels, 
including actions for the specific recovery of personal property. 
     5. An action for criminal conversation, or for any other injury to the 
person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter 
enumerated. 
     6. An action for relief, on the ground of fraud; the cause of action in 
such case not to be deemed to have accrued, until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud. 
     Sec. 72. Within three years: 
     1. An action against a sheriff or coroner, upon a liability incurred by 
the doing of an act in his official capacity, and in virtue of his office, 
or by the omission of an official duty; including the non-payment of money 
collected upon an execution. But this section shall not apply to an action 
for an escape. 
     2. An action upon a statue, for a penalty or forfeiture, where the 
action is given to the party aggrieved, or to such party and the people of 
this state, except where the statute imposing it prescribes a different 
limitation. 
     Sec. 73. Within two years: 
     1. An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, or false 
imprisonment. 
     2. An action upon a statute, for a forfeiture or penalty to the people 
of this state. 
     Sec. 74. Within one year:
     1. An action against a sheriff or other officer, for the escape of a 
prisoner arrested, or imprisoned on civil process. 
     Sec. 75. In an action brought to recover a balance due upon a mutual, 
open and current account, where there have been reciprocal demands between 
the parties, the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued from the 
time of the last item in the account, on the adverse side. 
     Sec. 76. An action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, given in 
whole or in part to any person who will prosecute for the same, must be 
commenced within one year after the commission of the offence, and if the 
action be not commenced within the year, by a private party, it may be 
commenced within two years thereafter, in behalf of the people of this 
state, by the attorney-general, or the district attorney of the county where 
the offence was committed. 
     Sec. 77. An action for relief, not hereinbefore provided for, must be 
commenced within ten years after the cause of action shall have accrued. 
     Sec. 78. The limitations prescribed in this title shall apply to 
actions brought in the name of the people of this state or for their 
benefit, in the same manner as to actions by private parties. 
     Sec. 79. An action shall not be deemed commenced, within the meaning of 
this title, unless it appear: 
     1. That the summons or other process therein was duly served upon the 
defendants, or one of them; or 
     2. That the summons was delivered, with the intent that it should be 
actually served, to the sheriff of the county in which the defendants, or 
one of them, usually or last resided; or, if a corporation be defendant, to 
the sheriff of the county in which such corporation was established by law, 
or where its general business was transacted, or where it kept an office for 
the transaction of business. 
     Sec.  80. If, when the cause of action shall accrue against a person, 
he be out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term herein 
limited, after his return to the state; and if, after the cause of action 
shall have accrued, he depart from and reside out of the state, the time of 
his absence shall not be part of the time limited for the commencement of 
the action. 
     Sec. 81. If a person entitled to bring an action, except for a penalty 
or forfeiture, or against a sheriff or other officer for an escape be at the 
time the cause of action accrued, either: 
     1. Within the age of twenty-one years; or, 
     2. Insane; or, 
     3. Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence 
of a criminal court, for a term less than his natural life; or, 
     4. A married woman: The time of such disability shall not be part of 
the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
     Sec. 82. If a person entitled to bring an action, die before the 
expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause 
of action survive, his representatives may commence the action, after the 
expiration of that time, and within one year from his death. 
     Sec. 83. When a person shall be an alien, subject or citizen of a 
country at war with the United States, the time of the continuance of the 
war shall not be part of the period limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
     Sec. 84. If an action shall be commenced within the time prescribed 
therefor, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be reversed, on appeal, 
the plaintiff, or if be die and the cause of action survive, his heirs or 
representatives may commence a new action within one year after the 
reversal. 
     Sec. 85. When the commencement of an action shall be stayed by 
injunction, the time of the continuance of the injunction shall not be part 
of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
     Sec. 86. No person shall avail himself of a disability, unless it 
existed when his right of action accrued. 
     Sec. 87. When two or more disabilities shall exist, the limitation 
shall not attach until they all be removed. 
     Sec. 88. This title shall not affect actions to enforce the payment of 
bills, notes, or other evidences of debt issued by moneyed corporations, or 
issued or put in circulation as money. 
     Sec. 89. This title shall not affect actions against directors or 
stockholders of a moneyed corporation, to recover a penalty or forfeiture 
imposed, or to enforce a liability created by the second title of the 
chapter of the Revised Statutes, entitled "Of Incorporations;" but such 
actions must be brought within six years after the discovery, by the 
aggrieved party, of the facts upon which the penalty or forfeiture attached, 
or the liability was created. 
     Sec. 90. Where the time for commencing an action arising on contract 
shall have expired, the cause of action shall not be deemed revived by an 
acknowledgment or new promise, unless the same be in writing, subscribed by 
the party to be charged thereby. 
   189. North Carolina. By the Revised Statutes, chapter 65, it is provided 
as follows, to wit: 
   190. 1. As to lands. 1. That no person or persons nor their heirs, which 
hereafter shall have any right or title to any lands, tenements, or 
hereditaments, shall thereunto enter or make any claim, but within seven 
years next after his, her, or their right or title descended or accrued, and 
in default thereof, such person or persons, so not entering or making claim, 
shall be utterly excluded and disabled from any entry or claim thereafter to 
be made: Provided, nevertheless, that if any person or persons, that is or 
hereafter shall be entitled to any right or claim of lands, tenements or 
hereditaments, shall be, at the time the said right or title first 
descended, accrued, come or fallen, within the age of twenty-one years, feme 
covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned or beyond seas, that then such person 
or persons shall and may, notwithstanding the said seven years be expired, 
commence his, her or their suit, or make his, her, or their entry, as he, 
she, or they might have done before this act, so as such person or persons 
shall, within three years next after full age, discoverture, coming of sound 
mind, enlargement out of prison, or persons beyond seas, within eight years 
after the title or claim becomes due, take benefit and sue for the same, and 
at no time after the times or limitations herein specified; but that all 
possessions, held without suing such claim as aforesaid, shall be a 
perpetual bar against all, and all manner of persons whatsoever, that the 
expectation of heirs may not, in a short time, leave much land unpossessed, 
and titles so perplexed, that no man will know of whom to take or buy land. 
Provided also, that if in any action of ejectment for the recovery of any 
lands, tenements or hereditaments, judgment be given for the plaintiff, and 
the same be reversed for error, or a verdict pass for the plaintiff, and, 
upon matter alleged in arrest of judgment, the judgment be given against the 
plaintiff that he take nothing by his plaint, writ or bill, or a verdict be 
given against the plaintiff, in all such cases the party plaintiff, his 
heirs or executors, as the case shall require, may commence a new action or 
suit from time to time, within one year after such judgment reversed, or 
judgment given against the plaintiff. 
   191.- 2. Where any person or persons, or the person or persons under 
whom he, she, or they claim, shall have been, or shall continue to be, in 
possession of any lands, tenements or hereditaments whatsoever, under titles 
derived from sales, made either by creditors, executors or administrators of 
any person deceased, or by husbands and their wives, or by endorsement of 
patents or other colorable title, for the space of twenty-one years, all 
such possessions of lands, tenements or, hereditaments, under such title, 
shall be and are hereby ratified, confirmed and declared to be a good and 
legal bar, against the entry of any person or persons, under the right or 
claim of the state, to all intents and purposes whatsoever; Provided, 
nevertheless, that the possession so set up shall have been ascertained and 
identified under known and visible lines or boundaries. 
   192.-2. As to personal actions. 3. All actions of trespass, detinue, 
actions sur trover and replevin for taking away of goods and chattels, all 
actions of account and upon the case, all actions of debt for arrearages of 
rent, all actions of debt grounded upon any lending or contract without 
specialty, and all actions of assault, menace, battery, wounding, and 
imprisonment, or any of them, which shall be sued or brought, shall be 
commenced or brought within the time and limitation in this act expressed, 
and not after; that is to say, actions of account render, actions upon the 
case, actions of debt for arrearages of rent, actions of debt upon simple 
contract, actions of detinue, replevin, and trespass either for goods and 
chattels or quare clausum fregit, within three years next after the cause of 
such action or suit, and not after; except such accounts as concern the 
trade of merchandise, between merchant and merchant, and their factors, or 
servants; and the said actions of trespass, of assault and battery, 
wounding, imprisonment, or any of them, within one year after the cause of 
such action or suit, and not after; and the said actions upon the case for 
words, within six months after the words spoken, and not after. 
   193.-4. Provided, nevertheless, that if, on any of the said actions or 
suits, judgment be given for the plaintiff, and the same be reversed by 
error, or a verdict pass for the plaintiff, and upon matter alleged in 
arrest of judgment, the judgment be given against the plaintiff, that he 
take nothing by his plaint, writ or bill; or if any of the said actions 
shall be brought by original writ, and the defendant cannot be attached or 
legally served with process, in all such cases, the party plaintiff, his 
heirs, executors or administrators, as the case shall require, may commence 
a new action or suit, from time to time, within a year after such judgment 
reversed, or such judgment given against the plaintiff, or till the 
defendant can be attached or served with the process, so as to compel him to 
appear and answer. And provided further, that if any person or persons, that 
is or shall be entitled to any such action or trespass, detinue, action sur 
trover, replevin, actions of accompt and upon the case, actions of debt for 
arrearages of rent, actions of debt grounded upon any lending or contract 
without specialty, actions of assault, menace, battery, wounding, and 
imprisonment, actions of trespass quare clausum fregit, actions upon the 
case for slanderous words, be, or shall be, at the time of any such cause of 
action given or accrued, fallen or come, within the age of twenty-one years, 
feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned or beyond the seas, then such 
person or persons shall be at liberty to bring the same actions, so as they 
bring the same within such times as are before limited, after their coming 
to or being of full age, discovert, of sound memory, at large or returned 
from beyond seas, as other persons having no such impediment might have 
done. And provided further, that when any person or persons, against whom 
there is cause of action, shall be beyond sea at the time of such cause of 
action given or accrued, fallen or come, the person, who shall have such 
cause of action, may bring his action against them within such time or times 
as are hereinbefore limited, for bringing such actions after their return. 
   194.-5. The limitation of actions shall apply to all bonds, bills, and 
other securities made transferable by law, after the assignment or 
endorsement thereof, in the same manner as it operates against promissory 
notes. 
   195.-3. As to penal Actions. 6. All actions and suits to be brought on 
any penal act of the general assembly, for the recovery of the penalty 
therein set forth, shall be brought within three years after the cause of 
such action or suit shall or may have accrued, and not after: Provided, that 
this act shall not affect the time of bringing suit on any penal act of the 
general assembly, which hath a time limited therein for bringing the same. 
   196. Ohio. 1. As to lands. Twenty-one years adverse possession of lands 
operates a bar, with a saving in favor of infants, femes covert, persons 
insane, imprisoned or beyond the sea, when the right of action accrues. And 
if a person shall have left the state, and remain out of the same at the 
time the cause of action accrued; or shall have left the state or county at 
any time during the period of limitation, (that is, after the right of 
action has accrued,) and remain out of the same in a place unknown to the 
person having the right of action, suit may be brought at any time within 
the period of limitation, after the return of such person to the state or 
county. 
   197.-2. As to personal actions. 1st. Actions upon the case, covenant 
and debt founded upon a specialty, or any agreement, contract or promise in 
writing, may be brought within fifteen years after the cause of action shall 
have accrued. 
   198.-2d. Actions upon the case and debt founded upon any simple 
contract, not in writing, and actions on the case for consequential damages, 
within six years. 
   199.-3d. Actions of trespass upon property, real or personal, detinue, 
trover and replevin, within four years. 
   200.-4th. Actions of trespass for any injury done to the person, 
actions of slander for words spoken, or for a libel, actions for malicious 
prosecution, and for false imprisonment; actions against officers for 
malfeasance or nonfeasance in office, and actions of debt qui tam, within 
one year. 
   201.-5th. Actions for forcible entry and detainer, or forcible detainer 
only, within two years. 
   202.-6th. All other actions within four years; and all penalties and 
forfeitures given by statute and limited by the statute, within the times so 
limited. 
   203.-7th. Infants, femes covert, persons insane or imprisoned, entitled 
to an action of ejectment, may, after the twenty-one years have elapsed, 
bring their actions within ten years after such disability removed. They may 
bring all other actions, within the respective times limited for bringing 
such actions, after the disability removed. 
   204.-8th. Actions, founded on contracts between persons resident at the 
time of the contract without this state, which are barred by the laws of the 
country where the contract was made, are barred in the courts of this state. 
   205.-9th. In all actions on contracts express or implied, in case of 
payment of an part, principal or interest, acknowledgment of an existing 
liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same, within the time 
herein limited, the action may be commenced within the time limited after 
such payment, acknowledgment or promise. 
   206.-10th. If judgment be arrested or reversed, the suit abate or the 
plaintiff become nonsuit, and the time limited shall have expired, the 
plaintiff may bring a new action within one year after such arrest, 
reversal, abatement or nonsuit. 
   207.-11th. A person who has left the state, or resides out of it, or 
whose place of residence is unknown although in the state, at the time the 
cause of action accrues, may be sued within the time limited by the act, 
after his return or to removal the state, or his place of residence, if in 
the state, becomes known. O. Stat. vol. 29, 214; Act of Feb. 18, 1831. Took 
effect, June 1, 1831. Swan's Col. Laws, 553, 4, 5, 6. 
   208. This act only operates upon causes of action accruing after the act 
took effect, and all causes of action previously subsisting are governed by 
the statutes (and there have been several) in force when the respective 
causes of action accrued, none of the statutes being retrospective in their 
operation. 7 O. R. p. 2, 235, West's Adm'r. v. Hymer; Id. 153, Hazlett et 
al. v. Crutchfield et al.; 6 Id. 96, Bigelow's Ex'r. v. Bigelow's Adm'r. 
   209.-3. As to penal actions. Prosecutions for any forfeitures under a 
penal statute, must be instituted within two years, unless otherwise 
specially provided for. 
   210. Pennsylvania. 1. As to lands. From henceforth no person or persons 
whatsoever, shall make entry into any manors, lands, tenements or 
hereditaments, after the expiration of twenty-one years next after his, her 
or their right or title to the same first descended or accrued; nor shall 
any person or persons whatsoever have or maintain any writ of right, or any 
other real or possessory writ or action, for any manor, lands, tenements or 
hereditaments, of the seisin or possession of him, her or themselves, his, 
her, or their ancestors, or predecessors, nor declare or allege any other 
seisin or possession of him, her or themselves, his, her or their ancestors 
or predecessors, than within twenty-one years next before such writ, action, 
or suit so hereafter to be sued, commenced or brought. Act of March 26, 
1785, s. 2, 2 Smith's Laws Pa. 299. 
   211. Section 4, provides, that if any person or persons having such right 
or title be, or shall be at the time such right or title first descended or 
accrued, within the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, 
imprisoned or beyond the seas, or from and without the United States of 
America, then such person or persons, and the heir or heirs of such person 
or persons, shall and may, notwithstanding the said twenty-one years be 
expired, bring his or their action, or make his or their entry, as he, she 
or, they might have done, before the passing of this act, so as such person 
or persons, or the heir or heirs of such person or persons, shall within ten 
years next after attaining full age, discoverture, soundness of mind, 
enlargement out of prison, or coming into the said United States, take 
benefit of or sue for the same, and no time after the said ten years; and in 
case such person or persons shall die within the said term of ten years, 
under any of the disabilities aforesaid, the heir or heirs of such person or 
persons shall have the same benefit, that such person or persons could or 
might have had; by living until the disabilities should, have ceased or been 
removed; and if any abatement happen in any proceeding or proceedings upon 
such right or title, such proceeding or proceedings may be renewed and 
continued, within three years from the time of such abatement, but not 
afterward. 
   212. By the act of March 11, 1815, the provision above contained, so far 
as the same relates to persons beyond the seas, and from and without the 
United States of America, is repealed. 
   213.-2. As to personal actions. All actions of trespass quare clausum 
fregit, all actions of detinue, trover and replevin, for taking away goods 
and cattle, all actions upon account, and upon the case, (other than such 
accounts as concern the trade of merchandise between merchant and merchant, 
their factors or servants,) all actions of debt, grounded upon any lending 
or contract without specialty, all actions of debt for arrearages of rent, 
except the proprietaries' quit rents, and all actions of trespass, of 
assault, menace, battery, wounding and imprisonment, or any of them, which 
shall be sued or brought at any time after the five and twentieth day of 
April, which shall be in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and 
thirteen, shall be commenced and sued within the time and limitation 
hereafter expressed, and not after; that is to say, the said actions upon 
the case, other than for slander, and the said actions for account, and the 
said actions for trespass, debt, detinue, and replevin for goods or 
chattels, and the said actions of trespass quare clausum fregit, within six 
years next after the cause of such actions or suit, and not after. And the 
said actions of trespass, of assault, menace, battery, wounding, 
imprisonment, or any of them, within two years next after the cause of such 
actions or suit, and not after. And the said actions upon the case for 
words, within one year next after the words spoken, and not after. Act. of 
March 27, 1713, s. 1. 
   214. If in any of the said actions or suits, judgment be given for the 
plaintiff and the same be reversed by error, or a verdict passed for the 
plaintiff, and upon matter alleged in arrest of judgment, the judgment be 
given against the plaintiff, that he take nothing by his plaint, writ or 
bill, then and in every such case, the party plaintiff, his heirs, 
executors, or administrators, as the case may require, may commence a new 
action or suit, from time to time, within a year after such judgment 
reversed, or given against the plaintiff, as aforesaid, and not after. Id. 
s. 2. 
   215. In all actions upon the cause, for slanderous words, to be sued or 
prosecuted by any person or persons, in any court within this province, 
after the said twenty-fifth day of April next, if the jury upon trial of the 
issue in such action, or the jury that shall inquire of the damages, do find 
or assess the damages under forty shillings, then the plaintiff or 
plaintiffs in such action shall have and recover only so much costs as the 
damages so given or assessed do amount unto without any further increase of 
the same. Id. s. 4. 
   216. Provided nevertheless, that if any person or persons who is or shall 
be entitled to any such action or trespass, detinue, trover, replevin, 
actions of account, debt, actions for trespass, for assault, menace, 
battery, wounding or imprisonment, actions upon the case for words, be, or, 
at the time of any cause of such action given or accrued, fallen, or come, 
shall be within the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, 
imprisoned or beyond the sea, that then such person or persons shall be at 
liberty to bring the same actions, so as they take the same within such 
times as are hereby before limited, after their coming to or being of full 
age, discoverture, of sound memory, at large, or returning into this 
province as other persons. id. s. 5. 
   217.-3. As to penal actions. All actions, suits, bills, indictments or 
information, which shall be brought for any forfeiture upon any penal act of 
assembly made or to be made, whereby the forfeiture is or shall be limited 
to the commonwealth only, shall hereafter be brought within two years after 
the offence was committed, and at no time afterwards, and all actions, 
suits, bills, or informations which shall be brought for any forfeiture upon 
any penal act of assembly made or to be made, the benefit and suit whereof 
is or shall be by the said act limited to the commonwealth, and to any 
person or persons that shall prosecute in that behalf, shall be brought by 
any person or persons that may lawfully sue for the same, within one year 
next after the offence was committed; and in default of such pursuit, then 
the same shall be brought for the commonwealth, any time within one year 
after that year ended; and if any action, suit, bill, indictment or 
information shall be brought after the time so limited, the same shall be 
void, and where a shorter time is limited by any act of assembly, the 
prosecution shall be within that time. Act of March 26, 1785, s. 6. 
   218. Rhode Island. 1. As to lands. It is enacted that where any person or 
persons, or others from whom he or they derive their titles, either by 
themselves, tenants or lessees, shall have been for the space of twenty 
years, in the uninterrupted, quiet, peaceable and actual seisin and 
possession of any lands, tenements or hereditaments in the, state, during 
the said time, claiming the same as his, her or their proper, sole and 
rightful estate in fee simple, such actual seisin and possession shall be 
allowed to give and make a good and rightful title to such person or 
persons, their heirs and assigns, forever; saving and excepting however, the 
rights and claims of persons under age, non compos mentis, feme covert, and 
persons imprisoned, or beyond seas, they bringing their suits for the 
recovery of such lands, &c., within the space of ten years next after the 
removal of such impediment saving also, the rights and claims of any person 
or persons, having any estate in reversion or remainder, expectant or 
dependent on any lands, &c., after the determination of the estate for 
years, life, &c.; such person or persons pursuing his or their title by due 
course of law, within ten years after his or their right of action shall 
accrue. 
   219.-2, As to personal actions. It provides that all actions upon the 
case, (except actions for slander,) all actions of account, (except such as 
concern trade and merchandise between merchant and merchant, their actors or 
servants,) all actions of detinue, replevin and trover, all actions of debt 
founded upon any contract without specialty, and all actions of debt for 
arrearages of rents, must be commenced within six years next after the 
accruing of the cause of said actions, and not after. That all actions of 
trespass for breaking enclosures, and all other actions of trespass for any 
assault, battery, wounding and imprisonment, must be commenced within four 
years next after the accruing of such cause of action, and not after. And 
that actions upon the case for words spoken, must be commenced within two 
years next after the words spoken, and not after. If the person against whom 
there is any such cause of action, at the time the same accrued, was without 
the limits of the state, and did not leave property or estate therein, that 
could, by common and ordinary process of law be attached, in that case, the 
person  who is entitled to such action, may commence the same, within the 
respective periods limited in the preceding clause, after such person's 
return into the state. If a person, entitled to any of the before described 
actions, is at the time any such cause of action accrues, within the age of 
twenty-one, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or beyond sea, such 
person may commence the same within the times respectively, limited as 
above, after being of full age, discovert, of sane memory, at large, or 
returned from beyond sea. 
   220.-South Carolina. 1. As to lands. By the act of 1712, s. 2, it is 
enacted, that if any person or persons to whom any right or title to lands, 
tenements or hereditaments within this province, shall hereafter descend or 
come, do not prosecute the same within five years after such right or title 
accrued, that then he or they, and all claiming under him or them, shall be 
forever barred to recover the same. 
   221. By section 5, that not only the persons who have not made claim 
within the time limited shall be barred, but also all persons that shall 
come under such as have lost their claim. 
   222. And by section 2, that any person or persons beyond the seas, or out 
of the limits of this province, feme covert, or imprisoned, shall be allowed 
the space of seven years to prosecute their right or title, or claim to any 
lands, tenements, or hereditaments in this province, after such right and 
title accrued to them or any of them, and at no time after the said seven 
years; and also, any person or persons that are under the age of twenty-one 
years, shall be allowed to prosecute their claims at any time within two 
years after they come of age, and if beyond the seas, three years." But a 
subsequent act, in 1778; Pub. L. 455, s. 2; as to persons under twenty-one, 
allows five years to prosecute their right to lands, after coming to twenty-
one. 
   223.-2. As to personal actions. By the act of 1712, s. 6, actions of 
account, and upon the case, (other than case for slander, and upon such 
accounts as concern the trade of merchandise between merchant and merchant, 
their factors or servants;) of debt grounded upon any lending or contract 
without specialty, or for arrearages of rent reserved by indenture; of 
covenant; of trespass, and trespass quare clausum fregit; of detinue, and of 
replevin for taking away of goods and chattels; must be commenced within 
four years next after the cause of such action or suits, and not after. 
Actions of trespass, of assault and battery, wounding, imprisonment, or any 
of them, within one year next after the cause of action; and actions on the 
case for words, within six months next after the words spoken, and not 
after. 
   224. There are various minute provisions in the savings, in favor of 
persons under age, insane, beyond seas, imprisoned, and of femes covert. 
   225. When the defendant is beyond seas at the time any personal action 
accrues, the plaintiff may sue, after his return, within such times as is 
limited for bringing such action. Act of 1712, s. 6. 
   226. Tennessee. 1. As to lands. The act of Nov. 16, 1819, c. 28, 2 Scott, 
482, enacts in substance: Sec. 1. That any persons, their heirs or assigns, 
who shall, at the passing of the act, or at any time after, have had seven 
years possession of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, which have been 
granted by this state, or the state of North Carolina, holding or claiming 
the same under a deed or deeds of conveyance, devise, grant, or other 
assurance, purporting to convey an estate in fee simple, and no claim by 
suit in law or equity effectually prosecuted shall have been set up, or made 
to said land, &c., within the aforesaid time, in that case, the persons, or 
their heirs or assigns, so holding possession, shall be entitled to keep and 
hold in possession, such quantity of land as shall be specified and 
described in his or their deed, of conveyance, devise, grant, or other 
assurance, as aforesaid, in preference to and against all and all manner of 
persons whatsoever; and any persons or their heirs, who shall neglect or 
have neglected, for the said term of seven years, to avail themselves of any 
title legal or equitable which they may have had to any lands, &c., by suit 
in law or equity, effectually prosecuted against the persons in possession, 
shall be for ever barred; and the persons so holding, their heirs. or 
assigns, for the term aforesaid, shall have an indefeasible title in fee 
simple to such lands. See 3 Am. Jur. 255. 
   227.-2. That no persons, or their heirs, shall maintain any action in 
law or equity for any lands, &c., but within seven years next after his, 
her, or their right to commence, have, or maintain such suit, shall have 
come, fallen, or accrued; and that all suits in law or equity shall be 
commenced and sued within seven years next after the title or cause of 
action accrued or fallen, and at no time after the said seven years shall 
have passed. 
   228. Persons who, when title first accrued, were within twenty-one years 
of age, femes covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or beyond the limits of 
the United States, or the territories thereof, may bring their action at any 
time, so as such suit is commenced within three years next after his, her, 
or their respective disabilities or death, and not after; and it is further 
provided, that in the construction of the savings, no cumulative disability 
shall prevent the bar. 
   229.-3. That if, in any of the said actions or suits, judgment is given 
for the plaintiff and is reversed for error, or verdict pass for the 
plaintiff, and upon matter alleged in arrest of judgment, the judgment be 
given against the plaintiff, that he take nothing, &c.; or, if the action be 
commenced by original writ, and the defendant cannot be legally attached, or 
served with process, in such case the plaintiff, his heirs, executors, or 
administrators, as the case is, may commence a new action, from time to 
time, within a year after such judgment reversed or given against the 
plaintiff, or until the defendant can be attached, or served with process, 
so as to compel him, her, or them to appear and answer. 
   230.-4. Provided, that this act shall have no bearing on the lands 
reserved for the use of schools. 
   231.-2. As to personal actions. Actions of account render; upon the 
case; debt for arrearages of rent; detinue; replevin; and trespass quare 
clausum fregit; must be brought within three years next after the cause of 
such action, and not after: except such accounts as concern the trade of 
merchandise, between merchant and merchant, and their factors or servants. 
Actions of trespass, assault and battery, wounding, and imprisonment, or any 
of them, within one year after the cause of such action, and not after: and 
actions of the case for words, within six months after the words spoken, and 
not after. Act of 1715, c. 27, s. 5. Persons who, at the time the cause of 
action accrued, are within the age of twenty-one years, femes covert, non 
compos mentis, imprisoned, or beyond seas, may bring their actions within 
the time above limited, after the removal of the disability.. Id. s. 9. 
   232. The act of 1756, c. 4, 1 Scott, 89, contains the following 
enactment: 1. Where the plaintiff founds his demand upon a book account for 
goods, wares, and merchandise, sold and delivered, or work done, and solely 
relies for proof of delivery of the articles upon his oath, such oath shall 
not be admitted to prove the delivery of any articles in the book, of longer 
standing than two years. 
   233.-2. And no such book of accounts, although proved by witnesses, 
shall be received in evidence for goods, &c., sold, or work done, above five 
years before action brought, except of persons being out of the government, 
or where the account shall be settled and signed by the parties. 
   234.-3. Creditors of any deceased person, residing in the state, shall, 
within two years, and out of the state, within three years, from the 
qualification of the executors or administrators, make demand of their 
respective accounts, debts, and demands, of every kind whatsoever, to such 
executors, and administrators, and on failure to make the demand, and bring 
suit within those times, shall be for ever barred; saving to infants, non 
compotes, and femes covert, one year to sue, after the disability removed. 
But if any creditor, after making demand of his debt, &c., of the executor 
or administrator, shall delay his suit at their special request, then the 
demand shall not be barred during the time of indulgence. 
   235. Vermont. 1. Criminal cases. Sect. 1. All actions, suits, bills, 
complaints, informations, or indictments, for any crime or misdemeanor, 
other than theft, robbery, burglary, forgery, arson, and murder, shall be 
brought, had, commenced, or prosecuted within three years next after the 
offence was committed, and not after. 
   236.-Sect. 2. All complaints and prosecutions for theft, robbery, 
burglary and forgery, shall be commenced and prosecuted within six years 
next after the commission of the offence, and not after. 
   237.-Sect. 3. If any action, suit, bill, complaint, information, or 
indictment, for any crime or misdemeanor, other than arson and murder, shall 
be brought, had, commenced, or prosecuted, after the time limited by the two 
preceding sections, such proceedings shall be void, and of no effect. 
   238.-Sect. 4. All actions and suits, upon any statute, for any penalty 
or forfeiture, given in whole or in part to any person who will prosecute 
for the same, shall be commenced within one year after the offence was 
committed, and not after. 
   239.-Sect. 5. If the penalty is given in whole or in part to the state, 
or to any county or town, or to the treasury thereof, a suit therefor may be 
commenced by or in behalf of the state, county, town or treasury, at any 
time within two years after the offence was committed, and not afterwards, 
   240.-Sect. 6. All actions upon any statute, for any penalty or 
forfeiture, given in whole or in part to the party aggrieved, shall be 
commenced within four years after the offence was committed, and not after. 
   241.-Sect. 7. The six preceding sections shall not apply to any bill, 
complaint, information, indictment or action, which is or shall be limited 
by any statute, to be brought, had, commenced or prosecuted within a shorter 
or longer time than is prescribed in these six sections; but such bill, 
complaint, information, indictment or other suit, shall be brought and 
prosecuted within the time that may be limited by such statute. 
   242.-Sect. 8. When any bill, complaint, information or indictment shall 
be exhibited in any of the cases mentioned in this chapter, the clerk of the 
court, or magistrate, to whom it shall be exhibited, shall, at the time of 
exhibiting, make a minute thereon, in writing, under his official signature, 
of the true day, month and year, when the same was exhibited. 
   243.-Sect. 9. When any action shall be commenced, in any of the cases 
mentioned in this chapter, the clerk or magistrate, signing the writ, shall 
enter upon it a true minute of the day, month and year, when the same was 
signed. 
   244.-Sect. 10. Every bill, complaint, information, indictment or writ, 
on which a minute of the day, month and year, shall not be made, as provided 
by the two preceding sections, shall, on motion, be dismissed. 
   245.-Sect. 11. None of the provisions of this chapter shall apply to 
suits against moneyed corporations, or against the directors or stockholders 
thereon to recover any penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to enforce any 
liability created by the act of incorporation or any other law; but all such 
suits shall be brought within six years after the discovery, by the 
aggrieved party, of the facts upon which such penalty or forfeiture 
attached, or by which such liability was created. 
   246.-2. Real and personal actions and rights of entry. Sec. 1. No 
action for the recovery of any lands, or for the recovery of the possession 
thereof, shall be maintained, unless such action is commenced within fifteen 
years next after the cause of action first accrued to the plaintiff, or 
those under whom he claims. 
   247.-Sect. 2. No person having right or title of entry into houses or 
lands, shall thereinto enter, but within fifteen years next after such right 
of entry shall accrue. 
   248.-Sect. 3. The right of any person to the possession of any real 
estate shall not be impaired or affected, by a descent being hereafter cast 
in consequence of the death of any person in possession of such estate. 
   249.-Sect. 4. The first two sections of this chapter, so far as they 
relate to or affect lands granted, given, sequestered or appropriated to any 
public, pious or charitable use, shall take effect from and after the first 
day of January, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and forty-two, and, 
until that day, the laws now in force relating to such lands, shall continue 
in operation. 
   250.-Sect. 5. The following actions shall be commenced within six years 
next after the cause of action accrued, and not after: 
     First. All actions of debt founded upon any contract, obligation or 
liability, not under seal, excepting such as are brought upon the judgment 
or decree of some court of record of the United States, or of this or some 
other state: 
     Second. All actions upon judgments rendered in any court not being a 
court of record: 
     Third. All actions of debt for arrearages of rent: 
     Fourth. All actions of account, assumpsit or on the case, founded on 
any contract or liability, express or implied: 
     Fifth. All actions of trespass upon land: 
     Sixth. All actions of replevin, and all other actions for taking, 
detaining or injuring goods or chattels: 
     Seventh. All other actions on the case, except actions for slanderous 
words, and for libels. 
   251. Sect. 6. All actions for assault and battery, and for false 
imprisonment, shall be commenced within three years next after the cause of 
action shall accrue, and not afterwards. 
   252.-Sect. 7. All actions for slanderous words, and for libels, shall 
be commenced within two years next after the cause of action shall accrue, 
and not after. 
   253.-Sect. 8. All actions against sheriffs, for the misconduct or 
negligence of their deputies, shall be commenced within four years next 
after the cause of action shall accrue, and not afterwards. 
   254.-Sect. 9. None of the foregoing provisions shall apply to any 
action brought upon a promissory note, which is signed in the presence of an 
attesting witness but the action, in such case, shall be commenced within 
fourteen years next after the cause of action shall accrue thereon, and not 
afterwards. 
   255.-Sect. 10. All actions of debt or scire facias on judgment shall be 
brought within eight years, next after the rendition of such judgment, and 
all actions of debt on specialties within eight years after the cause of 
action accrued, and not afterwards. 
   256.-Sect. 11. All actions of covenant, other than the covenants of 
warranty, and seisin, contained in deeds of conveyance of lands, shall be 
brought within eight years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and 
not after. 
   257.-Sect. 12. All actions of covenant, brought on any covenant of 
warranty contained in any deed of conveyance of land, shall be brought 
within eight years next after there shall have been a final decision against 
the title of the covenantor in such deed; and all actions of covenant 
brought on any covenant of seisin, contained in any such deed, shall be 
brought within fifteen years next after the cause of action shall accrue, 
and not after. 
   258.-Sect. 13. When any person shall be disabled to prosecute an action 
in the courts of this state, by reason of his being an alien, subject or 
citizen of any country at war with the United States, the time of the 
continuance of such war shall not be deemed any part of the respective 
periods herein limited for the commencement of any of the actions before 
mentioned. 
   259.-Sect. 14. If, at the time when any cause of action of a personal 
nature, mentioned in this chapter, shall accrue against any person, he shall 
be out of the state, the action may be commenced, within the time herein 
limited therefor, after such person shall come into the state; and if, after 
any cause of action shall have accrued, and before the statute has run, the 
person against whom it has accrued, shall be absent from and reside out of 
the state, and shall not have, known property within this state, which 
could, by the common and ordinary process of law, be attached, the time of 
his absence shall not be taken as any part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action. 
   260.-Sect. 15. If any person, entitled to bring any of the actions, 
before mentioned in this chapter, or liable to any such action, shall die 
before the expiration of the time herein limited therefor, or within thirty 
days after the expiration of the said time, and if the cause of action does 
by law survive, the action may be commenced, by the executor or 
administrator, within two years after such death, or against the 
administrator or executor of the deceased person, or the same may be 
presented to the commissioners on said estate, as the case may be, at any 
time within two years after the grant of letters testamentary or of 
administration, and not afterwards, if barred by the provisions of this 
chapter; provided, however, if the commissioners on such estate are required 
to make their report to the probate court before, the, expiration of said 
two years, the claim against the deceased shall be presented to the 
commissioners within the time allowed other creditors to present their 
claims. 
   261.-Sect. 16. If, in any action, duly commenced within the time in 
this chapter limited and allowed therefor, the writ shall fail of a 
sufficient service, or return, by any unavoidable accident, or by any 
default or neglect of the officer to whom it is committed, or if the writ 
shall be abated, or the action otherwise defeated or avoided, by the death 
of any party thereto, or for any matter of form, or if after a verdict for 
the plaintiff, the judgment shall be arrested, or if a judgment for the 
plaintiff shall be reversed on a writ of, error, or on exceptions, the 
plaintiff may commence a new action for the same cause, at any time within 
one year after the abatement or other determination of the original suit, or 
after the reversal of the judgment therein; and if the cause of action does 
by law survive, his executor or administrator may, in case of his death, 
commence such new action within the said one year; or, if no executor or 
administrator be appointed within that time, then within one year after 
letters testamentary or of administration shall have been granted to him. 
   262.-Sec. 17. Whenever the commencement of any suit shall be stayed by 
an injunction of any court of equity, the time, during which such injunction 
shall be in force, shall not be deemed any portion of the time in this 
chapter limited, for the commencement of suit. 
   263.-Sect. 18. If any person entitled to bring any action in this 
chapter specified, shall, at the time when the cause of action accrues, be a 
minor or a married woman, insane or imprisoned, such person. may bring the 
said action, within the times in this chapter respectively limited, after 
the disability shall be removed. 
   264.-Sect. 19. None of the provisions of this chapter shall apply to 
suits brought to enforce payment on bills, notes or other evidences of debt, 
issued by moneyed corporations. 
   265.-Sect. 20. All, the provisions of this chapter shall apply to the 
case of a debt or contract, alleged by way of set-off; and the time of 
limitation of such debt shall be computed in like manner as if an action had 
been commenced therefor, at the time when the plaintiff's action was 
commenced. 
   266.-Sect. 21. The limitations herein before prescribed for the 
commencement of actions, shall apply to the same actions, when brought in 
the name of the state, or in the name of any officer, or otherwise, for the 
benefit of the state, in the same manner as to actions brought by citizens. 
   267.-Sect. 22. In actions of debt or upon the case founded on any 
contract, no acknowledgment or promise shall be evidence of a new or 
continuing contract, whereby to take any case out of the provisions of this 
chapter, or to deprive any party of the benefit thereof, unless such 
acknowledgment or promise be made or contained by or in some writing, signed 
by the party chargeable thereby. 
   268.-Sect. 23. If there are two or more joint contractors, or joint 
executors or administrators of any contractor, no such joint contractor, 
executor or administrator shall lose the benefit of the provisions of this 
chapter, so as to be chargeable by reason only of any acknowledgment or 
promise, made or signed by any other or others of them. 
   269.-Sect. 24. In actions commenced against two or more joint 
contractors, or joint executors or administrators of any contractor, if it 
shall appear on the trial, or otherwise, that the plaintiff is barred by the 
provisions of this chapter, as to one or more of the defendants, but is 
entitled to recover against any other or others of them, by virtue of a new 
acknowledgment or promise, or otherwise, judgment shall be given for the 
plaintiff as to any of the defendants against whom he is entitled to 
recover, and for the other defendant. or defendants against the plaintiff. 
   270.-Sect. 25. If, in any action on contract, the defendant shall 
plead in abatement, that any other person ought to have been, jointly sued, 
and issue be joined on that plea, and it shall appear on the trial, that the 
action was, by reason of the provisions of this chapter, barred against the 
person so named in the plea, the said issue shall be found for, the 
plaintiff. 
   271.-Sect. 26. Nothing, contained in the four preceding sections, shall 
alter, take away or lessen the effect of a payment of any principal or 
interest, made by any person. 
   272.-Sect. 27. If there are two or more joint contractors or joint 
executors or administrators of any contractor, no one of them shall lose the 
benefits of the provisions of this chapter, so as to be chargeable by reason 
only of any payment, made by any other or others of them. 
   273.-Sect. 28. None of the provisions of this chapter, respecting the 
acknowledgment of a debt, or a new promise to pay it, shall apply to any 
such acknowledgment or promise, made before the first day of January, in the 
year of our Lord eighteen hundred and forty-two, but every such last 
mentioned acknowledgment or promise, although not made in writing, shall 
have the same effect as if no provisions, relating thereto, had been herein 
contained. 
   274.-Sect. 29. The provisions of this chapter which alter or vary the 
law now in force relative to the limitation of actions shall not apply to 
any case where the cause of action accrues before this chapter shall take 
effect, and go into operation; and in all cases, where the cause of action 
accrues before this chapter takes effect, the laws now in force limiting the 
time for the commencement of suits thereon, shall continue in operation. 
   275. Virginia. 1. As to lands. All writs of formedon in descender, 
remainder, or reverter, of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, shall be 
sued out within twenty years next after the title or cause of action 
accrued, and not afterwards: and no person having any right or title of 
entry into any lands, &c. shall make any entry but within twenty years next 
after such right or title accrued. Persons entitled to such writ or right or 
title of entry, who are under twenty-one years of age, femes covert, non 
compos mentis, imprisoned, or not within the commonwealth, at the time such 
right or title accrues, may themselves or their heirs, notwithstanding the 
said twenty years have expired, bring and maintain his action, or make his 
entry, within ten years next after such disabilities removed, or the death 
of the person so disabled. 
   276. In all writs of right, and other actions possessory, any person may 
maintain a writ of right upon the possession or seisin of his ancestor or 
predecessor within fifty years, or any other possessory action upon the 
possession or seisin of his ancestor or predecessor, within forty years; but 
no person shall maintain a real action upon his own possession or seisin, 
but within thirty years next before the teste of the writ. 
   277.-2. As to personal actions. The provisions in relation to personal 
actions are as follows: 1. Upon all actions upon the case, (other than for 
slander,) actions of account or assumpsit, (other than such accounts as 
concern the trade of merchandise between merchant and merchant, their 
factors or servants,) debt grounded upon any lending or contract without 
specialty, debt for arrears of rent, trespass, detinue, trover, or replevin 
for goods and chattels, and trespass quare clausum fregit, five years: 2. 
Upon actions of assault, battery, wounding, or imprisonment, three years: 3. 
Upon actions of slander, one year. Infants, femes covert, persons non compos 
mentis, imprisoned, beyond seas, or out of the country, are allowed full 
time to bring all such actions, except that of slander, after the disability 
has been removed. 
   278. All actions or suits, founded upon any account for goods, sold and 
delivered, or for articles charged in any store account, must be commenced 
within one year next after the cause of action, or the delivery of the 
goods, and not after; except that, in the case of the death of the creditors 
or debtors, before the expiration of the said term of one year, the farther 
time of one year, from the death of such creditor or debtor, shall be 
allowed. In suits in the name of any person residing beyond the seas, or out 
of this country, for recovery of any debt due for goods actually sold and 
delivered here by his factor or factors, the saving in favor of persons 
beyond the seas at the time their causes of action accrued, is not to be 
allowed; but, if any factor shall happen to die before the expiration of the 
time in which suit should have been brought, his principal shall be allowed 
two years from his death, to bring suit for any debt due on account of any 
contract or dealing with such factor. 1 Rev. Code, 489-491. 

LINE, descents. The series of persons who have descended from a common 
ancestor, placed one under the other, in the order of their birth. It 
connects successively all the relations by blood to each other. Vide 
Consanguinity; Degree. 
 
³ A  ³
³ s  ³                     ÚÄ    6. Tritavus, Tritavia.
³ c  ³                     ÃÄ    5. Atavus, Atavia.
³ e  ³                     ÃÄ    4. Abavus, Abavia.
³ n  ³ Great grand-   ³    ³
³ d Ä´ father, great  ÃÄ   ÃÄ    3. Proavus, Proavia.
³ i  ³ grandmother,   ³    ³
³ n  ³                     ³
³ g  ³ Grand father,  ³    ³
³    ³ grandmother    ÃÄ   ÃÄ    2. Avus, Avia.
³ l  ³                     ³
³ i  ³ Father, mother      ÃÄ    1. Pater, Mater.
³ n  ³                     ³
³ e  ³                     ³
       EGO.                ÃÄ     EGO.
³ D  ³                     ³
³ e  ³                     ³
³ s  ³ Son.                ÃÄ    1. Filius.
³ c  ³ Grandson            ÃÄ    2. Nepos, Nepti.
³ e  ³ Great Grandson.     ÃÄ    3. Pronepos, Proneptis.
³ n  ³                     ÃÄ    4. Abnepos, Abneptis.
³ d  ³                     ÃÄ    5. Adnepos, Adneptis.
³ i  ³                     ÃÄ    6. Trinepos, Trineptis.
³ n  ³
³ g  ³
³    ³
³ L  ³
³ i  ³
³ n  ³
³ e  ³

     2. The line is either direct or collateral. The direct line is composed 
of all the persons who are descended from each other. If, in the direct 
line, any one person is assumed the propositus, in order to count from him 
upwards and downwards, the line will be divided into two parts, the 
ascending and descending lines. The ascending line is that, which counting 
from the propositus, ascends to his ancestors, to his father, grandfather, 
great-grandfather, &c. The descending line, is that which, counting from the 
same person, descends to his children, grandchildren, great-grand-children, 
&c. The preceding table is an example. 
     3. The collateral line considered by itself, and in relation to the 
common ancestor, is a direct line; it becomes collateral when placed along 
side of another line below the common ancestor, in whom both lines unite for 
example: 

                      Common ancestor.
                                    O
                     ÚÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÁÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ¿
                     ³                               ³
                     o                               o
                     ³                               ³
                     o                               o
              Direct ³                               ³ Collateral
               line. o                               o line.
                     ³                               ³
                     o                               o
                     ³                               ³
                     o                               o
                     ³                               ³
                     O                               o
                    Ego.

     4. These two lines are independent of each other; they have no 
connexion, except by their union in the person of the common ancestor. This 
reunion is what forms the relation among the persons composing the two 
lines. 
     5. A line is also paternal or maternal. In the examination of a 
person's ascending line, the line ascends first to his father, next to his 
paternal grandfather, his paternal great-grandfather, &c. so on from father 
to father; this is called the paternal line. Another line will be found to 
ascend from the same person to his mother, his maternal grandmother, and so 
from mother to mother; this is the maternal line. These lines, however, do 
not take in all the ascendants, there are many others who must be imagined. 
The number of ascendants is double at each degree, as is shown by the 
following table: 

                                       ÚÄÄÄÄÄ o
                                       ³
                            ÚÄÄÄÄÄoÄÄÄÄ´
                            ³          ³
                            ³          ÀÄÄÄÄÄ o
                            ³
                     ÚÄÄÄÄÄÄ´
                     ³      ³
                  F  ³      ³          ÚÄÄÄÄÄ o
                  a  ³      ³          ³
                  t  ³      ÀÄÄÄÄÄoÄÄÄÄ´
                  h  ³                 ³
                  e  ³                 ÀÄÄÄÄÄ o
                  r  ³
               ÚÄÄOÄÄ´
               ³     ³
            P  ³   O ³                 ÚÄÄÄÄÄ o
            a  ³   t ³                 ³
            t  ³   h ³      ÚÄÄÄÄÄoÄÄÄÄ´
            e  ³   e ³      ³          ³
            r  ³   r ³      ³          ÀÄÄÄÄÄ o
            n  ³     ³      ³
            a  ³   L ÀÄÄÄÄÄÄ´
            l  ³   i        ³
               ³   n        ³          ÚÄÄÄÄÄ o
            L  ³   e        ³          ³
            i  ³            ÀÄÄÄÄÄoÄÄÄÄ´
            n  ³                       ³
            e  ³                       ÀÄÄÄÄÄ o
               ³
  Ego.   OÄÄÄÄÄ´
               ³
            M  ³                       ÚÄÄÄÄÄ o
            a  ³                       ³
            t  ³            ÚÄÄÄÄÄoÄÄÄÄ´
            e  ³            ³          ³
            r  ³   O        ³          ÀÄÄÄÄÄ o
            n  ³   t        ³
            a  ³   h  ÚÄÄÄÄÄ´
            l  ³   e  ³     ³
               ³   r  ³     ³          ÚÄÄÄÄÄ o
            l  ³      ³     ³          ³
            i  ³   l  ³     ÀÄÄÄÄÄoÄÄÄÄ´
            n  ³   i  ³                ³
            e  ³   n  ³                ÀÄÄÄÄÄ o
               ³   e  ³
               ÀÄÄÄoÄÄ´
                      ³
                   M  ³                ÚÄÄÄÄÄ o
                   o  ³                ³
                   t  ³     ÚÄÄÄÄÄoÄÄÄÄ´
                   h  ³     ³          ³
                   e  ³     ³          ÀÄÄÄÄÄ o
                   r  ³     ³
                      ÀÄÄÄÄÄ´
                            ³
                            ³          ÚÄÄÄÄÄ o
                            ³          ³
                            ÀÄÄÄÄÄoÄÄÄÄ´
                                       ³
                                       ÀÄÄÄÄÄ o

     Vide 2 Bl. Com. 200, b. 2, c. 14; Poth. Des Successions, ch. 1, art. 3, 
Sec.  2; and article Ascendants. 

LINE, measures. A line is a lineal measure containing the one twelfth part 
of a on inch. 

LINE, estates. The division between two estates. Limit; border; boundary. 
     2. When a line is mentioned in a deed as ending at a particular 
monument, (q.v.) it is to be extended in the direction called for, without 
regard to distance, until it reach the boundary. 1 Taylor, 110, 303 2 Hawks, 
219; 3 Hawks, 21; 2 Taylor, 1. And a marked line is to be adhered to 
although it depart from the course. 7 Wheat. 7; 2 Overt. 304; 3 Call, 239; 7 
Monr. 333; 2 Bibb, 261; 4 Bibb, 503; 4 Monr. 29; see further, 2 Dana, 2; 6 
Wend. 467; 1 Bibb, 466; 1 Marsh. 382; 3 Marsh. 382; 3 Murph. 82; 13 Pick. 
145; 13 Wend. 300; 5 J. J. Marsh. 587. 
     3. Where a number of persons settle simultaneously or at short 
intervals in the same neighborhood, and their tracts, if extended in certain 
directions, would overlap each other, the settlers sometimes by agreement 
determine upon dividing lines, which are called consentible lines. These 
lines, when fairly agreed upon, have been sanctioned by the courts; and such 
agreements are conclusive upon all persons claiming under the parties to 
them with notice, but not upon bona fide purchasers for a valuable 
consideration without notice, actual or constructive. 5 S. & R. 273; 9 W. & 
S. 66; 3 S & R. 323; 5 Binn. 129; 10 Watts, 324; 17 S. &. R. 57; Jones, L. 
0. T. 
     4. Lines fixed by compact between nations are binding on their citizens 
and subjects. 11 Pet. 209; 1 Overt. 269; 1 Ves. sen., Rep. 450; 1 Atk. R. 2; 
1 Ch. Cas. 85; 1 P. Wms. 723727; 2 Atk. R. 592; 1 Vern. 48; 1 Ves. 19; 2 
Ves. 284; 3 S. & R. 331. 

LINEAGE. Properly speaking lineage is the relationship of persons in a 
direct line; as the grandfather, the father, the son, the grandson, &c. 

LINEAL. That which comes in a line. Lineal consanguinity is that which 
subsists between persons, one of whom is descended in a direct line from the 
other. Lineal descent, is that which takes place among lineal kindred. 

LINEAL WARRANTY, old English law. A warranty by the heir, when he derived 
title to the land warranted, either from or through, the ancestor who made 
the warranty. See Warranty. 

LIQUIDATED. That which is made clear, certain, and manifest; as, liquidated 
damages, ascertained damages liquidated debt, an ascertained debt, as to 
amount. A debt is liquidated when it is certain what is due, and how much is 
due, cum certum est an et quantum debeatur; for although it may appear that 
something is due, if it does not also appear how much is due, the debt is 
not liquidated. An unliquidated claim is one which one of the parties to the 
contract cannot alone render certain. 5 M. R. 11; 1 N. S. 130; 6 N S. 715; 6 
N. S. 10,  13 L. R. 275; 7 L. R. 134, 599. Such a claim cannot be set off. 2 
Dall. 237; S. C. 1 Yeates' R. 571; 10 Serg. & Rawle, 14; see Poth. Ob. n. 
628; Dig. 50, 17, 24; Id. 42, 1, 64; Id. 1, 45, 112; Id. 46, 5, 11; Code, 7, 
47. Dom. Lois Civ. l. 4, t. 2, s. 2, n. 2; Arg. Inst. 1. 4, c. 7; 7 Toull. 
n. 369; 6 Duv. Dr. Civ. Fr. n. 304. 

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. By this term is understood the fixed amount which a 
party to an agreement promises to pay to the other, in case he shall not 
fulfill some primary or principal engagement into which he has entered by the

same agreement it differs from a penalty. (q.v.) Vide Damages liquidated. 
     2. The damages will be considered as liquidated in the following cases: 
1. When the damages are uncertain, and not capable of being ascertained by 
any satisfactory or known rule; whether the uncertainty lies in the nature 
of the subject itself, or in the particular circumstances of the case. 2 T. 
R. 32 1 Ale. & N. 389; 2 Burr. 2225 10 Ves. 429; 7 Cowen, 307; 4 Wend. 468. 
2. When, from the nature of the case, and the tenor of the agreement, it is 
clear, that the damages have been the subject of actual and fair calculation 
and adjustment between the parties. 2 Greenl. Ev. Sec. 259; 2 Story, Eq. 
Sec. 1318; 3 C. & P. 240; 10 Mass. 450, 462; 6 Bro. P. C. 436; 3 Taunt. 473; 
7 John. 72; 4 Mass. 433; 3 Conn. 58; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 655, 765. 

LIQUIDATION. A fixed and determinate valuation of things which before were 
uncertain. 

LIRA. The name of a foreign coin. In all computations at the custom house, 
the lira of Sardinia shall be estimated at eighteen cents and six mills. Act 
of March 22, 1846. The lira of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, and the lira 
of Tuscany, at sixteen cents. Act of March 22, 1846. 

LIS. A suit; an action; a controversy in court; a dispute. 

LIS MOTA. The cause of the suit or action. By this term is understood the 
commencement of the controversy, and the beginning of the suit. 4 Campb. R. 
417; 6 Carr. & P. 552, 561; 2 Russ. & My. 161; Greenl. Ev. Sec. 131, 132. 

LIS PENDENS. The pendancy of a suit; the time between which it is instituted 
and finally decided. 
     2. It has been decided that the mere serving of a subpoena in chancery, 
unless a bill be also filed, is not a sufficient lis pendens, but the bill 
being filed, the lis pendens commences from the service of the subpoena, 
although that may not be returnable till the following term 1 Vern. 318; and 
after a decree, final in its nature, there remains no lis pendens. 1 Vern. 
459. 
     3. It is a general rule, that lis pendens is a general notice of an 
equity to all the world. 3 Atk. 343; 2 P. Wms. 282; Amb. 676; 1 Vern. 286. 
Vide 2 Fonb. Eq. 152, note; 1 Supp. to Ves. jr. 284; 3 Rawle, R. 14; Pow. 
Mortg. index, h.t.; 1 John. Ch. R. 566; 2 John. Ch. R. 158; 4 John. Ch. 
Rep. 83; 2 Rand. Rep. 93; 1 M'Cord, Ch. R. 264; Harp. Eq. R. 224; 1 Bibb, R. 
314; 5 Ham. Rep. 462; 4 Cowen, R. 667; 1 Wend. R. 583; 1 Desaus. R. 167, 
170; 2 Edw. R. 115; 1 Hogan, R. 69; 6 Har. & John. 21; 2 Dana, R. 480; Jac. 
R. 202; 1 Russ. & My. 617 Corn. Dig. Chancery, 4 C 3; 2 Bell's Com. 152, 5th 
ed.; 1 Bail. Eq. R. 479; 7 Dana, R. 110; 7 J. J. Marsh. 529; 1 Clarke, R. 
560, 584; 14 Ohio, 109, 323. 
     4. When a defendant is arrested pending a former suit or action, in 
which he was held to bail, he will not, in general, be held to bail, if the 
second suit be for the same cause of action. Grah. Pr. 98; Tro. & Hal. Pr. 
44; 4 Yeates' R. 206. But under special circumstances, he may be held to 
bail twice, and of these circumstances the court will judge. 2 Miles, Rep. 
99, 100, 142. See 14 John. R. 347. When such a second action is commenced, 
the first ought to be discontinued and the costs paid; but, it seems, it is 
sufficient if they are paid before the replication of nul tiel record to a 
plea of autre action pendant. in the second suit. Grah. Pr. 98; and see 1 
John. Cas. 397; 7 Taunt. 151; 1 Marsh. R. 395; Merl. Rep. Litispendance; 5 
Ohio R. 462; 6 Ohio R. 225; 1 Blackf. R. 53; Id. 315; Autre action pendent; 
Bail; Litigiosity. 

LIST. A table of cases arranged for trial or argument; as, the trial list, 
the argument list. See 3 Bouv. Inst. n. 3031. 

LISTERS. This word is used in some of the states to designate the persons 
appointed to make lists of taxables. See Verm. Rev. Stat. 538. 

LITERAL CONTRACT, civil law. A contract, the whole of the evidence of which 
is reduced to writing. This contract is perfected by the writing, and binds 
the party who subscribed it, although he has received no consideration. Leg. 
Elem. Sec. 887. 

LITERARY PROPERTY. This name has been given to the right which authors have 
in their works. This is secured to them by copyright. (q.v.) Vide 2 Bl. 
Com. 405-6; 4 Vin. Ab. 278; Bac. Ab. Prorogation, F 5; 2 Kent, Com. 306 to 
315; 1 Supp. to Ves. jr. 360, 376; 2 Id. 469; Nicklin on Literary Property; 
Dane's Ab. Index, b. t.; 1 Chit. Pr. 98; 2 Amer. Jur. 248; 10 Amer. Jur. 62; 
1 Law Intel. 66; Curt. on Copyr. 11; 1 Bell's Com. B. 1, part 2, c. 4, s. 
2, p. 115; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 508, et seq. Vide Copyright. 

LITIGANT. One engaged in a suit; one fond of litigation.

LITIGATION. A contest authorized by law, in a court of justice, for the 
purpose of enforcing a right. 
     2. In order to prevent injustice, courts of equity will restrain a 
party from further litigation, by a writ of injunction; for example, after 
two verdicts on trials at bar, in favor of the plaintiff, a perpetual 
injunction was decreed. Str. 404. And not only between two individuals will 
a court of equity grant this relief, as in the above case of several 
ejectments, but also, when one general legal right, as a right of fishery, 
is claimed against several, distinct persons, in which case there would be 
no end of bringing actions, since each action would only bind the particular 
right in question, between the plaintiff and defendant in such action, 
without deciding the general right claimed. 2 Atk. 484; 2 Ves. jr. 587. Vide 
Circuity of Actions. 

LITIGIOSITY, Scottish law. The pendency of a suit; it is an implied 
prohibition of alienation to the disappointment of an action, or of 
diligence, the direct object of which is to obtain possession, or to acquire 
the property of a particular subject. The effect of it is analogous to that 
of inhibition. (q.v.) 2 Bell's Com. 152, 5th ed. Vide Lis Pendens. 

LITIGIOUS. That which is the subject of a suit or action; that which is 
contested in a court of justice. In another sense, litigious signifies a 
disposition to sue; a fondness for litigation. 

LITIGIOUS RIGHTS, French law. Those which are or may be contested either in 
whole or in part, whether an action has been commenced, or when there is 
reason to apprehend one. Poth. Vente, n. 584; 9 Mart. R. 183; Troplong, De 
la Vente, n. 984 a 1003; Civ. Code of Lo. art. 2623; Id. 3522, n. 22. Vide 
Contentious jurisdiction. 

LITIS CONTESTATIO, civil law. "Contestari." It is when each party to a suit 
(uterque reus) says "Teste estote." It was therefore, so called, because 
persons were called on by the parties to the suit "to bear witness," "to be 
witnesses." It is supposed that this contestatio was the usual termination 
of certain acts before the magistratus or in jure, of which the persons 
called to be witnesses were at some future time to bear record before the 
judex, in judicio. The lis contestata, in the system of Justinian, consisted 
in the statements made by. the parties to a suit before the magistrate 
respecting the claim or demand, and the answer or defence to it. When this 
was done, the cause was ready for hearing. Savig. Traite de Droit Romain, 
tom. vi. Sec.  cclviii.; Smith, Dict. Gr. & Rom. Antiq. h.v. The contesting 
of the suit, or pleading the general issue. Vide 2 Bro. Civ. and Adm. Law, 
358. 

LITISPENDENCE. The part of an action being depending and undetermined; the 
time during which an action is pending. See Lis pendens. 

LITRE. A French measure of capacity. It is of the size of a decimetre, or 
one-tenth part of a cubic metre. It is equal to 61.028 cubic inches. Vide 
Measure. 

LIVERY, Engl. law. 1. The delivery of possession of lands to those tenants 
who hold of the king in capite, or knight's service. 2. Livery was also the 
name of a writ which lay for the heir of age, to obtain the possession of 
seisin of his lands at the king's hands. F. N. B. 155. 3. It signifies, in 
the third place, the clothes given by a nobleman or gentleman to his 
servant. 

LIVERY OF SEISIN, estates. A delivery of possession of lands, tenements, and 
hereditaments, unto one entitled to the same. This was a ceremony used in 
the common law for the conveyance of real estate; and the livery was in 
deed, which was performed by the feoffor and the feoffee going upon the 
land, and the latter receiving it from the former; or in law, where the game 
was not made on the land, but in sight of it. 2 Bl. Com. 315, 316. 
     2. In most of the states, livery of seisin is unnecessary, it having 
been dispensed with either by express law or by usage. The recording of the 
deed has the same effect. In Maryland, however, it seems that a deed cannot 
operate as a feoffment, without livery of seisin. 5 Harr. & John. 158. Vide 
4 Kent, Com. 381 2 Hill, Ab. c. 26, s. 4; 1 Misso. R. 553; 1 Pet. R. 508; 1 
Bay's R. 107; 5 Har. & John. 158; Fairf. R. 318; Dane's Abridgment, h.t.; 
and the article Seisin. 

LIVRE TOURNOIS, com. law. A coin used in France before the revolution. It is 
to be computed in the ad valorem duty on goods, &c., at eighteen and a half 
cents. Act of March 2, 1798, s. 61, 1 Story's L. U. S. 626. Vide Foreign 
Coins. 

LOADMANAGE, maritime law, contracts. The pay to loadsmen; that is, persons 
who sail or row before ships, in barks or small vessels, with instruments 
for towing the ship, and directing her course, in order that she may escape 
the dangers in her way. Poth. Des Avaries, n. 147; Guidon de la Mer, ch. 14; 
Bac. Ab. Merchant and Merchandise, F. 

LOAN, contracts. The act by which a person lets another have a thing to be 
used by him gratuitously, and which is to be returned, either in specie or 
in kind, agreeably to the terms of the contract. The thing which is thus 
transferred is also called a loan. 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 1077. 
     2. A loan in general implies that a thing is lent without reward; but, 
in some cases, a loan may be for a reward; as, the loan of money. 7 Pet. R. 
109. 
     3. In order to make a contract usurious, there must be a loan; Cowp. 
112, 770; 1 Ves. jr. 527; 2 Bl. R. 859; 3 Wils. 390 and the borrower must be 
bound to return the money at all events. 2 Scho. & Lef. 470. The purchase of 
a bond or note is not a loan ; 3 Scho. & Lef. 469; 9 Pet. R 103; but if such 
a purchase be merely colorable, it will be considered as a loan. 2 John. 
Cas. 60; Id. 66; 12 S. & R. 46; 15 John. R. 44. 

LOAN FOR CONSUMPTION, or, MUTUUM. (q.v.) A contract by which the owner of 
a personal chattel, called the lender, delivers it to another, known as the 
borrower, by which it is agreed that the borrower shall consume the chattel 
loaned, and return at the time agreed upon, another chattel, of the same 
quality, kind, and number, to the lender, either gratuitously or for a 
consideration; as, if Peter lends to Paul one bushel of wheat, to be used by 
the latter, so that it shall not be returned to Peter, but instead of which 
Paul will return to Peter another bushel of wheat of the same kind and 
quality, at a time agreed upon. 
     2. It is evident that this contract differs essentially from a loan for 
use. In the latter, the property of the thing lent remains with the lender, 
and, if it be destroyed without the fault or negligence of the borrower, it 
is his loss, and the thing to be returned is the identical thing lent; but 
in the loan for consumption, the property passes to the borrower, and in 
case of its destruction, he must bear the loss, and the identical property 
is never to be returned, but other property of the like kind, quality, and 
number. This contract bears a nearer resemblance to a barter or exchange; in 
a loan for consumption the borrower agrees to exchange with the lender a 
bushel of wheat, which he has not, but expects to obtain, for another bushel 
of wheat which the lender now has, and with which he is willing to part; or 
a more familiar example may be given: Debtor borrows from Creditor, one 
hundred dollars to use as he shall deem best, and he promises to return to 
Creditor another hundred dollars at a future time. 
     3. In cases of loan for consumption, the lender may charge for the use 
of the thing loaned or not; as, if I lend one thousand dollars to a friend 
for a month, I may charge interest or not but a loan for use  is always 
gratuitous when anything is charged for the use, it becomes a hiring. See 
Hire; and also Mutuum. 

LOAN FOR USE, or COMMODATUM, contracts. A bailment, or loan of an article 
for a certain time, to be used by the borrower, without paying for it. 2 
Kent's Com. 446, 447. Sir William Jones defines it to be a bailment of a 
thing for a certain time, to be used by the borrower, without paying for it. 
Jones' Bailm. 118. According to the Louisiana Code, art. 2864, it is an 
agreement by which a person delivers a thing to another, to use it according 
to its natural destination, or according to the agreement, under an 
obligation on the part of the borrower, to return it after he shall have 
done using it. This loan is essentially gratuitous. The Code Civil, art. 
1875, defines it in nearly the same words. Lord Holt has defined this 
bailment to be, when goods or chattels, that are useful, are lent to a 
friend gratis, to be used by him: and it is called commodatum, he adds, 
because the thing is to be restored in specie. 2 Ld. Ray. 909, 913. 
     2. The loan for use resembles somewhat a gift, for the lender, as in a 
gift, gives something to the borrower; but it differs from the latter, 
because there the property of the thing given is transferred to the donee; 
instead of which, in the loan for use, the thing given is only the use, and 
the property in the thing lent remains in the lender. This contract has also 
some analogy to the mutuum, or loan for consumption; but they differ in 
this, that in the loan for use the lender retains the property in the thing 
lent, and it must be returned in individuo; in the loan for consumption, on 
the contrary, the things lent are to be consumed, such as money, corn, oats, 
grain, cider, &c., and the property in them is transferred to the borrower, 
who becomes a debtor to the lender for the same quantity of like articles. 
Poth. Pret a. Usage, n. 9, 10. 
     3. Several things are essential to constitute this contract; first, 
there must be a thing which is lent; and this, according to the civil law, 
may be either a thing movable, as a horse, or an immovable, as a house or 
land, or goods, or even a thing incorporeal. But in our law, the contract 
seems confined entirely to goods and chattels, or personal property, and not 
to extend to real estate. It must be a thing lent, in contradistinction to a 
thing deposited or sold, or entrusted to another for the purpose of the 
owner. Story on Bailm. Sec.  223. 
     4. Secondly. It must be lent gratuitously, for if any compensation is 
to be paid in, any manner whatsoever, it falls under Another denomination, 
that of hire. Ayliffe's Pand. B. 4, tit. 16, n. 516; Louis. Code, art. 2865; 
Pothier, Pret a Usage, c. 1, art. 1, n. 1, c. 2, art., 3, n. 11. 
     5. Thirdly. It must be lent for use, and for the use of the borrower. 
It is not material whether the use be exactly that which is peculiarly 
appropriate to the thing lent, as a loan of a bed to lie on, or a loan of a 
horse to ride; it is equally a loan, if the thing is lent to the borrower 
for any other purpose; as, to pledge as a security on his own account. Story 
on Bailm. Sec. 225. But the rights of the borrower are strictly confined to 
the use actually or impliedly agreed to by the lender, and cannot be 
lawfully exceeded. Poth. Pret a Usage, c. 1, Sec. 1, art. l, n. 5. The use 
may be for a limited time, or for an indefinite time. 
     6. Fourthly. The property must be lent to be specifically returned to 
the lender at the determination of the bailment; and, in this respect it 
differs from a mutuum, or loan for consumption, where the thing borrowed, 
such as corn, wine, and money, is to be returned in kind and quantity. See 
Mutuum. It follows, that a loan for use can never be of a thing which is to 
be consumed by use; as, if wine is lent to be drunk at a feast, even if no 
return in kind is intended, unless, perhaps, so far as it is not drunk; for, 
as to, all the rest, it is strictly a gift. 
     7. In general, it may be said that the borrower has the right to use 
the thing during the time and for the purpose which was intended between the 
parties. But this right is strictly confined to the use, expressed or 
implied in the particular transaction; and the borrower, by any excess, will 
make himself responsible. Jones' Bailm. 68; Cro. Jac. 244; 2 Ld. Raym. 
909,916; 1 Const. Rep. So. Car. 121; Louis. Code: art. 2869; Code Civil, 
art. 1881; 2 Bulst. 306. 
     8. The obligations of the borrower are to take proper care of the thing 
borrowed, to use it according to the intention of the lender, to restore it 
in proper time, and to restore it in proper condition. Story on Bailm. Sec. 
236; Louis. Code, art. 2869; Code Civ. 1880. 
     9. By the common law, this bailment may always be terminated at the 
pleasure of the lender. (q.v.) Vin. Abr. Bailment, D; Bac. Abr. Bailment, 
D. 
    10. The property in the thing lent in a loan for use, remains in the 
lender, Story on Bailment, Sec. 283; Code Civil, art. 1877; Louis. Code, 
art. 2866. 
    11. It is proper to remark that the loan for use must be lawful; a loan 
by Peter to Paul of a ladder to enable him to commit a larceny, or of a gun, 
to commit a murder, is not a loan for use, but Peter by this act becomes an 
accomplice of Paul. 17 Duv. n. 503; 6 Duv. n. 32. 

LOCAL. Pertaining to a place; something annexed to the freehold or tied to a 
certain place; as, local courts, or courts whose jurisdiction is limited to 
a particular place; local allegiance, or allegiance due while you are in a 
particular place or country; local taxes, or those which are collected for 
particular districts. 

LOCAL ACTION, practice, pleadings. An action is local when the venue must be 
laid in the county where the cause of action arose. 1 Chit. PI'. 271; 21 
Vin. Ab. 79; 3 Bl. Com. 294; Bac. Ab. Actions, Local, &c.; Dane's Ab. Index, 
h.t.; 15 Mass. 284; 1 Brock. 203; 1 Greenl. 246. Vide Action; Venue. 

LOCALITY, Scotch law. This name is given to a life rent created in marriage 
contracts in favor of the wife, instead of leaving her to her legal life 
rent of terce. 1 Bell's Com. 55. See Jointure. 

LOCATIO. Hire; a letting out.

LOCATIO CONDUCTIO, Civil law. Location conduction is a consensual contract, 
by which a person becomes bound to deliver to another the use of a thing for 
a certain time, or to do work at. a certain price. 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 984. 

LOCATIO MERCIUM VEHENDARUM, contracts. A term used in the civil law to 
signify the carriage of goods for hire. 
     2. In respect to contracts of this sort entered into by private 
persons, not exercising the business of common carriers, there does not seem 
to be any material distinction varying the rights, obligations and duties of 
the parties from those of other bailees for hire. Every such private person 
is bound to ordinary diligence, and a reasonable exercise of skill; and of 
course he is not responsible for any losses not occasioned by ordinary 
negligence unless he has expressly, by the terms of his contract, taken upon 
himself such risk. 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 917, 918; 4 Taunt. 787; 6 Taunt. 577; 2 
Marsh. 293,; Jones' Bailm. 103, 106, 121; 2 Bos. & Pull. 1l7; 1 Bouv. Inst. 
n. 1020. See Common Carrier. 

LOCATIO OPERIS, contracts. A term used in the civil law, to signify the 
hiring of labor and services. It is a contract by which one of the parties 
gives a certain work to be performed by the other, who binds himself to do 
it for the price agreed between them, which he who gives the work to be done 
promises to pay to the other for doing it. Poth. Louage, n. 392. This is 
divided into two branches, first, Locatio operis faciendi; and, secondly, 
Locatio mercium vehendarum. See these words. 

LOCATIO OPERIS FACIENDI, contracts. A term used in the civil law. There are 
two kinds, first, the location operis faciendi, strictly so called, or the 
hire of labor and services; such as the hire of tailors to make clothes, and 
of jewelers to set gems, and of watchmakers to repair watches. Jones' Bailm. 
90, 96, 97. Secondly, Locatio custodiae, or the receiving of goods on 
deposit for a reward, which is properly the hire of care and attention about 
the goods. Story on Bailm. 422, 442; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 994. 
     2. In contracts for work, it is of the essence of the contract, first, 
that there should be work to be done; secondly, for a price or reward; and, 
thirdly, a lawful contract between parties capable and intending to 
contract. Pothier, Louage, n. 395 to 403. 

LOCATIO REI, contracts. A term used in the civil law, which signifies the 
hiring of a thing. It is a contract by which one of the parties obligates 
himself to, give to the other the use and enjoyment, of a certain thing for 
a period of time agreed upon between them, and in consideration of a price 
which the latter binds himself to pay in return. Poth. Contr. de Louage, n. 
l. See Bailment; Hire; Hirer; Letter. 

LOCATION, contracts. A contract by which the temporary use of a subject, or 
the work or service of a person, is given for an ascertained hire. 1 Bell's 
Com. B. 2, pt. 3, c. 2, s. 4, art. 2, Sec. 1, page 255. Vide Bailment; Hire. 

LOCATION, estates. Among surveyors, who are authorized by public authority 
to lay out lands by a particular warrant, the act of selecting the land 
designated in the warrant and surveying it, is called its location. In 
Pennsylvania, it is an application made by any person for land, in the 
office of the secretary of the late land office of Pennsylvania, and entered 
in the books of said office, numbered and sent to the surveyor general's 
office. Act June 25, 1781, Sec. 2, 2 Sm. Laws, 7. 

LOCATOR, civil law. He who leases or lets a thing to hire to another. His 
duties are, 1st. To deliver to the hirer the thing hired, that he may use 
it. 2d. To guaranty to the hirer the free enjoyment of it. 3d. To keep the 
thing hired in good order in such manner that the hirer may enjoy it. 4th. 
To warrant that the thing hired has not such defects as to destroy its use. 
Poth. Du. Contr. de Louage, n. 53. 

LOCK-UP HOUSE. A place used, temporarily as a prison. 

LOCO PARENTIS. In the place of a parent. 
     2. It is frequently important in cases of devises and bequests, to 
ascertain whether the testator did or did not stand towards the devisee or 
legatee, in loco parentis. In general, those who assume the parental 
character may be considered as standing in that relation but this character 
must clearly appear. 
     3. The fact of his so standing may be shown by positive proof, or the 
express declarations of the testator in his will, or by circumstances; as, 
when a grandfather; 2 Atk. 518; a brother; 1 B. & Beat. 298; or an uncle; 2 
A. 492; takes an orphan child under his care, or supports him, he assumes 
the office of a parent. The law places a master in loco parentis in relation 
to his apprentice. See 2 Ashm. R. 178, 207; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2216. 

LOCUM TENENS. He who holds the place of another, a deputy; as A B, locum 
tenens of C D, mayor of the city of Philadelphia. 

LOCUS. The place where a thing is done.

LOCUS CONTRACTUS. The place of the contract. In general, the law of the 
place where the contract is made, governs in everything which relates to the 
mode of construing it. Vide Lex loci contractus. 

LOCUS DELICTI. The place where the tort, offence, or injury has been 
committed. 

LOCUS POENITENTIAE. contracts, crim. law. Literally this signifies a place 
of repentance; in law, it is the opportunity of withdrawing from a projected 
contract, before the parties are finally bound; or of abandoning the 
intention of committing a crime, before it has been completed, 2 Bro. C. R. 
569; Ersk. Laws of Scotl. 290. Vide article Attempt. 

LOCUS IN QUO. The place in which. In pleadings it is the place where 
anything is alleged to have been done. 1 Salk. 94. 

LOCUS REI SITAE. The place where a thing is situated. In proceedings in rem, 
in real actions in the civil law, or: those which have for their object the 
recovery of a thing; and in real actions in the common law, or those for the 
recovery of land, the proper forum is the locus rei sitae. 2 Gall. R. 191. 

LOCUS SIGILLI. The place of the seal. 2. In many of the states, instead of 
sealing deeds, writs, and other papers or documents requiring it, a scroll 
is made in which the letters L. S. are printed or written, which is an 
abbreviation of Locus Sigilli. This in some of the states has all the 
efficacy of a seal, but in others it has no such effect. See Scroll. 

LODGER. One who has a right to inhabit another man's house. He has not the 
same right as a tenant; and is not entitled to the same notice to quit. 
Woodf. L. &_T. 177. See 7 Mann. & Gr. 87; S. C. 49 E. C. L. R. 85, 151, and 
article Inmate. 

LODGINGS. Habitation in another's house, in which the owner dwells; the 
occupier being termed a lodger. 

LOG BOOK. A ship's journal. It contains a minute account of the ship's 
course, with a short history of every occurrence during the voyage. 1 Marsh. 
Ins. 408. When a log books required by law to be kept, it is an official 
register so far as regards the transactions required by law to be entered in 
it, but no further. Ab. Sh. by Story, 468, n. 1; 1 Sumn. R. 373 2 
Summ. 19, 78; 4 Mason, R. 544; 1 Esp. R. 427. 

LOQUELA, practice. An imparlance. Loquela sine die, a respite in law to an 
indefinite time. Formerly by loquela was meant the allegations of fact 
mutually made on either side, now denominated the pleadings. Steph. PI. 29. 

LORD. In England, this is a title of honor. Fortunately in the U. S. no such 
titles are allowed. 

LORD'S DAY. The same as Sunday. (q.v.) Dies Dominicus non est juridicus. 
Co. Litt. 135; Noy's Max. 2. 

LOSS, contracts. The deprivation of something which one had, which was 
either advantageous, agreeable or commodious. 
     2. In cases of partnership, the losses are in general borne by the 
partners equally, unless stipulations or circumstance's manifest a different 
intention. Story, Partn. Sec. 24. But it is not essential that the partners 
should all share the losses. They may agree, that if there shall be no 
profits, but a loss, that the loss shall be borne by one or more of the 
partners exclusively, and that the others shall, inter se, be exempted from 
all liabilities for losses. Colly. Partn. 11; Gow, Partn. 9; 3 M. & Wels. 
357; 5 Barn. & Ald. 954 Story, Partn. Sec. 23. 
     3. When a thing sold is lost by an accident, as by fire, the loss falls 
on the owner, res perit domino, and questions not unfrequently arise, as to 
whether the thing has been delivered and passed to the purchaser, or whether 
it remains still the property of the seller. See, on this subject, Delivery. 

LOSS IN INSURANCE, contracts. A loss is the injury or damage sustained by 
the insured in consequence of the happening of one or more of the accidents 
or misfortunes against which the insurer, in consideration of the premium, 
has undertaken to indemnify the insured. 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 1215. 
     2. These accidents or misfortunes, or perils, as they are usually 
denominated, are all distinctly enumerated in the policy. And no loss, 
however great or unforeseen, can be a loss with the policy, unless it be the 
direct and immediate consequence of one or more of these perils, Marsh. Ins. 
B, 1, c. 12. As to the risks which are within the common policy, see Marsh. 
Ins. c. 7, s. 2. 
     3. Every loss is either total or partial. 
     4. The term total loss is understood in two different senses; natural 
and legal. In its natural sense it signifies the complete and absolute 
destruction of the thing inured. In its legal sense, it means, not merely 
the entire destruction or deprivation of the thing insured, but also such 
damage to it, though it specifically remain, as renders it of little or no 
value to the owner. A loss is also deemed total, if, by the happening of any 
of the perils or misfortunes insured against, the voyage be lost, or be not 
worth pursuing, and the projected adventure be frustrated; or if the value 
of what he saved, be less than the freight. See Dougl. 231; 1 T. R. 608; Id. 
187; Str. 1065; 13 East, R. 323; 2 M. & S 374 1 N. R. 236; 1 Wils. 191; 4 T. 
R. 785 9 East, R. 283; 3 B. & P. 388; Marsh. Ins. B. 1, c. 12; 1 T. R. 187. 
     5. A partial loss, is any loss or damage short of, or not amounting to 
a total loss, for if it be not the latter it must be the former. See 4 Mass. 
374; 6 Mass. 102; Id, 122; Id. 317; 7 Mass. 349; 9 Mass. 20; 12 Mass. 170; 
12 Mass. 288; 6 Mass. 479; 8 Mass. 494; 10 Johns. Rep. 487; 8 Johns. 237; 5 
Binn. 595; 2 Serg. & Rawle, 553. 
     6. Partial losses are sometimes denominated average losses, because 
they are often in the nature of those losses which are the subject of 
average contributions; and they are distinguished into general and 
particular averages. See tit. Average. 
     7. Losses are occasioned in a variety of ways but most usually by the 
following: 1. By perils of the sea. See tit. Perils of the Sea. 2. By 
collision, as where one ship drives against, or runs foul of another. Marsh. 
Ins. B. 1, c. 12, s. 2. 3. By fire. Marsh. B. 1, c. 12, s. 3. 4. By capture. 
See tit. Capture; Marsh. Ins. B. 1. c. 12, s. 4; 2 Caines' C. Err. 158; 7 
Johns. R. 449; 13 Johns. R. 161; 14 Johns. R. 227; 3 Wheat. 183; 4 Cranch, 
43; 6 Mass. 197. 5. By detention of princes. By the terms of the policy, the 
insurer is liable for all loss occasioned by "arrest or detainments of all 
kings, princes, and people, of what nation, condition, or quality soever." 
Under these words, the insurers are liable for all losses occasioned by 
arrests or detention of the ship, or goods insured, by the authority of any 
prince or public body claiming to exercise sovereign power, under what 
pretence soever. Marsh. Ins. B. 1, c. 12, s. 5. See Embargo; People. 6. By 
Barratry. Marsh. Ills. B. 1, c. 12, s. 6. See tit. Barratry; 2 Caines' R. 
67; Id. 222; 3 Caines' Rep. 1; 1 Johns. R. 229; 8 Johns. R. 209, 2d edit.; 5 
Day, 1; 11 Johns. Rep. 40; 13 Johns. Rep. 451; 2 Binn. 574; 2 Dall. 137; 8 
Cranch, 39; 3 Wheat. 168. 7. By average by contribution. See Marsh. Ins. B. 
1, c. 12, s. 7; this Dict. tit. Average. 8., By salvage. See tit. Salvage; 
Marsh. Ins. B. 1, c. 12, s. 8. 9. By the death of animals. If animals, such 
as horses, cattle, or beasts or birds of curiosity, be insured in their 
passage by sea, their death, occasioned by tempests, by the shot of an 
enemy, by jettison in a storm, or by any other extraordinary accident, 
occasioned by the perils enumerated in the policy, is a loss for which the 
underwriters are liable. Not so, if it be occasioned by mere disease or 
natural death. Marsh. Ins. B. 1, c. 12, s. 10. 10. By fraud. Marsh. Ins. B. 
1, c. 12, s. 11. See, generally, Com. Dig. Merchant, E 9, n; Bac. Abr. 
Merchant, 1. 5 

LOST. What was once possessed and cannot now be found. 
     2. When a bond or other deed was lost, formerly the obligee or 
plaintiff was compelled to go into equity to seek relief, because there was 
no remedy a law, the plaintiff being required to make profert in his 
declaration. 1 Chan. c. 7T. But in process of time courts of law dispensed 
with profert in such cases, and thereby obtained concurrent jurisdiction 
with the courts of chancery, so that now the loss of any paper, other than a 
negotiable note, will not prevent the plaintiff from recovering at law as 
well as in equity. 3 Atk. 214; 1 Ves. 341; 5 Ves. 235; 6 Ves. 812, 7 Ves. 
19; 3 V. & B. 54. 
     3. When a negotiable note has been lost, equity will grant relief. In 
such case the claimant must tender an indemnity to the debtor, and file a 
bill in chancery to compel payment. 7 B. & C. 90; Ryan & Mo. 90; 4 Taunt. 
602; 2 Ves. sen. 327; 16 Ves. 430. 

LOST PAPERS. When a paper containing an agreement between parties, a will, 
and the like, has been so mislaid, that after a diligent search it cannot be 
found, it is said to be lost. 
     2. When such a document has been lost, and it is required to prove its 
contents, the party must prove that he has made diligent search, and, in 
good faith, exhausted all sources of information accessible to him. For this 
purpose his own affidavit is sufficient. 1 Atk. 446; 1 Greenl. Ev. Sec. 349. 
On being satisfied of this, the court will allow secondary evidence to be 
given of its contents. See Evidence. 
     3. Even a will proved to be lost, may be admitted to probate, upon 
secondary evidence. 1 Greenl. Ev. Sec. 84, 509, 575; 2 Greenl. Ev. Sec. 668, 
a, 2d ed. But the fact of the loss must be proved by the clearest evidence, 
because it may have been destroyed by the testator animo revocandi. 8 Mete. 
487; 2 Addams, 223; 6 Wend. 173; 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 115; 3 Pick. 67; 5 B. 
Munroe, 58; 2 Curt. 913. 

LOST OR NOT LOST. These words are sometimes inserted in policies of marine 
insurance. They are used when the underwriter undertakes that if the ship or 
goods should be lost at the time of the insurance, still the underwriter is 
liable, provided there is no fraud. Moll. B. 2, c. 7, s. 5; Hildy. on Mar. 
Ins. 10. 

LOT. Anything on which depends the accidental determination of a right by 
which we acquire or lose something; or it is that which fortuitously 
determines what we are to acquire. When it can be certainly known what are 
our rights, we ought never to resort to a decision by lot; but when it is 
impossible to tell what actually belong to us, as if an estate is divided 
into three parts and one part given to each of three persons, the proper way 
to ascertain each one's part is to draw lots. Wolff, Dr. &c., de la Nat. 
Sec. 669. 

LOT OF GROUND. A small piece of land in a town or city usually employed for 
building, a yard, a garden or such other urban use. Lots are in-lots, or 
those within the boundary of the city or town, and out-lots, those which are 
out of such boundary, and which are used by some of the inhabitants of such 
town or city. 

LOTTERY. A scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance. 
     2. In most, if not all of the United States, lotteries not specially 
authorized by the legislatures of the respective states are prohibited, and 
the persons concerned in establishing them are subjected to a heavy penalty. 
This is the case in Alabama, Connecticut Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Tennessee, Vermont and Virginia. In Louisiana, a license is granted 
to sell tickets in a lottery not authorized by the legislature of that 
state, on the payment of $5000, and the license extends only to one lottery. 
In many of the states, the lotteries authorized by other states, are 
absolutely prohibited Encycl. Amer. h.t. 

LOUISIANA. The name of one of the new states of the United States of 
America. This state was admitted into the Union by the act of congress, 
entitled "An act for the admission of the state of Louisiana into the Union, 
and to extend the laws of the United States to the said state," approved 
April 8, 1812, 2 Story's L. U. S. 1224; the preamble of which recites and 
the first section enacts as follows, namely: 
     2. Whereas the representatives of the people of all that part of the 
territory or country ceded, under the name of "Louisiana," by the treaty 
made at Paris, on the thirtieth day of April, one thousand eight hundred and 
three, between the United States and France, contained within the following 
limits; that is to say: beginning at the mouth of the river Sabine; thence, 
by a line to be drawn along the middle of said river, including all islands 
to the thirty-second degree of latitude; thence, due north, to the 
northernmost part of the thirty-third degree of north latitude, thence, 
along the said parallel of latitude, to the river Mississippi; thence, down 
the said river, to the river Iberville; and from thence, along the middle of 
the said river, and lakes Maurepas and Ponchartrain, to the gulf of Mexico; 
thence, bounded by the said gulf, to the place of beginning; including all 
islands within three leagues of the coast; did, on the twenty-second day of 
January, one thousand eight hundred and twelve, form for themselves a 
constitution and state government, and give to the said state the name of 
the state of Louisiana, in pursuance of an act of congress, entitled "An act 
to enable the people of the territory of Orleans to form a constitution and 
state government, and for the admission of the said state into the Union, on 
an equal footing with the original states, and for other purposes: And the 
said constitution having been transmitted to congress, and by them being 
hereby approved; therefore, 
     3.-1. Be it enacted, &c. That the said state shall be one, and is 
hereby declared to be one of the United States of America and admitted into 
the Union on an equal footing with the original states, in all respects 
whatever, by the name and title of the state of Louisiana: Provided, That it 
shall be taken as a condition upon which the said state is incorporated in 
the Union, that the river Mississippi, and the navigable rivers and waters 
leading into the same, and into the Gulf of Mexico, shall be common 
highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said state as 
to the inhabitants of other states, and the territories of the United 
States, without any tax, duty, impost, or toll, therefor, imposed by the 
said state; and that the above condition, and also all other the conditions 
and terms contained in the third section of the act, the title whereof is 
hereinbefore recited, shall be considered, deemed, and taken, fundamental 
conditions and terms, upon which the said state is incorporated in the 
Union. See 11 M. R. 309. 
     4. By the present constitution of the state of Louisiana, which was 
adopted in 1845; the powers of the government of the state of Louisiana, are 
divided into three distinct departments, each of them confined to a separate 
body of magistracy, to wit: The legislative to one, the executive to 
another, and the judicial to a third. Title I. 
     5.-1st. The legislative power is vested in a general assembly, which 
consists of a senate and house of representatives. 
     6.-1. The senate will be considered with reference to the 
qualification of the electors; the qualification of the members the length 
of time for which they are elected and the time of their election. 1. In all 
elections by the people, every free white male, who has been two years a 
citizen of the United States, who has attained the age of twenty-one years, 
and resided in the state two consecutive years next preceding the election, 
and the last year thereof in the parish in which he offers to vote, shall 
have the right of voting: Provided, That no person shall be deprived of the 
right of voting, who, at the time of the adoption of this constitution, was 
entitled to that right under the constitution of 1812. Absence from the 
state for more than ninety consecutive days, shall interrupt the acquisition 
of the residence required in the preceding section, unless the person 
absenting himself shall be a housekeeper, or shall occupy a tenement for 
carrying on business, and his dwelling house or tenements for carrying on 
business, be actually occupied during his absence, by his family or 
servants, or some portion thereof, or by some one employed by him. No 
soldier, seaman, or marine in the army or navy of the United States, no 
pauper, no person under interdiction, nor under conviction of any crime 
punishable by hard labor, shall be entitled to vote at any election in this 
state. 2. No person shall be a senator, who, at the time of his election, 
has not been a citizen of the United States ten years, and who has not 
attained the age of twenty-seven years and resided in the state four years 
next preceding his election, and the last year thereof, in the district in 
which he may be chosen. The number of senators shall be thirty-two. 3. The 
members of the senate shall be chosen for the term of four years. 4. Their 
election takes place on the first Monday in November, every two years, so 
that one half of their number are elected every two years, and a perpetual 
rotation thereby kept up. 
     7.-2. The house of representatives will be treated of in the same 
manner as that of the senate. 1. The electors are qualified in the same 
manner as those of the senate. 2. No person shall be a representative, who, 
at the time of his election, is not a free white male, and has not been for 
three years a citizen of the United States, and has not attained the age of 
twenty-one years, and resided in the state for three years next preceding 
the election, and the last year thereof in the parish for which he may be 
chosen. The number of representatives shall not be more than one hundred, 
nor less than seventy. 3. They are chosen every two years. 4. Their election 
is on the first Monday in November, every two years. Title II. 
     8.-2d. The supreme executive power of the state shall be vested in a 
chief magistrate, who shall be styled the governor of the state of 
Louisiana. He is elected by the qualified electors at the time and place of 
voting for representatives; the person having the greatest number of votes, 
shall be declared elected. But if two or more persons shall be equal in the 
highest number of votes polled, one of them shall immediately be chosen 
governor by the joint vote of the members of the general assembly. 2. No 
person shall be eligible to the office of governor, who shall not have 
attained the age of thirty-five years, been fifteen years a citizen of the 
United States, and a resident within the state for the same space of time 
next preceding his election. 3. He shall hold his office during the term of 
four years, but shall be ineligible for the succeeding four years after its 
termination. 4. His principal functions are as follows: He shall be 
commander-in-chief of the army and navy of this state, and of the militia 
thereof, except when they shall be called into the service of the United 
States. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. From time 
to time give to the general assembly information respecting the situation of 
the state, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he may deem 
expedient. Shall have power to grant reprieves for all offences against the 
state. With the consent of the senate, have power to grant pardons and remit 
fines and forfeitures, after conviction, except in cases of impeachment. In 
cases of treason, may grant reprieves until the end of the next session of 
the general assembly, in which the pardoning power shall be vested. Shall 
nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, appoint all 
officers established by this constitution, whose mode of appointment is not 
otherwise prescribed by the constitution, nor by the legislature. Have power 
to fill vacancies during the recess of the senate, provided he appoint no 
one whom the senate have rejected for the same office. May, on extraordinary 
occasions convene the general assembly at the seat of government, or at a 
different place, if that should have become dangerous from an enemy or from 
an epidemic; and in case of disagreement between the two houses as to the 
time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he may think 
proper, not exceeding four months. He shall have the veto power. Title III. 
     9.-3d. The judicial power is vested by title IV of the constitution, 
as follows: 
    10.-1. The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, in 
district courts, and injustices of the peace. 
    11.-2. The supreme court, except in cases hereinafter provided, shall 
have appellate jurisdiction only, which jurisdiction shall extend to all 
cases when the matter in dispute shall exceed three hundred dollars, and to 
all cases in which the constitutionality or legality of any tax, toll, or 
impost of any kind or nature soever, shall be in contestation, whatever may 
be the amount thereof; and likewise to all fines, forfeitures, and penalties 
imposed by municipal corporations, and in criminal cases on questions of law 
alone, whenever the punishment of death or hard labor may be inflicted, or 
when a fine exceeding three hundred dollars is actually imposed. 
    12.-3. The supreme court shall be composed of one chief justice, and 
of three associate justices, a majority of whom shall constitute a quorum. 
The chief justice shall receive a salary of six thousand dollars, and each 
of the associate judges a salary of five thousand five hundred dollars 
annually. The court shall appoint its own clerks. The judges shall be 
appointed for the term of eight years. 
    13.-4. When the first appointments are made under this constitution, 
the chief justice shall be appointed for eight years, one of the associate 
judges for six years, one for four years, and one for two years and in the 
event of the death, resignation, or removal of any of said judges before the 
expiration of the period for which he was appointed, his successor shall be 
appointed only for the remainder of his term; so that the term of service of 
no two of said judges shall expire at the same time. 
    14.-5. The supreme court shall hold its sessions in New Orleans, from 
the first Monday of the month of November, to the end of the month of June, 
inclusive. The legislature shall have power to fix the sessions elsewhere 
during the rest of the year; until otherwise provided, the sessions shall be 
held as heretofore. 
    15.-6. The supreme court, and each of the judges thereof, shall have 
power to issue writs of habeas corpus, at the instance of all persons in 
actual custody under process, in all cases in which they may have appellate 
jurisdiction. 
    16.-7. In all cases in which the judges shall be equally divided in 
opinion, the judgment appealed from shall stand affirmed; in which case each 
of the judges shall give his separate opinions in writing. 
    17.-8. All judges, by virtue of their office, shall be conservators of 
the peace throughout the state. The style of all processes shall be, "The 
State of Louisiana." All prosecutions, shall be carried on in the name and 
by the authority of the state of Louisiana, and conclude, against the peace 
and dignity of the same. 
    18.-9. The judges of all the courts within this state shall, as often 
as it may be possible so to do, in every definite judgment, refer to the 
particular law in virtue of which such judgment may be rendered, and in all 
cases adduce the reasons on which their judgment is founded. 
    19.-10. No court or judge shall make any allowance by way of fee or 
compensation in any suit or proceedings, except for the payment of such fees 
to ministerial officers as may be established by law. 
    20.-11. No duties or functions shall ever be attached by law to the 
supreme or district courts, or to the several judges thereof, but such as 
are judicial; and the said judges are prohibited from receiving any fees of 
office or other compensation than their salaries for any civil duties 
performed by them. 
    21.-12. The judges of all courts shall be liable to impeachment; but 
for any reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground for 
impeachment, the governor shall remove any of them on the address of three-
fourths of the members present of each house of the general assembly. In 
every such case the cause or causes for which such removal may be required, 
shall be stated at length in the address, and inserted in the journal of 
each house. 
    22.-13. The first legislature assembled under this constitution shall 
divide the state into judicial districts, which shall remain unchanged for 
six years, and be subject to reorganization every sixth year thereafter. The 
number of districts shall not be less than twelve, nor more than twenty. For 
each district one judge, learned in the law, shall be appointed, except in 
the districts in which the cities of New Orleans and Lafayette are situated, 
in which the legislature may establish as many district courts as the public 
interest may require. 
    23.-14. Each of the said judges shall receive a salary to be fixed by 
law, which shall not be increased or diminished during his term of office, 
and shall never be less than two thousand five hundred dollars annually. He 
must be a citizen of the United States, over the age of thirty years, and 
have resided in the state for six years next preceding his appointment, and 
have practised law therein for the space of five years. 
    24.-15. The judges of the district courts shall hold their offices for 
the term of six years. The judges first appointed shall be divided by lot 
into three classes, as nearly equal as can be, and the term of office of the 
judges of the first class shall expire at the end of two years, of the 
second class at the end of four years, and of the third class at the end of 
six years. 
    25.-16. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction in all 
civil cases when the amount in dispute exceeds fifty dollars, exclusive of 
interest. In all criminal cases, and in all matters connected with 
successions, their jurisdiction shall be unlimited. 
    26.-17. The jurisdiction of justices of the peace shall never exceed, 
in civil cases, the sum of one hundred dollars, exclusive of interest, 
subject to appeal to the district court in such cases as shall be provided 
for by law. They shall be elected by the qualified voters of each parish for 
the term of two years, and shall have such criminal jurisdiction as shall be 
provided for by law. 

LOW WATER MARK. That part of the shore of the sea to which the waters recede 
when the tide is the lowest. Vide High Water Mark; River; Sea Shore; Dane's 
Ab. h.t.; 1 Halst. R. 1. 

LOYAL. Legal; according to law; as, loyal matrimony, a lawful marriage; 
attached to the existing law. 

LOYALTY. That which adheres to the law, that which sustains an existing 
government. See Penal Laws of China, 3. 

LUCID INTERVAL, med. jur. That space of time between two fits of insanity, 
during which a person non compos mentis is completely restored to the 
perfect enjoyment of reason upon every subject upon which the mind was 
previously cognizant. Shelf. on Lun. 70; Male's Elem. of Forensic Medicine, 
227; and see Dr. Haslam on Madness, 46; Reid's Essays on Hypochondriasis, 
317 Willis on Mental Derangement, 151. 
     2. To ascertain whether a partial restoration to sanity is a lucid 
interval, we must consider the nature of the interval and its duration. 1st. 
Of its nature.: "It must not," says D'Aguesseau, "be a superficial 
tranquillity, a shadow of repose, but on the contrary, a profound 
tranquillity, a real repose; it must not be a mere ray of reason, which only 
makes its absence more apparent when it is gone, not a flash of lightning, 
which pierces through the darkness only to render it more gloomy and dismal, 
not a glimmering which unites night to the day; but a perfect light, a 
lively and continued lustre, a full and entire day, interposed between two 
separate nights of the fury which precedes and follows it; and to use 
another image, it is not a deceitful and faithless stillness, which follows 
or forebodes a storm, but a sure and steady tranquillity for a time, a real 
calm, a perfect serenity; without looking for so many metaphors to represent 
an idea, it must not be a mere diminution, a remission of the complaint, but 
a kind of temporary cure, an intermission so clearly marked, as in every 
respect to resemble the restoration of health." 2d, Of its duration. "As it 
is impossible," he continues, "to judge in a moment of the qualities of an 
interval, it is requisite that there should be a sufficient length of time 
for giving a perfect assurance of the temporary reestablishment of reason, 
which it is not possible to define in general, and which depends upon the 
different kinds of fury, but it is certain there must be a time, and a 
considerable time." 2 Evan's Poth. on Oblig. 668, 669. 
     3. It is the duty of the party who contends for a lucid interval to 
prove it; for a person once insane is presumed so, until it is shown that he 
has a lucid interval or has recovered. Swinb. 77; Co. Litt. by Butler, n. 
185; 3 Bro. C. C. 443; 1 Rep. Con. Ct. 225; 1 Pet. R. 163; 1 Litt. R. 102. 
Except perhaps the alleged insanity was very long ago, or for a very short 
continuance. And the wisdom of a testament, when it is proved that the party 
framed it without assistance, is a strong presumption of the sanity of a 
testator. 1 Phill. R. 90;1 Hen. & Munf. 476. 
     4. Medical men have doubted of the existence of a lucid interval, in 
which the mind was completely restored to its sane state. It is only an 
abatement of the symptoms, they say, and not a removal of the cause of the 
disease; a degree of irritability of the brain remains behind which renders 
the patient unable to withstand any unusual emotion, any sudden provocation, 
or any unexpected pressing emergency. Dr. Combe, Observations on Mental 
Derangement, 241; Halsam, Med. Jur. of Insanity, 224; Fodere, De Medecine 
Legale, tom, 1, p. 205, 140; Georget, Des Maladies Mentales, 46; 2 Phillim. 
R. 90; 2 Hagg. Eccl. R. 433; 1 Phillim. Eccl. R. 84. 
     See further, Godolph. 25; 3 Bro. C. C. 443; 11 Ves. 11; Com. Dig. 
Testimoigne, A 1; 1 Phil. Ev. 8; 2 Hale, 278; 10 Harg. State Tr. 478; 
Erskine's Speeches, vol. 5, p. l; 1 Fodere, Med. Leg. Sec.  205. 

LUCRE. Gain, profit. Cl. des Lois Rom. h.t. 

LUCRI CAUSA. This is a Latin expression, which signifies that the thing to 
which it applies is done for the sake of gain. 
     2. It was supposed that when a larceny was committed the taking should 
have been lucri causa; but it has been considered that it is not necessary 
the taking should be lucri causa, if it be fraudulenter, with intent to 
wholly deprive the owner of the property. Russ. & Ry. 292; 2 RUSS.' on Cr. 
92. 1 Car. & K. 532. Vide Inst. lib. 4, t. 1, s. 1. 

LUGGAGE. Such things as are carried by a traveller, generally for his 
personal accommodation; baggage. In England this word is generally used in 
the same sense that baggage is used in the United States. See Baggage. 

LUNACY, med. jur. A disease of the mind, which is differently defined as it 
applies to a class of disorders, or only to one species of them. As a 
general term it includes all the varieties of mental, disorders, not 
fatuous. 
     2. Lunacy is adopted as a general term, on account of its general use 
as such in various legislative acts and legal proceedings, as commissions of 
lunacy, and in this sense it seems to be synonymous with non compos mentis, 
or of unsound mind. 
     3. In a more restricted sense, lunacy is the state of one who has bad 
understanding, but by disease, grief, or other accident, has lost the use of 
reason. 1 Bl. Com. 304. 
     4. The following extract from a late work, Stock on the Law of Non 
Compotes Mentis, will show the difficulties of discovering what is and what 
is not lunacy. "If it be difficult to find an appropriate definition or 
comprehensive name for the various species of lunacy," says this author, 
page 9, "it is quite as difficult to find anything approximating to a 
positive evidence of its presence. There are not in lunacy, as in fatuity, 
external signs not to be mistaken, neither is there that similarity of 
manner and conduct which enables any one, who has observed instances of 
idiocy or imbecility, to detect their presence in all subsequent cases, by 
the feebleness of perception and dullness of sensibility common to them all. 
The varieties of lunacy are as numerous as the varieties of human nature, 
its excesses commensurate with the force of human passion, its phantasies 
coextensive with the range of human intellect. It may exhibit every mood 
from the most serious to the most gay, and take every tone from the most 
sublime to the most ridiculous. It may confine itself to any trifling 
feeling or opinion, or overcast the whole moral and mental conformation. It 
may surround its victim with unreal persons and events, or merely cause him 
to regard real persons and events with an irrational favor or dislike, 
admiration or contempt. It may find satisfaction in the most innocent folly, 
or draw delight from the most atrocious crime. It may lurk so deeply as to 
elude the keenest search, or obtrude so openly as to attract the most 
careless notice. It may be the fancy of an hour, or the distraction of a 
whole life. Such being the fact, it is not surprising that many scientific 
and philosophical men have vainly exhausted their observation and ingenuity 
to find out some special quality, some peculiar mark or characteristic 
common to all cases of lunacy, which might serve at least as a guide in 
deciding on its absence or presence in individual instances. Being hopeless 
of a definition, they would willingly have contented themselves with a test, 
but even this the obscurity and difficulty of the subject seem to forbid. 
     5. Lord Erskine, who, in his practice at the bar, had his attention 
drawn this way, from being engaged in some of the most remarkable trials of 
his time involving questions of lunacy, has given as his test, "a delusive 
image, the inseparable companion of real insanity," (Ersk. Misc. Speeches) 
and Dr. Haslam, whose opportunities of observation have surpassed most other 
persons, has proposed nearly the same, by saying that "false belief is the 
essence of insanity." (Haslam on Insanity.) Sir John Nicholl, in his 
admirable judgment in the case of Dew v. Clark, thus expresses himself: "The 
true criterion is, where there is delusion of mind there is insanity; that 
is, when persons believe things to exist, which exist only, or at least, in 
that degree exist only in their own imagination, and of the non-existence of 
which neither argument nor proof can convince them; they are of unsound mind;

or as one of the counsel accurately expressed it, it is only the belief of 
facts, which no rational person could have believed, that is insane 
delusion." (Report by Haggard, p. 7.) Useful as these several remarks are, 
they are not absolutely true. It is indeed beyond all question that the 
great majority of lunatics indulge in some "delusive image," entertain some 
"false belief." They assume the existence of things or persons which do not 
exist, and so yield to a delusive image, or they come to wrong conclusions 
about persons and things which do exist, and so fall into a false belief. 
But there is a class of cases where lunacy is the result of exclusive 
indulgence in particular trains of thought or feeling, where these tests are 
sometimes wholly wanting, and yet where the entire absorption of the 
faculties in one predominant idea, the devotion of all the bodily and mental 
powers to one useless or injurious purpose, prove that the mind has lost its 
equilibrium. With some passions, indeed, such as self-esteem and fear, what 
was at first an engrossing sentiment, will often go on to a positive 
delusion; the self-adoring egotist grows to fancy himself a sovereign or a 
deity; the timid valetudinarian becomes the prey of imaginary diseases, the 
victim of unreal persecutions. But with many other passions, such as desire, 
avarice or revenge, the neglect and forgetfulness of all things save one, 
the insensibility to all restraints of reason, morality, or prudence, often 
proceed to such an extent as to justify holding an individual as a lunatic, 
incapable of all self-restraint, although, strictly speaking, not possessed 
by any delusive image or false belief. Much less do these tests apply to 
many cases of irresistible propensity to acts wholly irrational, such as to 
murder or to steal without the smallest assignable motive, which, rare as 
they are, certainly occur from time to time, and cannot but be held as an 
example of at least partial and temporary lunacy. It is to cases where no 
false belief or image can be detected, that the remark of Lord Erskine is 
more particularly applicable; "they frequently mock the wisdom of the wisest 
in judicial trials," (Ersk. Misc. Speeches,) and were not the paramount 
object of all legal punishment the benefit of the community, which makes it 
inexpedient to spare offenders against the law, if insanity be the ground of 
their defence, except upon the clearest proof, lest skillful dissemblers 
should thereby be led to hope for impunity, very subtle questions might no 
doubt be raised as to the degree of moral responsibility and mental sanity 
attaching to the perpetrators of many atrocious acts, seeing that they often 
commit them tinder temptations quite inadequate to allure men of common 
prudence, or under passions so violent as to suspend altogether the 
operations of reason or free will. For as it is impossible to obtain an 
accurate definition of lunacy, so it is manifestly so, to draw the line 
correctly between it and its opposite rationality, or, to borrow the words 
of Chief Justice Hale, (1 Hale's P. C. p. 30,) "Doubtless most persons that 
are felons, of themselves and others, are under a degree of partial insanity 
when they commit those offences. It is very difficult to define the 
indivisible line that divides perfect and partial, insanity; but it must 
rest on circumstances duly to be weighed and considered both by the judge 
and jury, lest on one side there be a kind of inhumanity towards the defects 
of human nature, or on the other side too great an indulgence given to great 
crimes." 

LUNAR. That which belongs to the moon; relating to the moon as a lunar 
month. See Month. 

LUNATIC, persons. One who has had an understanding, but who, by disease, 
grief, or other accident, has lost the use of his reason. A lunatic is 
properly one who has had lucid intervals, sometimes enjoying his senses, and 
sometimes not. 4 Co. 123; 1 Bl. Com. 304; Bac. Abr. Idiots, &c., A; 1 Russ. 
on Crimes, 8; Shelf. on Lun. 4; Merlin, mot Demence; Fonb. Eq. Index, h.t.;
15 Vin. Ab. 131; 8 Com. Dig. 721; 1 Supp. to Ves. jr. 94, 130, 369, 404; 
2 Supp. to Ves. jr. 51, 106, 151, 360; 1 Vern. 9, 137, 262; Louis. Code, 
tit. 9, c. 1; and articles Lucid Interval; Lunacy. 

LYING IN GRANT. Incorporeal rights and things which cannot be transferred by 
livery of possession, but which exist only in idea, in contemplation of law, 
are said to lie in grant, and pass by the mere delivery of the deed. Vide 
Grant; Livery of Seisin; Seisin. 

LYING IN WAIT. Being in ambush for the purpose of murdering another. 
     2. Lying in wait is evidence of deliberation and intention. 
     3. Where murder is divided into degrees, as in Pennsylvania, lying in 
wait is such evidence of malice, that it makes the killing, when it takes 
place, murder in the first degree. Vide. Dane's Ab. Index, h.t. 

LYNCH-LAW. A common phrase used to express the vengeance of a mob, 
inflicting an injury, and committing an outrage upon a person suspected of 
some offence. In England this is called Lidford Law. Toml.L. Dict. art. 
